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Abstract 
This thesis will argue that feminism is at the edge of a new wave brought about by the 
fragmentation of the feminist political movement and the rise of postmodern theory. It 
contends that postmodern theories have been used by feminists as a `critical strategy' 
to understand why the movement fragmented and to move towards the acceptance of 
more strategic and conventional politics. Thus many feminists are now prepared to 
leave behind the utopian and separatist legacies of the second wave. These feminists 
are willing to consider how a future feminist movement can be built that will account 
for the differences between women, and realise that there will thus need to be a painful 
and precarious process of alliance-building. It is argued that given the precarious 
nature of the alliance, feminists in a new wave must also re-conceive democratic 
models of citizenship to ensure that women and feminists' concerns are met in the 
wider political sphere. This second concern also makes sure that they have institutional 
and procedural support should fragmentation recur. 
The thesis considers three such models of citizenship: Seyla Benhabib's 
deliberative model, Iris Young's communicative model and Chantal Mouffe's agonal 
one. It contends that these models only partly address the concerns of new wave 
feminism, because they are based on transformative and participatory models of 
politics. These models undermine the importance of feminists finding legitimate 
political relationships that respect the multiplicity of their demands as feminists, as 
women and as citizens. This thesis concludes that representative models of democracy 
are more suited to feminist concerns in a new wave. Such models have distinctive 
characteristics that allow women to be politically included in terms of a range of 
political concerns and identities. Representative models of democracy, moreover, make 
it clear that the political relationship is one of formal authorisation and not one of 
personal identity recognition and transformation. 
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Introduction: A New Wave of Feminism? 
Twenty years ago the second wave feminist movement in the West was in decline. It 
had fragmented into factions, despite attempts to build a sisterhood, and many women 
had left the movement, feeling disillusioned and frustrated. More worrying is that its 
radical elements refused to engage with mainstream politics, choosing instead to fight 
for separatist, women-only utopias that would embody their views of authentic 
feminist living. ' The purpose of this thesis is to draw together the developments that 
have occurred in feminist political theory in the past twenty years. It seeks to 
understand both why the second wave movement fragmented and how feminists have 
responded to its demise. Indeed, it suggests that feminism is on the precipice of a new 
wave of theory and practice in which the political dreams of second wave feminism 
have become more diffuse and less certain: gone are the separatist political visions, the 
search for a universalistic sisterhood and the idea that feminism can only be defined in 
terms of one theory of oppression or patriarchy. In their place, many feminists are 
developing more inclusive political models of democratic citizenship, the idea of the 
movement as an alliance, and an understanding of how different women suffer from 
different forms of oppression. 2 
To understand how feminism has moved towards this new wave, it is crucial to 
examine the role of postmodern theories. It is true that few feminists would view 
themselves as 'postmodern-feminists, ' yet certain postmodern themes have been vital 
in understanding feminist fragmentation and in rethinking its central political 
concepts. What will be defended here is the idea of postmodernism as a critical 
strategy that is particularly useful for evaluating radical movement politics: arising, as 
it did, out of the ashes of the 1960s' liberation movements. Seen as a critical strategy, 
postmodernism looks for the limits of radical activist politics, rather than seeking to 
'Two useful studies of the politics of the second wave movement are B. Ryan's, Feminism and the 
Women's Movement: Dynamics of Change in Social Movement Ideology and Activism, (New York 
and London: Routledge, 1992), and D. Bouchier's, The Feminist Challenge: The Women's 
Movement for Liberation in Britain and the USA, (London: Macmillan, 1983). 
reject the entire emancipatory tradition. Hence, postmodernism, as a critical strategy, 
questions the tradition's emphasis on the possibility of finding a universal, 
revolutionary subject, an overarching theory of oppression, and a utopian political 
settlement free from relations of inequality and power. Instead, it stresses the anti- 
essential basis of subjectivity, the contingency of all political thought, and the 
impossibility of utopia. 
When this strategy is applied to the feminist movement, it exposes three 
problems in the way that the second wave movement operated. Firstly, it challenges the 
idea that an `authentic feminist' subject can be theorised, arguing that such a project 
always essentialises women. Secondly, it considers the contingent nature of feminist 
political thought on existing political practices and questions the second wave feminist 
rejection of these as inherently anti-feminist and anti-women. Thirdly, it questions the 
viability of feminist separatism, believing that feminists, by searching out these types 
of political settlements, deny politics and power relations. While some feminists may 
fear these changes3, arguing that a feminism without these elements cannot have a 
political project, it will be contended that such ideas actually provide the conditions for 
a rejuvenation of feminist politics as a more realistic and attractive enterprise than it 
was perceived to be at the end of the second wave. 
In this rejuvenated politics women will be able to find political inclusion and 
make political demands in terms of a range of identities and in a number of political 
spaces. They can be feminists, citizens, mothers and businesswomen, without risking 
their feminist identity or being accused of `false consciousness'. Thus, 
postmodernism sets up a twofold strategy for feminists. First, feminists must be 
realistic about the structure of any future feminist politics. They must not hope for a 
united, solidaristic sisterhood, but must instead look at how different feminist groups, 
2 Valerie Bryson's latest book, Feminist Debates: Issues of Theory and Political Practice, (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1999), gives an illuminating portrayal of the recent trends in feminist political 
thought. 
' Two critiques of the postmodern project are to be found in N. Hartsock, 'Postmodernism and 
Political Change: Issues for Feminist theory, ' Cultural Critique, No. 14, (Winter 1989-1990), and S. 
Lovibond, 'Feminism and Postmodernism, ' New Left Review, No. 178, (November/December 
1989). 
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with different interpretations of feminist political demands, might come together for 
political action. The purpose of such an alliance structure is to allow for this common 
action without essentialising women. However, given its loose bonds, the alliance is 
expected to be precarious, often dissolving into its constituent parts and needing 
constant negotiation to rebuild it. The second strand of new wave feminist strategy, 
therefore, is to acknowledge both the precariousness of feminist movement politics 
and the anti-essential identity of women. The latter means that women will always be 
more than feminists, and will often want political inclusion in terms of other aspects of 
their identities, other political interests, other political claims. Hence, feminists in a new 
wave must work to find models of democratic citizenship that can allow women 
multiple levels of representation and participation. In short, they are looking for 
models that can respond to the plurality of women's demands as both feminists and 
citizens. 
To this end, the second part of the thesis will consider three feminist models of 
democratic citizenship, examining how successfully they incorporate women as 
feminists and as citizens: Benhabib's model of deliberative democracy, Iris Young's 
model of communicative democracy and Chantal Mouffe's rather embryonic model of 
agonal democracy. 4 These thinkers are all dealing with the question of how to make 
democratic models accessible to feminism, which has itself been transformed by the 
experiences of fragmentation and the influence of postmodern theories. They consider 
the demands of the citizenship process on feminist theories, addressing how 
democratic inclusion and participation can empower both feminists and women to 
become active citizens. 
However, it will be argued that these models are not ideal for new wave 
feminism because they do not find the right balance between women's feminist and 
citizen identities. Benhabib and Mouffe's models will be shown to subsume women's 
feminist identity under their citizen identity, whereas Young privileges women's 
° The basic premises of their models are to be found in S. Benhabib, Situating the Self. " Gender, 
Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics, (Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press and 
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feminist identity at the expense of their wider citizen one. Given these problems, the 
last chapter will conclude by positing representative democracy as a model that can 
respond to both the need for autonomous feminist organisations and alliances, and the 
need for women to be citizens in terms of a number of political identities, some of 
which may not be influenced by either feminist or gender identity. 
A brief outline 
Feminists in a new wave need to re-engage with politics by conceiving a future 
feminist movement as an alliance, and by considering how women can find political 
inclusion as citizens. They need to be aware of the historic circumstances of their 
politics and, hence, Chapter One of the thesis considers the historical tradition of 
feminism: from its roots in Enlightenment thought and revolutionary practice, to the 
fragmentation and demise of the second wave feminist movement. If feminism is to be 
reconceived as a contingent and dynamic political project, it is sensible to consider its 
long tradition. Part of the reason for the fragmentation of the second wave feminist 
movement was that many feminists denied this history, presenting in its place a grand 
theoretical account of women's universal and eternal oppression that did not take 
account of women's past activism. This chapter wants to redress the balance and 
present the feminist tradition as a useful intellectual resource for future feminist 
accounts. On these terms, the specific incidence of the second wave fragmentation is 
best understood as part of a historical tradition, such that is both a powerful legacy 
and a series of lessons to be learned for feminists in a new wave. 
In Chapter Two the postmodern problematic is introduced. It is defended as a 
critical strategy that is useful for understanding the historical tradition and 
fragmentation of feminism. As a critical strategy it is used to explain why feminism 
fragmented in the late 1970s and how its central ideas of feminist political collectivity 
and agency can be re-thought. At the same time, the critical strategy acknowledges 
feminist criticisms and fears of postmodernism, addressing how these are often 
Blackwell, 1992), I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, (Princeton: Princeton University 
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informed by the powerful legacies of second wave movement politics. The chapter 
concludes with the suggestion that the best way to recognise the legacy of the second 
wave is to protect the diverse feminist voices that arose in this period and the strong 
call by many feminists not to be essentialised, not to be determined in terms of 
authentic notions of feminist identity. It is on this basis that feminists in a new wave 
need to consider how feminists can come together as an alliance - to protect this 
diversity - and how they should operate politically in inclusive, not separatist, political 
models. Such political models are important for those times when the alliance is 
fragmented and when women want to make other political demands. It is the 
recognition that women's political ambitions do not begin and end with feminism, 
they are also citizens with a wide range of democratic demands. 
The thesis then moves onto the detailed examination of three models of 
democratic inclusion. Benhabib, Young and Mouffe have been chosen because they 
have all, to varying extents, addressed the postmodern concerns discussed in Chapter 
Two. They have accepted that women have a range of political concerns and have 
brought women back into the political fold, so to speak, by addressing how women 
could be included as citizens and how their demands as citizens can be heard by 
democratic models of citizenship that have often excluded women's and feminists' 
concerns. 
In Chapter Three Benhabib's model of deliberative democracy is considered. 
She modifies the Habermasian vision of deliberative democracy and its base in 
discourse ethics to make it more open to the particularity of feminist demands. 
However, even this revised model has a number of difficulties which make it less than 
adequate for feminism in a new wave, where the movement is structured, at best, as an 
alliance and women are seen as diverse social actors. Put briefly, she continues to 
posit feminism as a unified political grouping whose primary political objective is that 
of achieving democratic inclusion. She does not consider the distinct nature of 
women's political demands as feminists. Thus, it is argued that her model is both 
Press, 1990) and C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, (London and New York: Verso, 1993). 
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undesirable and impracticable for feminists in a new wave, leaving feminists to 
sacrifice the specificity of their demands to the common interest of all citizens. 
Chapter Four looks at Young's attempt to further modify deliberative 
democracy. In her attempt she avoids some of Benhabib's difficulties because she 
neither presupposes a unified feminist group nor presumes that inclusive democratic 
politics produces a common interest. Instead of presupposing a unified feminist 
group, she theorises the idea of an `affinity group' that allows women to come 
together politically without needing to share an inherent essential identity. The 
`affinity group' according to Young is fluid, dynamic and cognisant of the differences 
between women. She believes that women can be represented in a more inclusive 
democratic model, she calls `communicative democracy, ' in terms of this `affinity 
group' identity. With this type of representation, they can make their specific political 
demands heard and still remain a heterogeneous collective. However, her concept of 
communicative democracy, is only useful for group representation if the affinity group 
is structured as a permanent, rigid and institutionalised forum for women, losing its 
fluidity and flexibility. To overcome these problems, she has recently theorised a 
concept of `serial collectivity' which envisions any future feminist group as a short- 
term, possibly issue-based and narrowly representative political group. However, she 
has not altered her concept of democracy to respond to these changes. 
Chantal Mouffe, in contrast to both Benhabib and Young, is more successful 
in understanding the difficulties of achieving a feminist collective after the 
fragmentation of second wave movement. She is also aware of the particular demands 
political processes make on all public actors and, thus, she does not believe that an 
cohesive political model is possible. Her response therefore has been to address how 
feminists can form political groups which do not essentialise women by connecting 
with other marginalised groups, and by stating their demands as part of a wider fight 
against subordination. She calls this vision `radical democratic citizenship' and argues 
that it would be structured as a loose alliance. In such an alliance the groups could 
come together for political action but maintain their differences. In addition to this 
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concept of citizenship, she has recently begun to theorise a model of agonal 
democracy that further accounts for the difficulties in forming political collectives in 
diverse societies, where citizens may have a number of social and political allegiances. 
This is a promising move and the Chapter ends by speculatively reading Mouffe's 
concept of agonal democracy and agonal politics in terms of feminist politics. It 
shows that while the model of agonal democracy is promising and worthy of detailed 
analysis, it is still being developed in her work. Hence, she continues to privilege a 
citizen identity based on the radical democratic collective. On her argument, 
membership in such a collective radically transforms the pre-existing identities of 
those in it. Consequently, she too, like Benhabib, risks losing the specificity of the 
feminist movement to wider democratic demands. 
Chapter Six begins by reiterating the three broad problems Benhabib, Young 
and Mouffe's models of democracy have in protecting women's identities as both 
feminists and citizens. These problems are as follows: firstly, their shared assumption 
that women, in the right political model, can be successfully unified as an active 
feminist political collective; secondly, their portrayal of democratic politics as 
transformative, changing conflicts of opinion and value-pluralism into collective 
concerns, and thirdly, their continued failure to recognise and accommodate the range 
of women's political concerns, with Benhabib and Mouffe undermining the specificity 
of feminist political demands and Young favouring a unified feminist identity at the 
expense of women's wider concerns as citizens. 
Thus, it is argued that, in view of these problems, the model of representative 
democracy fits the demands of feminism in a new wave more adequately than any of 
these models. Representative democracy has distinctive features that take account of 
the specific nature of the political process in diverse societies as conflictual, partial and 
exclusionary. At root, the model is based on the representative relationship that does 
not depend on the representative sharing the same identity as the represented. Rather, 
the relationship is a formal and partial one that is established by the electoral process, 
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another distinctive feature of representative democracy. s The electoral process gives 
the relationship temporary definition, authorising the representative to act for the 
represented for as long as the electoral decision holds, leaving the latter free to pursue 
other political identities. The two political actors - the representative and the 
represented - do not need to agree over everything and their relationship can be 
renegotiated or revoked at the next election. For women, this representative 
relationship allows them to find representation in terms of their feminist identity 
without sacrificing their other civil concerns. Indeed, with the right institutional 
framework, women could have representation in terms of a number of their political 
identities, with each relationship being partial and temporary. Consequently, the model 
allows women to be politically included as both feminists and citizens, with varying 
levels of political commitment. In meeting these demands, it returns to the postmodern 
critical strategy of Chapter Two, respecting anti-essential identities, anti-utopianism 
and the contingency of political thought on existing political traditions and practises. 
Ultimately, it is argued that feminists have much to gain, in terms of movement and 
citizenship politics, by making strategic use of existing democratic practices and 
concepts of representation. They must take political action now, even in a minimal 
way, and not wait for utopian conditions. 
s See Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), pp. 42-93. 
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Chapter One. The End of Movement Politics? Understanding the 
Place of Citizenship and Identity in the History of Feminism 
Introduction 
By the early 1980s Western second wave feminism was in crisis. Its political 
movement had disintegrated and no cohesive feminist theory had developed from 
either the experiences of the movement or the gradual increase in feminist scholarship. 
Initially, much of the blame for this fragmentation was placed on external factors, 
notably the backlash of sentiment towards feminism, which developed throughout the 
decade. However, other feminists began to study how the internal workings of the 
second wave political movement contributed to its fragmentation. Many of these 
studies' have agreed that the identity politics of the second wave caused division and 
dissent in a movement which had attempted to build a sisterhood on the politics of 
personal experience. 
This chapter will contend that the roots of the second wave movement's 
internal problems can be found in the transformation in ideas about what should be 
the proper objective of feminism. Between the first and the second wave movements 
the objective of feminism shifted from a predominating quest for formal citizenship to 
a quest for identity. In the first wave, Enlightenment thinking and French 
Revolutionary practise had inspired early feminist theorists such as Mary 
Wollstonecraft in Britain and Olympe de Gouges in France to seek out citizenship for 
women. Hence, they wanted to extend the democratic rights of citizenship to women 
and this demand became the main focus of the first wave political movement until the 
1920s, by which time most Western women had been partially enfranchised. 
' See J. Lovenduski and V. Randall, Contemporary Feminist Politics: Women and Power in Britain, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) for information on the British movement. B. Ryan, 
Feminism and the Women's Movement: Dynamics of Change in Social Movement Ideology and 
Activism, (New York and London: Routledge, 1992) on the American movement. And, D. Bouchier, 
The Feminist Challenge: The Movement for Women's Liberation in Britain and the USA, (London: 
Macmillan, 1983) on both. 
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The novelty of the second wave feminist movement was its move away from 
the inherently political concern of citizenship in favour of a far reaching concern with 
feminist theories as sites of, and quests for, identity recognition and affirmation. Many 
second wave feminists felt that this shift towards identity politics was necessary 
because achieving the vote and formal citizenship for women had done little to advance 
their social standing. Thus, feminists such as Virginia Woolf2, Simone de Beauvoir3 
and Betty Friedan4, who wrote between the first and second wave of feminism, 
introduced three sets of ideas that provided a theoretical framework for the second 
wave's focus on the politics of identity. Firstly, Woolf introduced a new concept of 
patriarchy that was developed by de Beauvoir and Friedan. Secondly, these feminists 
began to question the public/private divide in a way that had not been done in the first 
wave. Thirdly, these transitional feminists made self-identity a valid place for feminist 
analysis and politics. 
While these ideas provided useful points of solidarity for the second wave 
movement, by the end of the 1970s they had given rise to a widespread emphasis on 
identity and selfhood that made mass movement politics difficult. And by the 1980s 
the movement had largely disintegrated into a mass of small groups arguing over what 
it meant to be a true feminist. Feminism became rife with factionalism and it was often 
politically inactive. Feminists stopped facing each other as feminists, to discuss liberty 
and equality, and became distanced from conventional political institutions and 
processes in which to make their demands. Indeed, many feminists ended up in the 
very position they had been hoping to escape: at the margins of politics. The first 
critiques of second wave feminism, voiced by black, lesbian and poor women, were 
explicit attacks on what they perceived to be the failure of the feminist movement and 
theories to represent and reflect their identities and experiences in the sisterhood. A 
sisterhood that in their view was concerned only with the interests and promotion of 
one kind of woman: white, middle class and professional. These criticisms were a 
2 V. Woolf, A Room of One's Own, (London: Penguin Books, 1945). 
S. de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, Trans. H. M. Parshley, (London: Picador, 1988). 
4 B. Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1965). 
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valuable challenge to the easy assumptions of early second wave feminists. But black, 
lesbian and poor women tended to work with similar notions of authentic identity that 
only furthered the fragmentation of the movement. 
Thus, to fully understand the fragmentation of second wave feminism it is 
necessary to place feminism in its rich and diverse historical perspective. Feminists in 
a new wave of theorising must learn from their history. Therefore, the first burgeoning 
of feminist theories will be traced, starting with their basis in the philosophy of the 
European Enlightenment and the politics of the French Revolution of 1789. Although 
feminists did not gather into a self-conscious movement until the nineteenth century, it 
was the ideals of this period that provided the concerns and concepts that became 
crucial in the first wave. The theory and practice of the first wave movement, which 
culminated in the struggle for suffrage, will then be examined. Once Western women 
achieved these political and civil rights, in the early twentieth century, the move away 
from citizenship towards identity politics began. The latter will be traced in the works 
of Virginia Woolf, Simone de Beauvoir and Betty Friedan. When this transition is 
understood, the chapter will address the development of the Western second wave 
feminist movement and its problems of fragmentation and factionalism. 
The founding of feminism 
The story of first wave feminism begins with the Enlightenment. Feminists in this 
period were influenced by the new philosophical ideas of equality, universalism and 
rational human natures They were also inspired by the emergence of radical and 
revolutionary politics. Richard Evans characterises the influence of this period on 
early feminism, stating: 
The Enlightenment did assemble a whole battery of intellectual 
weapons to be wielded in the feminist cause: ideas of reason, progress, 
natural law, the fulfilment of the individual, the beneficent power of 
See M. Ferguson (ed. ), First Feminists: British Women Writers 1578-1799, (Bloomington and 
New York: Indiana University Press and The Feminist Press, 1985) for a thorough introduction to 
the writings of early British feminists. 
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education and the social utility of freedom from the restrictions and 
equality of rights. ' 
In light of this analysis, three areas of Enlightenment thinking will be examined in 
relation to their influence on first feminists: the importance of reason, the importance 
of autonomous selfhood, and the concepts of freedom and agency. These ideas led 
into a broadly humanistic view of feminism that lasted until the late nineteenth century. 
The importance of reason 
The idea of a universal rational human nature was the fundamental tenet of French and 
continental Enlightenment philosophy. According to this philosophy, to possess 
reason meant that the individual was able to be autonomous. This picture of rational 
and autonomous human selfhood was first developed by Descartes' and reached its 
apogee in the works of thinkers such as Kant' and de Condorcet. 9 Kant's work is 
particularly relevant because he introduced the idea of the universal rational self that 
was nevertheless duty bound. For many early humanist feminists, these views of 
universal selfhood and rationality became the stating point of their theories. The early 
first wave humanist feminist Mary Astell believed that as long as equal recognition 
was denied women they would be kept in a condition akin to slavery, remaining 
`useless... Animals (sic)'. 1° More famously, Wollstonecraft developed the concept of 
the duty bound rational self for women. " She argued passionately that women needed 
to be recognised as rational human beings if they were ever to fulfil their duties. 
Enlightenment thinkers also used this notion of the rational human mind as a 
basis for their theories of education. According to many Enlightenment thinkers, 
6 R. Evans, The Feminists: Women's Emancipation Movements in Europe, America and 
Australasia, 1840-1920, (London and New York: Croom Helm and Barnes and Noble, 1977), p. 17. 
7 R. Descartes, 'From Mediations on First Philosophy', in L. Cahoone (ed. ), From Modernism to 
Postmodernism: An Anthology, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 29-40. 
8 See I. Kant, 'Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals (1785) in, Mary. J. Gregor (ed. and 
Trans. ), The Cambridge Edition of the Work of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996) for his classic statement of the duty bound, rational self. 
9 A. de Condorcet, Sketch for the Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind, (London; 
Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, 1955). 
`° M. Astell, 'A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, ' in M. Ferguson (ed. ), First Feminists: British 
Women Writers 1578-1799, op. cit., p. 187. 
12 
Wollstonecraft and de Condorcet included, education was designed to impart a series 
of rational truths and immutable principles. These thinkers believed that with the 
correct knowledge and the proper use of reason, the human mind could be reshaped 
and modified. 12 By giving each person a basic and developing body of knowledge, 
moreover, education helped the individual to use their rationality with autonomy. On 
this basis, many feminist thinkers, such as, for example, Bathsua Pell Makin", 
Catherine Macaulay Graham14 and Wollstonecraft's, demanded a system of thorough, 
rational education for women. For all of these thinkers education was central to 
women's sense of autonomous selfhood; it became a way of lessening their 
dependence on men by giving them practical skills and the ability to reason. 
The idea of autonomous selfhood 
These ideas of rational selfhood found their most famous feminist expression in Mary 
Wollstonecraft's work, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. A work that was 
central to the arguments of many humanist feminists in the first and the second wave 
movements. In common with many humanist feminists of the eighteenth century, she 
believed that it was impossible to know the true nature of female identity due to 
women's general subordinated position. 16 She argued therefore that women would 
need to be recognised as citizens and humans before their true selves could develop. 
Indeed, she was adamant that, without natural human or civil rights, women had no real 
duties, remarking: 
The wife in the present state of things, who is faithful to her husband, 
and neither suckles nor educates her children, scarcely deserves the 
" M. Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 141, 
speaks of women needing to recognise and fulfil their 'human duties (her italics)'. 
12 Male thinkers of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, for example Helvetius and d'Holbach, 
also advocated the extension of education to women, S. Moller Okin, Women in Western Political 
Thought, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 103. 
13 B. Pell Makin, 'From An Essay to Revive the Antient Education of Gentlewomen, ' in M. 
Ferguson (ed. ), First Feminists: British Women Writers 1578-1799, op. cit., pp. 128-142. 
14 C. Macaulay Graham, 'From Letters on Education: Letter XXI, ' ibid., pp. 400-402. 
" M. Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, op. cit., sets out her views on 
education in Chapter Twelve, pp. 279-306. 
16Ibid., pp. 122-123. 
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name of wife, and has no right to that of citizen. But take away natural 
rights and duties become null. " 
It was enough to suggest that women, if they were not included as rational creatures, 
would remain little more than frilly accompaniments to their husbands. Hence, she 
made it clear that men and women would benefit from female emancipation. Men 
would gain a more practical and equal wife, whereas women would gain rational 
selfhood and independence. ' 8 
Consequently, Wollstonecraft argued that women must be able to make 
autonomous decisions regardless of their biological sex. It was on this basis that 
Wollstonecraft argued for women to value their citizen identity over motherhood. 
Indeed, she went so far as to argue that: 
The being who discharges the duties of its station is independent; and, 
speaking of women at large, their first duties is to find themselves as 
rational creatures, and the next, in point of importance, as citizens, is 
that, which includes so many, of a mother (my italics). ' 9 
In the context of the late eighteenth century it was very radical to argue that a woman's 
role as a mother be subordinated to her 'duty' to define herself first independently 
and then as a citizen. 2° This argument reflected both Wollstonecraft's view that 
citizenship was the key to women's humanity and her revolutionary fervour for a 
democratic citizenship that was coupled with the Kantian preference for duty. 
Freedom and agency 
Many Enlightenment radicals also incorporated this view of rational selfhood as a 
basis for revolutionary political activity. The old idea that human beings were assigned 
places in society by God gave way to the idea that the individual was governed by its 
"Ibid., p. 264. 
'8lbid., p. 268. 
"Ibid., p. 263. 
20 It is worthy of note that Carole Pateman in a recent article, 'Equality, difference, subordination: 
the politics of motherhood and women's citizenship, in G. Bock and S. James (eds. ), Beyond 
Equality and Difference: Citizenship, Feminist Politics and Female Subjectivity, (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1992), p. 20, cites the very same reference, suggesting that Wollstonecraft's view 
of citizenship supports both equality and difference. This reading undermines the humanistic 
intentions of Wollstonecraft, who, while recognising that women were mothers, felt that in the 
political realm of citizenship women should be capable of rational and autonomous thought, free 
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own will and rationality. Such a degree of self-reflexivity meant that customs, 
superstitions and prejudices, that were previously seen to be natural restraints on the 
self, could be reasoned away. Condorcet, gripped by revolutionary fervour, gave 
instant clarity to this sense of escaping from society's constraints, demanding, in 
Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind, the `annihilation 
of all prejudices', 21 including those prejudices that subordinated women. 
The French Revolution of 1789 proved to be the defining manifestation of 
these Enlightenment ideals. The central motivation of the French Revolution was the 
idea that society could be seized and transformed. This idea was, in turn, informed by 
the Rousseauian idea of democratic citizenship. Rousseau argued that the only form 
of true sovereignty, for both self and society, was self-sovereignty brought about by a 
people finding self-government. 22 In this concept of sovereignty the subject lives by 
the laws that it creates, thus ensuring its autonomy and independence. 
Work by Dominique Godineau on women's participation in the French 
Revolution suggests that female activists at the time were as committed as male 
activists to this idea of popular sovereignty. Although, as she notes, the actual practise 
of democratic citizenship often excluded the very women who supported it. Godineau 
therefore concludes that women found 
[T]heir status was ambiguous - that of citoyennes [female citizens] 
without citizenship. On the other hand, in the case of popular 
insurrection, when the Sovereign People made its voice 
audible... women constituted an integral portion of the Sovereign. 23 
It is somewhat ironic to find that women - who Rousseau famously excluded from his 
theories of citizenship24 - were also inspired by his view of sovereignty and radical 
agency. These women found that his view of self-sovereignty, that placed citizenship 
at its core, had a powerful message for women at the time: if you were excluded from 
from their family relationships. Moreover, Wollstonecraft was trying to reposition motherhood as a 
human duty. 
2' A. de Condorcet, Sketch for the Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind, op. cit., p. 
193. 
u J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, (London: J. M. Dent, 1993), p. 191. 
23 D. Godineau, 'Masculine and Feminine Political Practice during the French Revolution, 1793 - 
Year III, ' in H. B. Applewhite and D. G. Levy (eds. ), Women and Politics in the Age of the 
Democratic Revolution, (Michigan: the University of Michigan Press, 1993), p. 68. 
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the civil law-making process, as women were, then you were not free. Early feminists 
took heed and began to theorise citizenship as the key to autonomous selfhood. 
In the historical context of the Enlightenment, more generally, women were 
participating in political and intellectual life on an unprecedented scale. 25 They were 
entering intellectual circles in a number of roles: as Salonieres in France, as 
bluestockings, as scholars and as novelists (Aphra Benn et al). 26 And, during the 
French Revolution, they were members of a revolutionary grouping - the Cercle Social 
- that had a women's section and fought for women's rights. 
27 Outside of these rather 
intellectual groupings, women participated in strikes and in violent insurgent activities, 
gaining widespread notoriety as petroleuses. It was these types of groups that gave 
women at the time invaluable experience of modem, radical activist movements. 
The Enlightenment and the French Revolution therefore provided the 
intellectual and political context for early feminist thought to develop. Enlightenment 
ideas of universal reason, autonomous selfhood and radical agency inspired first 
feminists to theorise women's emancipation and participate in political activity. 
Further, Enlightenment thinkers such as Wollstonecraft and de Condorcet illustrated 
the importance of political activity for women by endorsing citizenship and civic duty 
as a means of achieving independent and rational selfhood. For feminists, moreover, 
citizenship brought a further benefit, it gave women legal recognition as equal human 
24 S. Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought, op. cit., p. 145. 
Zs See the D. Godineau article, 'Masculine and Feminine Political Practice during the French 
Revolution, 1793 - Year III, ' op. cit., pp. 61-80, in which she documents how women helped with an 
assassination of a deputy and for a more general discussion of women's revolutionary activities, Also 
in the same collection, H. B. Applewhite and D. G. Levy (eds. ), Women and Politics in the Age of 
the Democratic Revolution, ibid., see the article by D. Levy and H. Applewhite, 'Women, 
Radicalization and the Fall of the French Monarchy, ' pp. 81-107. 
26 E. Boulding, The Underside of History: A View of Women Through Time, (Revised ed., Vol. 2, 
Newbury Park, London and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1992), pp. 119-139, sets out the social 
and political activities of women during the Enlightenment. 
27 Again the importance of Rousseau's thought to women, and feminist, activists is noted by Gary 
Kates, "The Powers of Husband and Wife must be Equal and Separate': The Cercle Social and the 
Rights of Women, 1790-91, ' in H. B. Applewhite and D. G. Levy (eds. ), Women and Politics in the 
Age of the Democratic Revolution, op. cit, p. 176. Here, he argues that members of Cercle Social 
saw themselves as disciples of Rousseau. This meant that, 'Cercle Social feminists simply ignored 
Rousseau's attitudes regarding the status of women in civil society and emphasised, instead, his view 
that no political revolution would be successful without a corresponding transformation in family 
life'. 
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beings. In the 1800s women came together in their own movements to seize this 
humanistic recognition. 
Feminism in the 1800s: the organisation of a movement 
The main focus of first wave feminist movements was the quest for citizenship, 
although this undoubtedly led into other concerns. However, not all feminists shared 
the same view of feminist citizenship and there was a split between humanist and 
gynocentric feminists. 28 Most first wave feminists were humanist feminists, 
emphasising the universal, rational self. They argued for legislation that would 
equalise male/female relations, believing that the autonomy of the individual was 
paramount over family relationships and dependence on others. Wollstonecraft's 
feminist tract, in particular, inspired a whole generation of humanist female writers and 
theorists. 29 Her humanist vision of citizenship, as a means to freedom and equality for 
women, underpinned the founding of the first feminist political movement in America 
In Britain her humanist ideals were continued in J. S. Mill's The Subjection of 
Women. 30 In contrast, gynocentric feminists, such as Frances Power Cobbe, 
recognised and celebrated sex and gender distinctions, often seeking protective 
legislation that reflected a social and biological division between men and women. 
Hence it is necessary to consider both gynocentric and humanist feminist views of 
citizenship and how these views manifested themselves in movement politics. 
Humanist feminist views of citizenship 
In America and Britain the humanist view of citizenship inspired the establishment of 
the first feminist political movements. In America, the first women's movement began 
28 First wave feminist interpretations of citizenship were not homogeneous. The most useful 
distinction to make in terms of feminist thought is Iris Marion Young's differentiation between 
humanist and gynocentric feminism, I. M. Young, Throwing Like a girl, (Bloomington: Indiana 
Press, 1990), p. 73. I have applied this distinction to the historical roots of feminism. 
29 Miriam Schneir, (ed. ), The Vintage Book of Historical Feminism, (London: Vintage, 1972), p. 6, 
notes that it was published in the USA when it came out in 1792, and was republished in the 1860s 
as the first wave movement was underway. 
30 J. S. Mill, The Subjection of Women, (Illinois: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1980). 
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in 1848 at Seneca Falls, New York. 3' At this convention women formulated a 
declaration of rights, based on the American Declaration of Independence, containing 
twelve resolutions that the convention wanted to achieve politically. These resolutions 
included the recognition that women were equal to men, and promises to enshrine this 
equality in a set of political, civil and religious rights. 32 The women at Seneca Falls 
wanted these reforms for purely humanist reasons, to enable women to achieve 
autonomous selfhood. Consequently, the constitution explicitly attacked customs and 
laws that would `lessen her self-respect and. . . make 
her willing to lead a dependent 
and abject life (my italics)'. 33 
The American context, in general, with its own revolutionary background and 
pioneering spirit, gave rise to some of the most individualistic variants of humanist 
feminism. 34 The nineteenth century American feminist, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, for 
example, delivered an important speech outlining these views. It was entitled The 
Solitude of the Self and showed just how far the humanist feminist demand for 
autonomous selfhood had come since Wollstonecraft. In the speech Stanton 
suggested that `the isolation of every human soul and the necessity of self- 
dependence must give each individual the right to choose his (sic) own 
surroundings'. " For Stanton it was intrinsic to this search for autonomy that women 
be given citizenship as well as other rights, so that each would be able to fully 
recognise `her self-sovereignty'. She added that without this recognition, women 
would remain determined by the `incidental relations of life, such as a mother, wife, 
sister, daughter' (my italics). 36 For Stanton, therefore, rational autonomous selfhood 
meant complete independence of thought for women, aside from their traditional 
relationships. 
3' M. Schneir, (ed. ), The Vintage Book of Historical Feminism, op. cit., p. 77. 
'ZThese resolutions are set out in M. Schneir, ibid., pp. 80-82, and included the right to the franchise 
and participation in the workplace. 
33 Ibid., p. 80. 
34 For examples of American first wave feminist thought see, M. Schneir, The Vintage Book of 
Historical Feminism, ibid., pp. 76-159. 
35 Ibid., p. 158. 
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In Britain, J. S. Mill's, The Subjection of Women (first published, 1869) was 
stating humanist feminist ideals in a more moderate, but no less inspiring, manner than 
Stanton's work. Mill's humanism still envisioned a traditional role for women as 
wives and mothers. However, he believed that by equalising the relationship between 
the sexes, women could then begin to freely and rationally choose these roles, so that 
they lose their oppressive connotations. To equalise the relationship between the 
sexes, Mill reasserted the ideals of the eighteenth century Enlightenment. According to 
Mill, the nineteenth century had lost sight of these ideals, replacing the infallibility of 
reason with the infallibility of instinct. 37 He believed it was necessary to retrieve the 
era's sense of equality and justice to challenge current social relations between men 
and women and give women their individual freedom. 38 Mill's liberal interpretation of 
the philosophy of the Enlightenment re-emphasised how progress in society and in 
human nature would make this possible. Thus Mill came to the optimistic conclusion 
that the legal and civil reform of women's status would lead to wholesale change in 
the customs and prejudices that had so far subordinated women, amounting, no less, to 
the `moral regeneration of mankind'. " Such optimism came to typify the first wave 
feminist quest for citizenship. 
Hence, humanist feminists in the nineteenth century believed that it was 
possible to theorise a set of universal principles that could secure equal rights for 
women. Like the early humanist feminists of the Enlightenment, they believed that 
these rights needed to be legally and legislatively secured before women could truly 
achieve autonomous selfhood and independence from men. Their position contrasts 
strongly with the stance of `moral' or gynocentric feminists in the 1800s, such as 
Margaret Oliphant and Frances Power Cobbe, who demanded citizenship to legally 
affirm the equal worth of women's distinct values and traditional domestic roles. 
36 When Stanton wrote the speech she did not consider these duties to be unworthwhile for women, 
she only objected to the fact that they were not freely chosen. She believed moreover that when these 
familial duties had come to an end, women needed to be able to live independently, ibid., p. 157. 
37 J. S. Mill, The Subjection of Women, op. cit., p. 3. 
38 Ibid., p. 96. 
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Gynocentric feminist views of citizenship 
By the late nineteenth century gynocentric feminists were criticising the humanist 
hegemony. Their writing reacted to the Enlightenment and nineteenth century liberal 
ideas of the self-reflexive, autonomous individual. These feminists wanted instead to 
support and promote women's conventional place in the home. They wrote in the 
Victorian era and, thus, their work was often moral in tone and never really questioned 
the biological sex divide, as first wave humanist feminists had done. 40 Two examples 
of first wave gynocentric thinking were the works of Margaret Oliphant and Frances 
Power Cobbe. 
Margaret Oliphant's work epitomises the ambiguous stance of many English 
Victorian feminists. She started by eschewing humanist equality and suggesting that 
the specificity of women was `not as human creatures primarily, and women in second 
place, but as women and nothing but women -a distinct sphere of being' 4' Indeed, 
she went so far as to argue that `equality is the mightiest of humbugs' 42 By the late 
1800s however she was seeing some worth in the opinions of those she had 
previously decried as the "shrieking sisterhood". 43 She believed, for example, that it 
was vital that women be given recognition for their contributions in the home, citing 
the example of the important role of shopkeepers' wives to support her view. 44 She 
even called for the franchise to be extended to women who were taxpayers 45 In all, 
Oliphant wanted women to be recognised as having equal civil worth to men but 
different social capacities. 
Frances Power Cobbe also adopted the equality in difference approach. She 
used an apparently neo-Hegelian analysis of women's position in society to argue for 
their greater civil and political recognition. While she does not directly mention 
39 Ibid., p. 96. 
°° S. Hamilton's (ed. ), 'Criminals, Idiots, Women and Minors': Victorian Writing by Women on 
Women, (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1992) is a useful documentation of Victorian feminist 
writing. 
" M. Oliphant, 'The Condition of Women, ' in, S. Hamilton (ed. ), 'Criminals, Idiots, Women and 
Minors': Victorian Writing by Women on Women, ibid., p. 216. 
42 Ibid., p. 217. 
" Ibid., p. 232. 
44 Ibid., p. 236. 
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Hegel's theories, there is evidence that she considered men and women to have a 
dialectical relationship to one another. Hence, for Power Cobbe men and women 
needed to aim for equality through the unification of their distinctive standpoints. In 
this process they combine to create a kind of `Hegelian synthesis' (my wording), in 
which `absolute Philosophy is both intuitive and experimental; absolute Morality is 
both justice and love; absolute Religion is the worship... of the `Parent of God, 
Almighty, ' who is both parents in One' 46 Power Cobbe also emphasised the need for 
protective legislation to ensure women were legally recognised and defended from 
such things as marital brutality 47 
Gynocentric feminism became more important as feminists in the first wave 
movement realised that they also had to appeal to those women whom valued their 
roles as mothers and homekeepers. Indeed, if one were to provide a women's, as 
opposed to a feminist, history, it would be clear that feminism and active feminist 
politics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were minor features in most 
women's lives 48 In this moral and political climate it is hardly surprising that some 
feminists saw the strategic value of making feminism, as a whole, appeal to more 
moderate women. Their stance also helped soften the view of those male public and 
political decision makers who remained wary of, and often hostile to, the demand for 
women's citizenship. 
The work of Millicent Fawcett exemplifies the strategic thinking of many first 
wave feminists. She was at the forefront of the campaign for women's suffrage and 
believed in reason and individualism. 49 But, from the late 1800s, she feared that the 
feminist movement was increasingly seen as revolutionary and anarchistic S° Thus she 
wrote a very pragmatic piece placating both women who felt that it was `unwomanly' 
as Ibid., p. 243 
06 F. Power Cobbe, 'What Shall We Do With Our Old Maids? ' in S. Hamilton (ed. ), 'Criminals, 
Idiots, Women and Minors': Victorian Writing by Women on Women, ibid., p. 106. 
47 F. Power Cobbe, 'Wife-torture in England, ' ibid., pp. 132-171. 
`$ Martin Pugh, Women and the Women's Movement in Britain 1914-1959, (London: Macmillan, 
1992), p. 68, notes that, numerically, the membership of feminist organisations was negligible 
compared to that of such associations as the Women's Institute. 
49 See Susan Hamilton's bibliographic note on Fawcett, 'Criminals, Idiots, Women and Minors': 
Victorian Writing by Women on Women, op. cit., p. 269. 
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to push for liberation and critics who feared that feminist women would reject 
motherhood and doom the human race in the process. In this piece Fawcett went on to 
stress that women should have political representation and be politically active because 
of their difference from men: 
We do not advocate the representation of women because there is no 
difference between men and women; but rather because of the 
difference between them. We want women's special experience as 
women, their special knowledge of the home and home wants, of child 
life... to be brought to bear on legislations' 
Fawcett was exceedingly successful in her approach and used it to attract a wide 
constituency of women in her role as leader of the National Union of Women's 
Suffrage Societies (NUWSS) and by the 1910s the organisation had a membership of 
over 50,000 women 52 
Hence, the rise of gynocentric feminist theories provided another dimension to 
first wave feminist discourse and signalled a flexibility of approach that helped the 
first wave movement adapt in a variety of ways to the outbreak of World War One. In 
times of war new, emergency styles of politics usually emerge and feminist politics 
was no exception to this rule. 53 Some sections of the British movement, faithful to 
Christabel Pankhurst, became highly patriotic, fearing that the continuation of their 
militant tactics would undermine the unity of the country. 54 Fawcett, ever the 
opportunist, used the experience of war and women's contribution to the war effort to 
argue that women could be socially valuable if only they had democratic 
representation. " In America, many feminists adhered more to humanist feminist 
ideological calls for citizenship. Hence, some of them, to popular disapproval, 
so M. Fawcett, `The Emancipation of Women, ' ibid., p. 257. 
sl Ibid., p. 259, 
s2 M. Pugh argues in, Women and the Women's Movement in Britain 1914-1959, op. cit., p. 8, that 
such suffrage unions were very successful at engaging with British parliamentary politics and making 
political alliances and affiliations. However, in being so active, the failure to gain the vote became 
frustrating for first wave feminists. In Britain bills to extend the franchise to women were introduced 
with great regularity and were passed in the House of Commons 1870,1884,1904 and 1908, but 
vetoed by the Lords, R. Evans, The Feminists: Women's Emancipation Movements in Europe, 
America and Australasia, 1840-1920, op. cit., p. 65. 
s' See Martin Pugh's chapter, The Impact of the Great War, ' Women and the Women's Movement in 
Britain 1914-1959, op. cit., pp. 6-42. 
34 Ibid., p. 9. 
15 Ibid., p. 8. 
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demonstrated in front of President Woodrow Wilson, to suggest that it was 
incongruous to wage a war in the name of democracy, while at the same time 
continuing to withhold the electoral franchise from American women. 56 But still the 
quest for citizenship remained the one unifying thread between the fragments of 
theories, tactics and movement sectors in the first wave. This connection allowed 
women to be mobilised and the movement to be galvanised even during a war. 
When democratic citizenship was finally achieved, in Britain by 1928 and 
across America by 1920, feminism lost its united focal point; the convergence of 
objectives that link, for example, a gynocentric feminist such as Frances Power Cobbe 
and a humanist feminist such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton. However, Kate Millet and, 
more recently, Barbara Ryan argue that first wave feminists concentrated on the 
Enlightenment ideal of democratic citizenship at the expense of other issues and, thus, 
left women after the first wave in a vulnerable positions' What is misunderstood in 
these criticisms is the great sense of optimism most first wave feminists had, 
stretching back at least as far as Wollstonecraft, that obtaining the vote and civil rights 
would end women's subordination. This optimism was compounded by the fact that 
in Europe, during the decades leading up to the extension of the suffrage, legislation 
had been passed allowing married women to own property and women in general to 
enter the professions. In the eyes of many of the first wave humanist feminists, most 
of who were by then elderly, citizenship completed this gamut of rights. For the 
gynocentric feminists, these developments were useful to their cause and democratic 
representation increased the weight of their moral concerns; indeed, prohibition in 
America was one of the first effects of women's voting power, which proved to be 
highly conservative. 
56 R. Evans, The Feminists: Women's Emancipation Movements in Europe, America and 
Australasia, 1840-1920, op. cit., p. 195. 
s' Kate Millet in Sexual Politics, (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1971), p. 83, pronounces the vote to 
be the 'red herring' of the movement. Similarly, Barbara Ryan in Feminism and the Women's 
Movement: Dynamics of Change in Social Movement Ideology and Activism, op. cit., p. 37, blames 
the disintegration of the movement, after the franchise was extended, on the quest for formal 
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Into the second wave: feminism from the 1920s onwards 
Many of the feminists who started writing in the 1920s faced a new political and 
social situation to that of first wave feminists. Women had gained formal legal and 
citizenship rights, but their social status remained largely unchanged. The optimism of 
the first wave faltered as 1920s feminists looked at this range of rights and legislation 
and asked: `what went wrong? ' In answer, they began to look beyond civil and 
political rights and in the transition period to the second wave three new ideas emerged 
that provided the theoretical groundwork for a move towards identity politics. The first 
idea was the new concept of patriarchy posited by Virginia Woolf, which was 
developed much later in the works of Millet" and Daly. " The second idea, resulting 
from the new approach to patriarchy, was a concern with women's sense of personal 
identity as a legitimate area of feminist analysis. Betty Friedan and Simone de 
Beauvoir were at the forefront of this latter approach. The third idea was the radical re- 
conception of the public/private divide - between the public-political sphere and the 
domestic sphere - which had largely been maintained in the first wave. Each approach 
will be examined in turn to understand how the shift to identity politics took place. 
Woolf and the new concept of patriarchy 
Virginia Woolf was paramount in introducing a new approach to patriarchy. In A 
Room of One's Own, Woolf remarks that on the night women achieved the vote she 
found an aunt had left her an inheritance of five hundred pounds. Significantly for 
Woolf it was the latter that she found to be the key to her liberation. 60 She thus set out 
to examine why the legal and civil changes wrought by first wave feminists had done 
so little to alter the status of women. She concluded rather starkly that, `England is 
citizenship, arguing that the movement did not develop a 'multi-faceted, ' and 'deeply ingrained' 
ideology that could sustain the movement into the 1920s. 
" K. Millet, Sexual Politics, op. cit,. 
39 M. Daly, Gyn/Ecology, ((Boston: Beacon Press, 1978). 
60 V. Woolf, A Room of One's Own, op. cit., p. 38. 
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under the rule of patriarchy'. 61 In this patriarchy, according to Woolf, men hold all 
the political, legal and economic power. 
Her definition of patriarchy was rooted in what would now be termed a 
`structural' or `systematic' analysis. A structural analysis does not necessarily have 
to specify the origin of patriarchy, but it must account for the social reproduction of it 
through social and economic systems. 62 On the basis of this reading there is nothing 
inherently natural about the power men are seen to have over women, it is a social 
construct. As Woolf writes, `their [men's] education had been in some ways as faulty 
as my own. It had bred in them defects as great'. 63 Patriarchy thus becomes a way of 
socially constructing identity that is reproduced through the social system as a whole. 
According to Woolf's argument, society educates men to produce in them a greater 
freedom of mind, creates economic laws that give them the freedom to be the primary 
wage earners, and allows them the authority to make laws, thus perpetuating the whole 
patriarchal cycle. Hence, for Woolf men had real power over women and the 
comforting illusion that they were innately superior. 
Woolf's view of patriarchy differed to previous feminist analyses of male 
power by making it clear that patriarchy was entrenched. Social and legal tinkering 
would not alter the power men held over women because part of this power lay in the 
different perceptions of self men and women had; men were nurtured to believe they 
were superior and women were nurtured to believe they were dependent. In her view 
patriarchal power not only subordinated women, it also set up a coalition of values that 
were found to be intrinsically alienating by women, as these were `male' values ba 
61 Ibid., p. 35. 
62 The advantages of the structural analysis, and one Woolf identifies, is that the actions of individual 
men are not blamed for the ill-effects of patriarchy on women. As Woolf, ibid., pp. 39-40, asserts, 
'it is absurd to blame any class or any sex, as a whole. Great bodies of people are never responsible 
for what they do'. 
63 Ibid., p. 40. 
Interestingly, this position is closer to gynocentric positions that hold that men and women have 
differing values, than it is to humanist feminist positions, that Woolf, ibid., p. 111, was 
sympathetic to. According to humanist feminists, the universal possession of the rational core self 
meant that, via the use of this reason, universal 'human' values would become clear. In Woolfs 
vision women should still strive for human selfhood, but the concept of the human becomes one in 
which the female identity is partially preserved, and her work thus appears as a sort of halfway house 
between humanist and gynocentric feminist positions. 
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Thus, she imagines a woman reading the literary works of Kipling and Galsworthy 
and discovering that, `it is not only that they celebrate male values, enforce male values 
and describe the world of men; it is that the emotion with which these books are 
permeated is to a woman incomprehensible' 65 Thus, Woolf established a concept of 
patriarchy deeply embedded in social structures, values and identities. 
Woolf's concept of patriarchy reached its apogee in second wave feminist 
views of patriarchy and revolution. For many second wave feminists this argument 
made it necessary to reject conventional models of democratic citizenship and seek, 
instead, to revolutionise the whole social system. Kate Millet's work, Sexual 
Politics, 66 made the link between patriarchy and the need for revolutionary politics. 
She believed, like Woolf, that patriarchy developed and maintained its control through 
a range of social and economic institutions, including the family, the economic system 
and the educational structure. Consequently, on her account, patriarchy so totally 
defines women that it determines their temperament, role and status, ` leaving men and 
women confined to `two cultures'. 68 Hence, Millet called for a `sexual revolution' to 
end patriarchal divisions, writing, `for to actually change the quality of life is to 
transform personality, and this cannot be done without freeing human's from the 
tyranny of sexual-social category'. 69 For the second wave, in general, the new concept 
of patriarchy signalled a return to radical, activist politics. 
The quest for identity 
The new approach to patriarchy allowed feminists in the transition to the second wave 
to realign feminist objectives. By looking at de Beauvoir's and Friedan's work we can 
see the shift to issues of identity that marked out the second wave from the first. 
Whilst neither thinker interpreted identity politics in the radical manner of later second 
wave feminist thought, they sowed the theoretical seeds for such a development. Both 
65 Ibid., p. 100. 
" K. Millet, Sexual Politics, op. cit. 
67Indeed, in Millet's view, subjects' ibid., it is 'probable that no other system has ever exercised such 
a complete control over its p. 33. 
68 Ibid., p. 31. 
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thinkers examined the patriarchal construction of female identity, through a `myth of 
woman' and a `feminine mystique' respectively. 70 And both suggested that these 
myths presented women with an identity that was restrictive, oppressive and lacking in 
a coherent, autonomous sense of selfhood. " 
Simone de Beauvoir believed that women were socially constructed by the 
`myth of woman'. The myth started within family relationships, in which parents 
raised insipid girls and torrid boys. 72 According to de Beauvoir, the latter were 
encouraged from childhood to transcend their limits and to strive for `human' 
selfhood. As she argued, in a frequently cited passage, men's freedom thus lay in their 
socially unimpeded ability to achieve authentic selfhood: 
But for a man to feel in his fists his will to self-affirmation is enough 
to reassure him of his sovereignty... he does not let himself be 
transcended by others, he is himself at the heart of his subjectivity. 
Violence is the authentic proof of each one's loyalty to himself. 73 
For de Beauvoir, therefore, women's lack of self was not just a response to public 
exclusion; women were excluded from the public sphere because the `myth of 
woman' taught them to forgo the autonomous sense of selfhood necessary for public 
relationships. In short, the little girl was left clinging to her mother's skirts as the little 
boy fought for public dominance. 
Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique was inspired by de Beauvoir's work. 
In the work Friedan observes a generation of American women who have apparently 
been sold a feminine dream revolving around maternity, consumerism and sexuality; 
these ideals were personified by the stereotype (and actuality! ) of the American 
suburban housewife. By the mid-1950s a large number of educated, middle class 
women who had followed this lifestyle were, according to Friedan, dosed up on 
69 Ibid., p. 363. 
70 See S. de Beauvoir, The Second Sex op. cit., and B. Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, op. cit. 
" B. Friedan, in The Feminine Mystique, op. cit., p. 79, suggested that women faced an identity 
crisis. 
" S. de Beauvoir, The Second Sex op. cit, pp. 295-351, describes this process of gender socialisation. 
" Ibid., p. 354. The main difficulty of de Beauvoir's approach is that what she considers to be an 
'authentic' human self explicitly reflects what she also considers to be a 'male' self. Conflating male 
and female selfhood in this way raises doubts as to whether her view of the self counts as 'human' 
and whether women could ever attain it or wish to attain it. 
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Valium and extremely dissatisfied with life. 74 The cause of this was identity, or rather, 
`lack of identity'. So chronic was this lack of identity that women were beginning to 
discover that they had no options for self-fulfilment beyond that offered by the 
`feminine mystique'. Consequently, women perpetuated the mystique by trying 
harder to find satisfaction in their household appliances, children and sex. " In effect 
they were turning to the very things that had caused the dissatisfaction in the first 
place. Like de Beauvoir, Friedan also believed that feminism needed to begin with 
these private issues of identity, before it could engage with the public sphere. 76 
In some respects Friedan and de Beauvoir's theories of incomplete selfhood 
resonated with first wave feminist demands for autonomous selfhood provided by, 
among others, Wollstonecraft and Cady Stanton. But the difference lay in the second 
wave's predominating emphasis on problems of identity and their lack of faith in the 
democratic system to solve them. Moreover, de Beauvoir and Friedan's theories also 
bolstered the idea, begun by Woolf, that women's incapacity to achieve such a human 
identity was due to a patriarchally defined cultural hegemony - such as the `myth of 
woman' and the `feminine mystique'. For Friedan and de Beauvoir simply including 
women in citizenship would not be enough to overturn these myths. Hence, they 
began a quest for identity transformation that reached its zenith in the works of second 
wave radical feminists, such as Shulamith Firestone'? and Mary Daly, 78 who endorsed 
a radical view of the authentic, autonomous human self that could only be achieved in 
separatist, women-only societies. 
"See Chapter Two, entitled, 'Happy Housewife Heroine', for a detailed account of these social 
processes, B. Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, op. cit., pp. 33-68. 
" Friedan saw the new openness about sex in the 1950s, not as liberation for women, but as further 
indication of the grip that the feminine mystique was perceived to have on women. This manifested 
itself in 'sex without self, sex for lack of self, ' ibid., p. 278 
76 Ironically Friedan's analysis did not find such radical expression in her political objectives, where 
she favoured liberal strategy to improve women's situation. The political group - the National 
Organisation of Women (NOW) - that she helped found went on to become one of the bastions of 
liberal reformist feminism in the United States (although Friedan considered it to be radical in 
intent), B. Ryan, Feminism and the Women's Movement: Dynamics of Change in Social Movement 
Ideology and Activism, op. cit., p. 61. 
" S. Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The Case For Feminist Revolution, (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1971). 
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Challenging the public/private divide 
In the transition to the second wave, this emphasis on personal identity and its social 
formation meant that the public/private distinction was subjected to far more rigorous 
challenges than in the first wave. Elizabeth Frazer in a piece on the relationship 
between feminism and liberalism shows how first wave feminists tended to maintain a 
public/family divide, even if they were aware of the problems in domestic 
relationships. 79 Hence, she writes of Wollstonecraft, Mill and Stanton that they 
`maintain the conception of the political as distinct from and excluding the family, as 
coextensive with legislation and its enforcement, and the securing of constitutional and 
legal rights for the individual'. 8O In other words, first wave feminists, by separating the 
family from the public, could argue for equal rights for women in the public sphere 
without ever really challenging their private status as mothers or their position in the 
household. Further, as this chapter has shown, early humanist feminists saw the 
public-political sphere as the proper realm in which to give women rights and duties to 
aid their role in private. This liberal humanist position was compounded by the view of 
first wave gynocentric feminists who also maintained the public/private divide, 
considering the private sphere to be the proper realm for women's self-fulfilment. 
In contrast, the work of nineteenth and early twentieth century socialist 
feminists, such as, for example, Harriet Martineau, Mona Caird and Olive Schreiner, 
laid the foundations for the study of private relationships and began to question the 
public/private distinction. They meticulously detailed the conditions of women's 
everyday lives, portraying the private sphere as a place in need of direct political 
intervention. " The new conception of patriarchy, just detailed, added to these views, 
analysing the private sphere and identity formation to see how women were 
oppressed. 
'$ M. Daly, Gyn/Ecology, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978). 
79 E. Frazer, `Feminism and Liberalism' in J. Meadowcroft (ed. ), The Liberal Political Tradition: 
Contemporary Reappraisals, (Cheltenham and Brookfield: Edward Elgar, 1996), pp. 126-128. 
80 Ibid., pp. 126-127. 
81 See H. Martineau, 'Female industry, ' pp. 29-70, and Mona Caird, 'Marriage, ' pp. 271-288 in S. 
Hamilton (ed. ), `Criminals, Idiots, Women and Minors': Victorian Writing by Women on Women, 
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Thus, by the second wave many feminists had come to believe that women's 
status as mothers and their place in the household contributed to their subordination, 
and that simple legislative measures would not change this situation. Consequently, 
some feminists in the transition to the second wave, such as de Beauvoir and in the 
early second wave, for example, Germaine Greer82 and Shulamith Firestone, " rejected 
traditional motherhood and looked at alternative family arrangements. Further, many 
second wave feminists believed that women's subordinate position in the private 
sphere was the locus of their identity problems and, in effect, left them so unsure of 
themselves that it stopped them participating politically. Thus, as the second wave 
developed, the private increasingly became the stuff of politics - captured in the 
ubiquitous movement slogan, `the personal is political'. 
These three ideas - the new concept of patriarchy, the new concern for identity 
and the emphasis on private relationships - provided the three cornerstones of much 
second wave feminism. Most second wave feminists looked for deeply embedded 
patriarchal structures that oppressed women, not only by subordinating them but also 
by distorting their personal identity. The ubiquitous response of the second wave 
movement was to spotlight the private sphere and consider ways for women to 
transform their personal lives and identities; a radical feminist movement was reborn. 
Second wave feminism: the search for identity 
It is important to note from the outset that the British and American second wave 
movements were always diverse. Women joined many different groups to achieve 
unity, sameness and solidarity. Consequently, second wave feminists developed a 
number of different workings of identity, objectives and strategies. In the early to 
middle second wave humanist feminists dominated and became a medley of liberal 
feminists, socialist feminists and radical feminists. By the late 1970s, gynocentric 
feminists were again challenging the humanist feminist concept of identity, arguing for 
op. cit. See also, Olive Schreiner, 'Women and Labour, ' in M. Humm (ed. ), Feminisms: A Reader, 
(New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), pp. 18-20. 
82 G. Greer, The Female Eunuch, (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1970) p. 235. 
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a return to the values of mothering and femininity. Both groups need to be examined 
to understand the second wave movement. 
Second wave humanist feminists 
Most humanist feminists in the second wave believed that women needed to find self- 
fulfilment away from their traditional identities as mothers and housewives. Its more 
liberal strand was exemplified by Betty Friedan and the ideas of the NOW 
organisation in America. NOW favoured traditional liberal political methods to get 
equal rights legislation passed and to allow women to enter into the public sphere of 
the professions and politics. However, the humanist position was not a purely liberal 
one because at its most extreme the liberal belief in reformist politics was forsaken for 
revolutionary strategy. 
In Britain humanist feminists tended to favour socialist and Marxist politics 84 
They questioned the institutions of family and marriage, believing them to be the sites 
of women's specific exploitation. To this end, these feminists applied traditional 
Marxist concepts to women's social position and argued that they were doubly 
exploited in their role as producers and in their role as the reproducers of children. 
However, as David Bouchier documents, socialist feminists developed two sorts of 
political strategies to fight for their cause. The first strategy was a reformist emphasis 
on working with the labour movement to bring about wider social changes. The 
second strategy was more radical and demanded a revolutionary theory and practice to 
overthrow capitalism, thus ending all forms of oppression, including women's. 5 
The third strand of humanist feminism was informed by existential 
philosophy. It consisted of those feminists who believed that women needed to break 
free of their inauthentic identities and strive for a true sense of selfhood. Shulamith 
83 S. Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The Case For Feminist Revolution, op. cit., p. 81. 
84 D. Bouchier, The Feminist Challenge: The Movement for Women's Liberation in Britain and the 
USA, op. cit., pp. 67-73. 
85 Ibid., pp. 83- 84. 
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Firestone and Mary Daly were two examples of radical humanist feminists. 86 The 
latter, inspired by de Beauvoir, believed that patriarchy excludes women and physically 
and spiritually mutilates them through its myths, media and religion. For Daly men 
were simply `the Enemy'. 87 According to this argument, women could only achieve 
authentic selfhood by rejecting their biological desires and, instead, searching for their 
`Original self, ' and `original Integrity'. This strand of humanist feminism became in 
influential in the radical sector of the second wave movement, culminating in separatist 
political strategies. From Friedan to Daly it is clear, therefore, that the humanist 
position contained many workings of identity politics and many political strategies. 
Second wave gynocentric feminists 
Towards the middle to late 1970s a new position developed in second wave feminism 
that echoed the concerns of the gynocentric feminists of the first wave, such as 
Oliphant and Power Cobbe. Second wave gynocentrists believed, along with humanist 
feminists, that the differences in gender identity were socially constructed; this is the 
belief that one is socialised into being a man or a woman. However, gynocentrism 
gave the argument a new slant, arguing that, although the gender divide is determined 
by societal factors, the historical longevity of these roles made them socially 
necessary. As Sara Ruddick argued, `I am increasingly convinced that there are female 
traditions and practices out of which a distinctive kind of thinking has developed'. 88 
According to this thinking, gender differences are to all intents and purposes inherent 
and cannot simply be overridden in favour of a `human' identity. This thinking 
departs from that of second wave humanist feminists, who accepted the theory of 
8° Given the separatist sentiments of Daly and Firestone, some people may doubt whether they 
should be placed in the humanist feminist category. However, while I agree with Iris Young, 
Throwing Like a Girl, op. cit., p. 82, that Daly's is at the least a 'transition work' to gynocentric 
feminist positions, I would also point out that Daly's rejection of motherhood does not let her fit 
easily into the gynocentric camp. Thus, to try and get some sense of the ambivalent position of both 
Firestone and Daly, I have defined them as 'radical humanist feminists'. 
81 M. Daly, Gyn/Ecology, op. cit., p. 28. 
sR S. Ruddick, 'Maternal Thinking, ' in D. Tietjens Meyers (ed. ), Feminist Social Thought: A 
Reader, (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 587. 
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socially constructed, differential gender identity, but believed that such distinctions 
should be transformed. 
One of the most important gynocentric positions was and continues to be 
`maternalism', or `maternal thinking'. It incorporates thinkers such as Jean Bethke 
Elshtain and Sara Ruddick 89 They have analysed the mothering role, arguing that, in 
spite of feminism and advances in reproductive technology, women continue to have 
children and remain the primary caregivers to children and family members more 
generally. They controversially assert that this situation is not purely because of 
patriarchal society compelling women to have children. Rather, they suggest that 
women might actually choose to have children and find raising children to be a 
positive experience in their lives. Further, maternalists argue that, even if women were 
not making such a choice freely, the continued tendency of women to be the primary 
caregiver means that these experiences stand as a source of values that men do not 
share. Indeed, Sara Ruddick has argued that fathers need to adopt a mothering role in 
relation to their children and benefit from women's long tradition of distinctive values 
of care. 9° 
By asserting the positive value of mothering, maternal thinkers have also 
sought to revise Millet and Friedan's portrayal of women as the victims of a 
patriarchy that totally defines and oppresses them. This revision has been one of their 
most enduring points of analysis and recently the matemalist Elshtain has reassessed 
the private/public distinction to consider the wider value of women's private roles 91 
Elshtain's work argues that women have been powerful in their private mothering and 
domestic roles and states that this has not been recognised due to male, and one might 
add humanist feminist theories, that have perceived the public sphere as the site of 
`proper' power and political action. Consequently, these later theories have dismissed 
women's private roles, portraying them as apolitical and politically powerless because 
89 J. Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought, (Oxford: 
Martin Robertson, 1981), and S. Ruddick, 'Maternal Thinking, ' op. cit., pp. 584-603. 
90 Ibid., p. 598. 
91 J. Elshtain, 'The Power and Powerlessness of Women, ' in 0. Bock and S. James, (eds. ), Beyond 
Equality and Difference: Citizenship, Feminist Politics and Female Subjectivity, op. cit., p. 116. 
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they have not been involved in the public sphere as much as men 92 For Elshtain it is 
necessary therefore to revise traditional concepts of political power, to take into 
account women's distinctive experiences of it. 
Within the general gynocentric stance there are a number of divisions over 
strategy. Jean Bethke Elshtain is a moderate gynocentric feminist in terms of strategy. 
She believes that the best way to achieve gynocentric aims is to engage with traditional 
political sites and institutions, and traditional concepts of politics'. 93 However, this 
approach does not go far enough for many gynocentric feminists. They fear that such 
moderation privileges traditional, male political values and is thus dangerously close to 
an anti-feminist standpoint. Hence, more radical gynocentrists, such as Luce Irigaray, 
demand that women's values are juxtaposed with, and endorsed independently of, 
male values to protect women's special identity. 94 
At the extreme end of this thinking, some second wave gynocentric feminists 
felt that it would never be possible to transform male values by engaging in 
conventional politics. Thus, they joined radical humanist feminists, like Mary Daly, in 
favouring separatism. They demanded not just that women follow non-traditional 
forms of politics -a common strategy in the second wave movement - but that women 
should create and eventually inhabit a totally different sphere to men, in which their 
superior values could find unimpeded expression. The most extremist separatist 
position, in its gynocentric formulation, is found in the writings of second wave, 
radical lesbian feminists such as Charlotte Bunch" and Adrienne Rich. 96 They 
suggested that separatism meant complete `women-centredness' and that a woman 
could only be an `authentic' feminist if she was also a lesbian. 
92 See J. Bethke Elshtain, ibid., pp. 112-114, for a discussion of how power has traditionally been 
defined. 
93 Ibid., p. 124. 
Irigaray is an interesting example, in this regard, because although she believes in a distinctive 
'feminine' way of being, and encourages radical action in its name, she is wary of simply 
overturning male dominance in favour of women's values. She believes that this action in itself is 
equivalent to the male quest for dominance that is anathema to women, L. Irigaray, 'This Sex Which 
is Not One, ' in L. Nicholson (ed. ), The Second Wave: A Reader in Feminist Theory, (New York and 
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The separatist position was increasingly influential in the movement by the 
early 1980s and not just among gynocentric feminists. In Britain, the experiences of 
women protesting against missiles at Greenham Common gave many feminists a taste 
for women-only communities. 97 Further, many humanist feminists, who had been 
extremely negative about so-called `feminine' values, welcomed this revival in the 
movement's politics, feeling that such statements might broaden the appeal of 
feminism. Indeed, Betty Friedan, a figurehead for liberal humanist feminism, moved 
towards this position in the 1980s. 98 In general, therefore, by the early 1980s there 
was a widespread distrust of conventional political processes in both the British and 
American movements. Most feminists were interested in finding alternative political 
strategies and models, and often, separatist political forums for women. Ann 
Ferguson, a maternalist and a socialist feminist, summed up this call for alternative 
political models, stating, 
[the] women's movement must continue to build an oppositional 
culture and politics that validates social, egalitarian parenting... Only in 
this way can we strengthen ourselves as women and as mothers to use 
the current contradictions between masculine sex/affective production 
based in the family and the ongoing development of state capitalist 
society in a struggle to challenge public patriarchy as a system of male 
domination 99 
It is clear from this brief history that the British and American movements 
were always fragmented and never amounted to sisterhoods. There was a divide 
between humanist feminists and gynocentric feminists throughout the second wave 
period. The former dominated in the early part of the second wave and believed that 
women should aim for equality with men and strive for autonomous selfhood. For 
many humanist feminists this meant rejecting traditional female values and models of 
identity that they saw as oppressive, relegating women to a life of private dependence. 
Gynocentric feminists came to the fore in the late 1970s, arguing that women had 
96 A. Rich, `Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, ' ibid., pp. 176-180. 
D. Bouchier, The Feminist Challenge: The Movement for Women's Liberation in Britain and the 
USA, op. cit., pp. 193-4. 
98B. Friedan, The Second Stage, (London: Michael Joseph, 1982) pp. 45-46, contemplates whether 
the call for equality has been workable or whether it has closed down women's choices and made 
feminism unappealing to those women who might cherish their role in the home. 
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distinct values that needed to be protected, preferably in women-only spaces. It is 
necessary however to understand how the movement shifted from containable 
fragmentation to destructive factionalism and finally, disintegration. 
The fragmentation of second wave feminism 
The main reason for the fragmentation of the movement was the second wave concern 
with identity which bound different interpretations of liberty and equality into what it 
meant to be, and to live as, an `authentic' feminist. This desire for authenticity was 
coupled with extensive political utopianism in the second wave that left feminists 
politically marginalised. Identity politics also caused a number of problems in the 
movement structure during the humanist and gynocentric attempts to build a universal 
sisterhood. All of these factors brought about the fragmentation of the second wave 
movement and need separate consideration. 
The role of identity politics 
Although the movement was diverse in the second wave, it was initially successful. 
Identity politics - both humanist and gynocentric - allowed women to come together 
and mobilise in the name of their common experiences as women. But this very 
process depended on the asserted identity being stabilised and fixed as an unchanging 
mark of identification. David Miller has usefully characterised the logic of identity 
politics, writing: 
For identity politics cannot be infinitely flexible. It must designate 
certain groups for political recognition, fix their membership, and 
determine what rights they are going to enjoy. In practice it relies on 
taking some characteristic such as gender or race-and using this as 
the basis for group classification. goo 
" A. Ferguson, `On Conceiving Motherhood and Sexuality: A Feminist Materialist Approach, ' in 
D. Tietjens Meyers (ed. ), Feminist Social Thought: A Reader, op. cit., p. 57. 
101 D. Miller, Group identities, National Identities, and Democratic Politics, a paper presented at the 
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Miller's most salient point, then, is that identity politics can only function by fixing 
the identity of those who participate in it. In the second wave this fixing of identity 
became essentialising, itself curtailing women's identity choices. 
Hence, in the British and American second wave feminist movements, this sort 
of identity politics was not just a first step to establish solidarity, it was also woven 
into a quest for feminist authenticity that extended to women's lifestyle choices and 
which demanded ideological adherence. Many second wave humanist feminists, for 
example, Firestone and Friedan essentialised the human identity by depicting an 
`authentic' human self. In turn, this concept essentialised women by default, 
suggesting that they were not men and in their difference were incomplete human 
selves. Gynocentric feminists, in contrast, essentialised women in terms of an inherent 
`feminine' identity. The extreme gynocentrism of lesbian feminists took this identity 
politics still further and saw it as a demand for complete sexual authenticity. As 
Lovenduski and Randall put it, `the reasoning behind the Radical feminist 
understanding of the politics of sexuality was that only lesbians could really be 
feminists because only lesbians chose other women sexually, only lesbians were truly 
women-centred'. `o' 
Combined with the quest for authenticity, identity politics became 
essentialising and authoritarian. Women who were ill at ease with a particular 
portrayal of authentic feminism either withdrew from the movement or asserted their 
own purportedly authentic view of identity. Barbara Ryan, in her study of the second 
wave American movement, documents how this process took hold. She writes: 
The adoption of an ideology that found only certain actors, lifestyles 
and relationships acceptable is closely related to social movement 
histories characterised by values of domination and control. None of 
these feminist groups [small radical, feminist groupings] were desirous 
of dictatorial authority, yet the emphasis on ideological purity lent itself 
to sometimes oppressive mind-sets. 102 
'°' J. Lovenduski and V. Randall, Contemporary Feminist Politics: Women and Power in Britain, 
op. cit., p. 70-71. 
1°2 B. Ryan, Feminism and the Women's Movement: Dynamics of Change in Social Movement 
Ideology and Activism, op. cit., p. 61. 
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Moreover, as these mind-sets increased and the number of different groups grew, they 
began competing for autonomy, ideological conformity and, sometimes, funding. 113 
Universal sisterhood and representation 
This ideological infighting also undermined the search for sisterhood that marked out 
the early years of the movement. Initially the rhetoric of sisterhood, like identity 
politics in general, was an important tool for solidarity and representation. Basing the 
representativeness of the movement on sisterhood meant that any women could 
represent all women simply be evoking its name. On this analysis, to be a member of 
the sisterhood was to be all women, experiencing the same universal, patriarchal 
oppression. The irony is, of course, that sisterhood proved to be unrepresentative of 
many women. These women were not happy to be dismissed by the rhetoric of `false 
consciousness' and some serious criticisms of sisterhood emerged. 
Aside from the gynocentric criticisms addressed earlier, more strident 
concerns were voiced by black women who had been involved in the feminist 
movement and who found that, for all its diversity of theories, the movement focused 
only on the experiences of white women. bell hooks104 and Audre Lourde'°5 were 
crucial in asserting the black feminist critique. hooks, considered black women to 
suffer dual oppression. Firstly, they suffered oppression by a patriarchy in which the 
black male, even during slavery, had more power than the black female and, secondly, 
they suffered at the hands of a racist culture. 106 According to hooks, these two forms 
of oppression combined to place black women in a uniquely subordinate position. She 
believed that this position was perpetuated within the second wave movement and that 
black women found the attitudes of most white feminists to be covertly racist and 
`o; J. Lovenduski and V. Randall, Contemporary Feminist Politics: Women and Power in Britain, 
op. cit., note that the Greater London Council in the early 1980s was funding feminist groups in the 
locality and that there was fierce competition for this funding, p. 73. 
104 b. hooks, Ain't 1a Woman: Black Women and Feminism, (London and Sydney: Pluto Press, 
1982). 
pos A. Lourde, `Age, Race, Class and Sex: Women Redefining Difference, ' in M. Evans (ed. ), The 
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patronising. 107 hooks suggests that this feeling of alienation was compounded by the 
belief among black women, who were more likely to be poor than their white 
counterparts, that those leading the movement were not even oppressed to the same 
degree as them: tending to be white, middle class and educated. 108 At root, the black 
feminist critique is a powerful indication of the limitations of a movement that 
concentrated on questions of identity, and did so in a manner that tended towards 
ideological conformity. 
The black feminist position was not the only critique of second wave 
feminism, two others emerged: lesbian feminism and poor women. Lesbian feminists 
were often the leaders of the more radical, small group sector and by the late 1970s 
they were having an even greater impact within the movement as a whole. They 
believed that the movement reified heterosexual relations and had ignored their 
concerns as lesbians. Hence, lesbian feminists, such as Adrienne Rich, introduced the 
idea of `women-identified experience' to encourage women to stop wasting their 
energies on men and to seek friendship with other women who would nurture, not 
destroy, their selfhood. 1°9 In Britain lesbian feminists fought for the adoption of a 
seventh general movement aim to protect women from sexual coercion and male 
aggression in general and ward off, what they perceived to be, the negative effects of 
heterosexism. 10 
Poor women joined these dissenting voices. They were not satisfied that their 
demands were in the remit of the movement, despite the existence of many socialist 
feminist groups in the second wave. "' In fact, socialist feminists were often paralysed 
107 Ibid., p. 188. 
108 Ibid., p. 145. 
109 A. Rich, `Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, ' op. cit., p. 178. 
10 The rest were largely liberal demands for better education and government provided childcare, 
although the more extreme statement, that male violence amounted to political control over women, 
was omitted, D. Bouchier, The Feminist Challenge: The Movement for Women's Liberation in 
Britain and the USA, op. cit., pp. 132-133. 
"' The latter constituted a very important sector in the movement in Britain. In terms of identity 
politics, socialist feminists had to reflect two identities: the gender identity and the class identity. 
They often ended up privileging class identity and were sceptical of extreme radical groups that were 
concerned only with gender identity, feeling that they lacked a theoretically rigorous view of human 
nature, A. Jagger, Feminist Politics and Human Nature, (Sussex and New Jersey: Harvester and 
Rowman and Allanfeld, 1983), p. 105. 
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by factionalism in their sector of the movement, as a result of dogmatic assertions of 
`true' theory. For poor women, such theoretical infighting seemed irrelevant to their 
practical economic difficulties and they often felt alienated by it. Instead they chose to 
seek better representation in the trade unions and conduct their own battles. In Britain, 
women workers brought some of the first equal pay actions, without direct feminist 
involvement in their cause. "2 
The position of these critiques in this analysis is somewhat paradoxical. On 
the one hand, they exposed the dangers of the essentialist thinking that was present in 
much second wave humanist and gynocentric feminism. On the other hand, it is not 
clear that these theoretical challenges were themselves `anti-essentialist. ' Some of 
these theories, notoriously those of many radical lesbian feminists, were predicated on 
their own brand of essentialism, which proved to be just as inadequate as the ideas 
they criticised in determining what it meant to be a woman or an authentic feminist. 
Ultimately, they did not solve the representation problems of second wave feminism 
and the movement moved from fragmentation to disintegration as ideological warfare 
broke out. 
The unrepresentative nature of the second wave movement was compounded 
by its prevailing model of participatory democracy-' 13 In this model, the legitimating 
factor is not formal and institutional representation, but participation and agreement. 
Most feminist groups therefore did not have leaders or formal voting procedures. The 
groups wanted, instead, to be based on consensus decision-making, that reflected their 
common concerns as women. Anne Phillips has illustrated how the lack of formal 
procedures in the movement was very destructive because feminist groups either broke 
into smaller and smaller groups until they reached consensus or descended into 
"I D. Bouchier The Feminist Challenge: The Movement for Women's Liberation in Britain and the 
USA, op. cit., pp. 106-108. 
It is actually very surprising how quickly leading feminists realised that this lack of formalism 
caused problems and yet it still continued. A. Phillips, Engendering Democracy, (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1991) p. 127, notes how Jo Freeman's tract, The Structure of Structurelessness, which 
detailed these problems, was being circulated in America as early as 1970. 
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protracted debating processes that continually deferred decisions. 14 Further, the lack 
of leaders, and this stands as one of Phillips's most useful points, led to accountability 
and legitimacy problems. "5 If there is no formal leadership, as was the case with 
many second wave groups, then nobody has the authority to speak for, or to represent 
anyone else. In the second wave, this situation was worsened by the propensity of the 
media to create movement leaders - often the most articulate and the loudest members 
of a group - which also caused resentment among those feminists not chosen. 
Consequently, the following conclusions can be made about the historical 
patterns of first and second wave feminism. Movement unity has been the exception 
and not the general situation throughout the history of feminism. Where a unification 
of objectives has taken place, it has not been on the basis of grand, revolutionary 
schema, but because of more moderate single-issue campaigns. Hence, there was 
convergence in the first wave, to good effect, over the need for citizenship and the vote 
for women. In the second wave there was some banding together in America to get the 
constitutional Equal Rights Amendment passed and to gain abortion rights. ' t6 In 
Britain, the second wave movement found similar strength in defending the 1967 
abortion law from the several legislative attempts to restrict or abolish it that were 
made in the late 1970s. "7 Beyond these instances, it is hard to find much hard 
evidence of a sisterhood, other than as a vague symbol of solidarity. 
Movement meltdown: the end of feminist politics? 
Undoubtedly not all feminism organisations and groups in the second wave ended up 
in such disarray. Organisations such as NOW maintained a formal membership 
structure and, at its height, had a quarter of a million members. "' But these groups are 
"a See A. Phillips, Chapter Five, `The Paradoxes of Participation, ' ibid., pp. 120-146, for a general 
discussion of the movement's problems with democracy. 
"' Ibid., p. 134. 
116 B. Ryan, Feminism and the Women's Movement: Dynamics of Change in Social Movement 
Ideology and Activism, op. cit., p. 108. 
"' D. Bouchier, The Feminist Challenge: The Movement for Women's Liberation in Britain and the 
USA, op. cit., p. 113 
18 B. Ryan, Feminism and the Women's Movement: Dynamics of Change in Social Movement 
Ideology and Activism, op. cit., p. 73. 
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not those that the press continue to portray in a negative manner. Moreover, the legacy 
of radical groups has been greater than that of conventional organisations, with many 
feminists of the last decade, such as Iris Marion Young, celebrating their grassroots 
structure and practise of `cultural politics'. "' Thus, it seems imperative to reassess 
these groupings, just as much as the larger organisations, when providing a 
retrospective of the second wave movement. 
It was in smaller, more radical groups that second wave feminism's concern 
with personal identity became more pronounced. They used `consciousness raising' 
to concentrate on the personal identities and experiences of women. Many feminists 
had initially hoped that such a procedure would counteract the patriarchally imposed 
`false consciousness' of women, enabling them, instead, to become aware of their own 
personal oppression. "' The actual process was done in a group setting so that the 
shared nature of these experiences of oppression could become apparent, or so went 
the theory. In reality it often ended up as private therapy, having limited political affect 
beyond the group. Juliet Mitchell was one of the first feminists to note the 
fragmentary impact of group `consciousness raising', observing that, 'some ... have 
suffered the fate of the whirlpool. Individual - small group - individual. Lonely women 
have left the home and gone back home'. 'Z' In America some women began 
`trashing' women during `consciousness raising', whereby in the name of ideological 
purity and authentic identity, but often for personal reasons, they excluded women 
from their feminist group. Ti-Grace Atkinson was even excluded from The Feminists, 
the group she helped found. '22 In Britain there was a similar degree of factionalism 
and infighting, with a national body for feminist activity, the Women's National Co- 
19 I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 
154. 
120 J. Mitchell, Women's Estate, (London: Penguin, 1971) p. 61. 
Ibid., p. 63. 
122 B. Ryan, Feminism and the Women's Movement: Dynamics of Change in Social Movement 
Ideology and Activism, op. cit., p. 62. 
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ordinating Committee, being abolished in 1971 because of movement splits, only a 
year after its establishment. 123 
By the mid-1980s this factionalism had given way to the disintegration of the 
movement. Some feminists were working in highly structured pressure organisations 
in the political system and most of the radical sector was involved in small-scale, 
cultural measures. 12' The whole ethos of `the personal is political' turned in on itself 
and started to re-marginalise feminists in regard to politics. Diane Fuss succinctly 
depicts the retreat from politics brought about by identity politics, stating `a severe 
reduction of the political to the personal leads to a telescoping of goals, a limiting of 
revolutionary activity to the project of self-discovery and personal transformation'. ' 25 
Identity politics thus signalled movement meltdown in the second wave. David 
Bouchier even noted, in a rather bleak summary of the movement, that `as a movement, 
it is virtually a textbook case of every problem which has plagued every social 
movement in history'. "' Ultimately, the central difficulty remained the widespread 
tendency towards identity politics that saw many feminists seek out illusory ideas of 
`authentic' feminist experiences. It proved to be very hard to find theoretical 
agreement over these visions. Hence, the movement fragmented into a mass of 
feminist groups, each of which had a different idea of authenticity. Identity politics 
also narrowed the appeal of feminism because many women did not recognise 
themselves in these pictures of women's experiences. Thus, most feminists, by the late 
1980s, found themselves in a marginalised position. They were left with a rump 
movement and, as Susan Mendus has noted, they were disillusioned with 
democracy. ' Z' 
'z3 D. Bouchier, The Feminist Challenge: The Movement for Women's Liberation in Britain and the 
USA, op. cit., p. 94. 
'Z4 These measures continued to be important in providing safe spaces for women, but they tended to 
be insular and fragmented and did not help the wider movement politically engage. 
125 D. Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference, (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1989), p. 101. 
'26D. Bouchier, The Feminist Challenge: The Movement for Women's Liberation in Britain and the 
USA, op. cit., p. 208. 
127 See her article on the implications of this feminist disillusionment with democracy, S. Mendus, 
'Losing the Faith: Feminism and Democracy, ' in J. Dunn, (ed. ), Democracy the Unfinished Journey: 
508 BC to AD 1993, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 207-219. 
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Conclusion 
Feminists began writing during the Enlightenment and were inspired into greater 
activism by the revolutionary fervour of eighteenth century Europe. In the first wave 
the need to gain basic legal and civil rights meant that the movement was fairly unified. 
Although first wave feminists certainly raised questions of identity, it was the need for 
civil and legal recognition that remained important for both humanist and gynocentric 
feminists at that time. Most first wave humanist feminists, such as Mill and Stanton, 
believed that this sort of recognition would liberate women from their traditional 
dependence on men. For gynocentric feminists, such as Power Cobbe, civil 
recognition meant the positive and equal acceptance of women's distinctive values. 
Second wave feminist theorising, on the other hand, turned its attention to 
issues of identity to account for why, after attaining the most basic civil, political and 
social rights, women still appeared to be socially subordinate to men. The first 
feminist response was humanistic, with Woolf, de Beauvoir and Friedan arguing that 
women were suffering as human beings by their failure to take up educational and 
legal opportunities. Moreover, the very fact that women had not advanced meant that a 
more intensive analysis of their social and psychological position was deemed 
necessary. In Woolf's work this search culminated in the suggestion that there was a 
socially constructed and maintained coalition of values that women found inherently 
alienating. This argument was the start of the new definition of patriarchy. Although 
many feminists went on to develop this idea of women having intrinsically different 
identities to men into gynocentric feminist positions, others, such as Friedan and de 
Beauvoir, reasserted humanist feminism. In general, though, this period saw a 
transition to identity politics that came to define the second wave. 
In the second wave identity politics proved to be the common link between the 
gynocentrists and the humanists and in most cases the question of identity was fixed; 
it thus provided essentialised versions of what women were or should be and what it 
meant to be an `authentic' feminist. Second wave humanist feminists believed 
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therefore that women needed to search for autonomous human identity because they 
had been excluded from authentic human selfhood. Gynocentric feminists, Ruddick 
and Elshtain are good examples, believed, in contrast, that women have distinctive 
feminine identities that were equal, if not superior, to men's. Thus, they set out to 
defend and nurture the women's point of view. While this objective was a moderate 
project of political inclusion for Elshtain, for a radical feminist like Rich it meant that 
women's identity could only be protected in a separate political sphere. 
Identity politics took practical effect in the movement in a very distinctive 
manner. In the face of ideologically defined identities, all flexibility to appeal to 
women who fell beyond these rigid distinctions was lost. Indeed, many second wave 
feminists had difficulty accepting the diversity of women's voices and the dissent that 
arose; after all, they were propagating visions of authenticity. At its worst, identity 
politics culminated in feminists personally attacking each other's lifestyle choices and 
excluding women who didn't `fit. ' Moreover, the propensity to favour non-traditional 
and informal political ties meant that such infighting could not be legitimately 
processed by appeal to a leader or procedural rules; this often led to fragmentation 
into still smaller groupings where unanimity and consensus on identity and lifestyle 
could be achieved. Unfortunately, some women were compelled to withdraw altogether 
from feminist politics. On the rare occasions there was a convergence of objectives in 
the movement, it was never the result of a unified feminist theory or of a widespread 
solidarity among women. Rather, feminists converged on single issues such as 
abortion policy, and later the anti-missile campaign. In these instances a base unity of 
objectives could be retained, even if disagreement over strategies and tactics existed. 
Since the late 1980s, two responses to the disintegration of the feminist 
movement have arisen. One response has been to continue the search for a feminist 
sisterhood and a single feminist theory. The other response, to which this thesis is 
sympathetic, has been to re-evaluate the utopianism, essentialism and universalism of 
the second wave and rethink questions of feminist collectivity and movement politics. 
It is a big step however to forsake the universal solidarity promised by the sisterhood. 
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Indeed, many feminists are convinced that without a sisterhood - or, more properly, the 
promise of a sisterhood - there cannot be an effective feminist movement. 
Consequently, the disintegration of second wave feminism needs to be better 
understood before these theoretical steps can be widely accepted. Hence, while this 
chapter has concentrated on the internal problems of feminism, the disintegration of 
the second wave movement can be usefully seen in a wider context. On this basis, 
feminists share the general dilemmas facing many radical activist movements in 
complex Western democracies: how to overcome disintegration and how to respond to 
increasingly pluralised political, social and cultural climates? 
The intellectual terms of this debate have found their clearest manifestation in 
the body of thought termed postmodernism. The disparate band of thinkers making 
up postmodernism includes Jean-Francois Lyotard, Michel Foucault, Richard Rorty, 
Jacques Lacan and Julia Kristeva. Their theories stand behind an important shift in 
feminist political theory, to be examined in the next chapter, and have been used by 
many feminists to understand the fragmentation of the second wave. Seyla Benhabib, 
Iris Young and Chantal Mouffe are three feminists who have taken postmodern 
discourses seriously, using them to question the second wave's emphasis on essential 
identity, utopian political settlements and feminist theories of knowledge that all 
proved to be so devastating for the movement. Moreover, these thinkers realise that 
feminism is now a permanently contested and complex concept. They are all keen, 
therefore, to re-engage feminist concerns with a wider political framework of 
democratic politics and ensure that feminist concerns are not left marginalised, as they 
have been since the fragmentation of the second wave. 
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Chapter Two. Understanding the Relationship between Feminism 
and Postmodernism 
Introduction 
It was shown in the last chapter that the second wave feminist movement fragmented 
by the late 1980s for three reasons. Firstly, the feminist emphasis on identity politics 
left them fighting bitter battles over authenticity. Secondly, their search for a universal 
sisterhood based on shared identity and common experiences excluded and 
misrepresented many women. Thirdly, as the movement began to fragment, many 
feminist groups withdrew from political engagement, often concentrating on utopian, 
separatist political settlements. Feminists have spent the last twenty years coming to 
terms with this fragmentation. Some feminists, such as Barbara Ryan, have continued 
to argue for a second wave model of feminism based on a sisterhood, ensuring that 
this time it is properly `inclusive'. ' However, a large number of feminist theorists have 
begun to rethink feminism and its fragmentation in terms of postmodern discourses. ' 
While this approach rarely amounts to `postmodern-feminism, ' it indicates how 
postmodernism has provided a critical impetus to re-examine the problems of feminist 
fragmentation and to move feminism into a new wave. It is necessary therefore to 
examine the role postmodern theory has played in shifting feminism into this new 
wave of thinking and in helping it to come to terms with the legacies of the second 
wave. However, postmodernism itself is not a coherent body of thought, it includes 
diverse thinkers and themes. Therefore, before the relationship between feminism and 
postmodernism can be fully understood, it is necessary to define postmodernism by 
' B. Ryan, Feminism and the Women's Movement: Dynamics of Change in Social Movement 
Ideology and Activism, (New York and London: Routledge, 1992) p. 133. 
2 For useful introductions to the feminist thinking after the postmodern critique see J. Butler, Gender 
Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, (New York and London: Routledge: 1990), N. 
Fraser and L. Nicholson, 'Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter Between Feminism 
and Postmodernism, ' in Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 5, Nos. 2-3, (June 1988), and C. Mouffe, 
'Feminism, Citizenship and Politics, ' in The Return of the Political, (London and New York: Verso, 
1993), pp. 74-89. 
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considering its roots in modern traditions of thought and delimiting its political 
implications. 
Hence, the aim of this chapter is to study contemporary approaches to 
postmodern thought. From this study it is possible to place postmodernism in a 
diverse historical tradition, before addressing current postmodern theories and their 
implications for feminist politics. The chapter will conclude with a consideration of the 
role postmodern thinking plays in a new wave of feminist political thought, including 
the problems and opportunities created by this paradigm change. It will argue that 
postmodernism has been used as a critical strategy that allows feminists to understand 
the fragmentation of the second wave, question their essentialist views of subjectivity 
and re-think their reliance on utopian and separatist political settlements. On these 
terms, postmodernism is a critical strategy that, once applied to the feminist example, 
indicates a twofold process. On the one hand, feminists can use it to rethink the 
feminist movement as an alliance or coalition rather than a sisterhood. In the alliance 
the aim of feminism is to create political strategies for feminists, not to search for 
identity affirmation. On the other hand, the postmodern approach calls for feminists to 
recognise the limits of their activist politics and the precarious nature of their 
solidarity. Consequently if feminists understand the postmodern position, they will 
also place feminism in a wider political framework, ensuring that women's citizen 
identity is protected, as well as their feminist one. Hence, it will be seen that 
postmodern theory finally breaks with the separatist position in feminism and 
reconciles feminism with political engagement. 
Approaching postmodern theories 
Postmodernism, at least in its current guise, has emerged over the past thirty years. It 
is a controversial theory that has met with many responses including outright rejection. 
In the early 1980s Jurgen Habermas made his famous condemnation of 
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postmodernism, vilifying it as conservative, apolitical and nihilistic. 3 However, 
Habermas's own approach to postmodernism was not without its difficulties. It tended 
to simplify the historical tradition of modernity and it dismissed all theories of 
postmodernism as variants of conservatism, missing the subtleties of the discourse. A 
more fruitful approach to postmodernism is to understand it as a diverse body of 
thought. So while some thinkers such as Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jean Braudillard 
have offered up concrete, alternative postmodern political discourses, ' others, such as 
Michel Foucault, Julia Kristeva and Richard Rorty, have used it as a project for 
`coming to terms' with modernity. 5 Lawrence Cahoone, who has offered one of the 
most cogent categorisations of postmodern thought, detects three forms of 
postmodern thinking to take account of its diversity. He suggests that each 
postmodern thinker must be examined to determine whether they are, 
(a) merely making the historical claim that modern ideas and methods 
are being superseded or abandoned in the present age; (b) questioning 
the validity of modem methods without making any explicit claims 
about their falsity or suggesting that they be abandoned; or (c) 
claiming the inadequacy of modern methods and inviting us to 
abandon them in favour of something else. 6 
It is the second postmodern approach that is most useful for feminist purposes. It is 
concerned with finding the limits of modem intellectual and political thought and 
constitutes what is best described as a critical strategy, rather than a nihilistic attempt to 
destroy all forms of theory and knowledge. Postmodernism, seen as a critical strategy, 
questions the present validity of modern ideas and methods of thought to establish 
their contingent usefulness for political thinking. This strategy makes no claims about 
I J. Habermas, `Modernity - An Incomplete Project, ' in H. Foster (ed. ), Postmodern Culture, 
(London: Pluto Press, 1985), p. 14. 
4 See J. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Trans., G. Bennington and B. 
Massumi, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984) and J. Braudillard, from, 'Symbolic 
Exchange and Death, ' in L. Cahoone (ed. ), From Modernism to Postmodernism: An Anthology, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 437-460. 
' See, M. Foucault, 'What is Enlightenment? ' in M. Foucault, The Foucault Reader, P. Rabinow 
(ed. ), (New York: Pantheon, 1984), R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), and J. Kristeva, The Kristeva Reader, T. Moi, (ed. ), (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1986). 
6 L. Cahoone in L. Cähoone (ed. ), From Modernism to Postmodernism: An Anthology, op. cit., p. 
18. 
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either the historical accuracy or necessity of these forms of thought. Indeed, part of the 
critical strategy might be to acknowledge a debt to the modem political tradition. 
Hence, the strand of postmodern thought that will be argued for here questions 
the contingent validity of the assumptions of universalistic, essentialistic and 
foundationalist thought that have underpinned Enlightenment philosophy and many 
modern activist movements, such as second wave feminism. It looks at how the theory 
and practice of these ideals, particularly by radical, activist movements, has pluralised 
and problematised them. Approaching postmodern thought in this manner, moreover, 
gives the discourse some historical depth, which helps explain its role in and 
relationship to a new wave of feminist thinking. 
The historical tradition of postmodern thought 
It is necessary to place postmodernism in its own historical tradition so that its 
contingent basis in modem thought can be understood. It also helps in establishing 
postmodern discourse as a critical strategy, which is constructive not nihilistic. In 
short, examining this tradition shows how modem and postmodern discourses mesh 
together and are dependent on each other. As Foucault writes, finding 
postmodernism's place in the modem tradition will not be a case of, 
seeking to distinguish the `modern era' from the `premodern' or 
`postmodern' ... it would be more useful to try and find out how the 
attitude of modernity ever since its formation, has found itself 
struggling with the attitudes of `countermodernity. '7 
For Foucault, therefore, postmodernism becomes an `ethos, ' a perspective on ways of 
thinking, that not everyone will share. 8 It does not signify a completely new 
philosophical age or method. Part of this approach to postmodernism is the 
recognition that modernity is not itself a singular tradition, but actually consists of a 
number of theoretical debates. Hence, this view of postmodernism as a `critical 
strategy' has direct historical roots in three areas of modem thought: the debates of 
the Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment, the rise of romanticism, and early 
7 M. Foucault, 'What is Enlightenment? ' op. cit p. 39. 
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twentieth century thinking on the modern condition. While the Enlightenment and 
counter-Enlightenment and the rise of Romanticism will be discussed below, early 
twentieth century thinking on the modem condition will be considered at a later point. 
These areas of thought set precedents for the postmodern questioning of universalism, 
rational selfhood and foundational philosophy, and thus each shall be examined in 
tum. 
Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment debates 
Enlightenment philosophy has been a definitive part of the Western tradition of 
political thought. It was seen in Chapter One that this thought established the concepts 
of the rational, autonomous human self, radical political agency, and universal, 
objective knowledge. Indeed, these concepts inspired the democratic revolutions of 
Europe, first wave feminist movements and nineteenth century liberal views of politics. 
Charles Taylor indicates the importance of the Enlightenment and, more specifically, 
Kantian views of the self in theorising the subject as an active social and political 
agent. According to Taylor, these views of selfhood were predicated on universal 
standards of action that meant the self was autonomous and active, but still had to fulfil 
certain duties and obligations. 9 
However, no concept can remain tied to the tradition of thought that first 
produced it. Thus in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Enlightenment view of 
the rational autonomous self, that used reason to found knowledge and realise its 
duties, was interpreted in many different ways. Initially for thinkers such as Descartes 
and Kant reason was seen as a form of philosophical critique that could be used to 
critically analyse knowledge-claims and to formulate first principles. However, for 
later thinkers it became clear that reason, once portrayed as a philosophical critique, 
could be used to question the ultimate truths and philosophic laws they had initially set 
8 Ibid., pp. 42-43. 
C. Taylor, Sources of the Self: the Making of Modern Identity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989) p. 84. 
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out to theorise. 1° With this established, the idea of the reasoning self who founds 
knowledge passes from Enlightenment discourse to counter-Enlightenment 
discourses. John Gray notes how Nietzsche developed a counter-Enlightenment 
discourse that brought to fruition the Enlightenment themes of the rational, 
autonomous self and the use of critical reason. As Gray writes, 'Nietzsche's thought 
accomplishes the dissolution of the Enlightenment project, because in it the apotheosis 
of human subjectivity is combined with a subversive critical reason and only the will- 
to-power remains'. " In other words, the idea of the autonomous selfhood using 
reason to establish universal laws, gives way to the subject using reason to question all 
laws, limits and obligations, leaving only its individual will. " The new ways of 
thinking that emerged in the Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment debates of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries find echoes in contemporary postmodern thought. 
The most crucial legacy is the concept of critical reason that Nietzsche began to 
evaluate in contrast to the Enlightenment meaning of thought as a tool to find universal 
laws and knowledge. In his thought, reason no longer sought out universal 
philosophical truths, but was used to question the idea of truth itself. " This counter- 
Enlightenment view of critical reason finds postmodern expression in the discourse's 
questioning of philosophical essences, origins and foundations. The postmodern 
thinker Foucault argues that the use of critical reason in this manner does not replicate 
Enlightenment or counter-enlightenment thinking, but invokes the contingency of our 
philosophical tools on these traditions: 
10 Kant was one of the first thinkers to question the idea of singular and essential origins. According 
to Andrew Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory: The Philosophy of German Literary 
Theory (London and New York: Routledge, 1997). pp. 31-32, Kant doubts the possibility of ever 
knowing an a priori, ready-made-world. Instead, Kant saw it as a product of human knowing and 
judgement, such that, there is no essential origin or cause, because then one would always have to 
find the origin of the origin, ibid., pp. 33-34. 
" J. Gray, Enlightenment's Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age, (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1995) pp. 165-166. 
12 We saw in Chapter One how the Kantian self was prevented from pure self-assertion by its duties 
and obligations that were governed by universal laws. If autonomous selfhood is separated from these 
universal laws, as Nietzsche effectively did by questioning universalism, all that is left is self- 
assertion. 
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The thread that may connect us with the Enlightenment is not a 
faithfulness to doctrinal elements but rather the permanent reactivation 
of an attitude - that is of a philosophical ethos that could be described 
as a permanent critique of our historical era. " 
The problem, according to Foucault, has been the tendency to see this ethos as 
modernity per se, as constitutive of an historical epoch. He suggests, instead, that it is a 
philosophical attitude that a few, now and then, continue to hold. In this sense, 
postmodern philosophy, if Foucault's theory is applied, is indebted to Enlightenment 
and counter-Enlightenment views of critique, and the tensions between them. However, 
the real challenge to Enlightenment thought emanated from nineteenth century 
Romanticism. 
The rise of Romanticism 
The rudiments of the Romantic alternative to Enlightenment theories, based on 
rationalism, universalism and foundationalism, developed over a hundred years. It was 
not the first discourse to oppose Enlightenment views of the centrality of reason in 
constituting the self and knowledge. In the same century that this view of rationality 
was being established, some thinkers simultaneously accepted the importance of 
sentiments and emotion. " Isaiah Berlin believes that the early Romantics followed this 
trajectory of thought, believing that the human will needed both reason and creativity 
for self-expression. " So in many respects, Romantic thinkers tried to theorise a richer 
concept of reason than that which was commonly held in the Enlightenment, to take 
account of all aspects of human existence. " For example, Herder rejected the 
Enlightenment's rather stolid picture of the autonomous, rational human self, arguing, 
" Indeed Foucault examines the full implications of Nietzsche's genealogy for modern philosophical 
methods in M. Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, ' in L. Cahoone (ed. ), From Modernism to 
Postmodernism: An Anthology, op. cit., pp. 360-378. 
14 M. Foucault, 'What is Enlightenment? ' op. cit, p. 42. 
C. Taylor, Sources of the Self the Making of Modern Identity, op. cit., pp. 343-347, notes that 
both Hume and Diderot were challenging the predominant views of reason in this period. 
16 I. Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, H. Hardy (ed. ), (London: John Murray, 1990), pp. 
214-215. 
" N. O'Sullivan, Conservatism, (London: J. M. Dent and Son, 1976), says that this new concept of 
reason was intended to `do justice to the diversity and complexity of the universe, the social order and 
human nature itself, ' p. 70. 
53 
philosophers have exalted human reason to a position of supremacy, 
independent of senses and organs. But just as there is no such thing as 
an isolated faculty of reason, so there is no man who has become all he 
is entirely by his own effort. '$ 
By questioning the supremacy of reason, Herder showed that the human self was a 
social being located within the world, and that even the use of reason was determined 
by social existence. Hence, while it is clear that many Romantics did not oppose 
rationality, they did give theoretical depth to the idea of the self who is primarily 
emotional and social. 
Most Romantic thinkers agreed with the idea of the social self, but they 
developed both conservative and radical responses to it. In nineteenth century 
Germany a strong conservative Romantic Movement emerged, writing in the 
nationalist spirit of the then nascent German unification. German conservative 
Romantic thinkers tended to emphasise the values of nation and social unity. '9 French 
Romantics, such as Charles Baudelaire, were often more radical and individualist than 
their German counterparts. 2° In general, however, most Romantics felt that questions 
of identity were more complex than many Enlightenment thinkers had imagined. 
Romantic thinkers wanted to acknowledge the social differences between individuals, 
differences that could not be levelled by the exercise of universal reason. Baudelaire 
summed up this diversity, stating, `within that unity which we call a Nation (sic), the 
various professions and classes and the passing centuries all introduce variety'. 2' 
The nineteenth century Romantic belief in difference and diversity 
encompassed more than their view of human nature. They also questioned the 
Enlightenment belief in the possibility of universal solutions to moral and political 
problems. As Arthur Lovejoy argues, in The Great Chain of Being, Romantic thinkers 
'$ J. Herder, Herder on Social and Political Culture, F. Barnard, (ed. ), (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969) p. 311. 
19 See the chapter, 'The German Conservative Tradition: Romanticism and Power', in N. O'Sullivan, 
Conservatism, op. cit., pp. 58-81, for a useful overview of this period. 
20 C. Baudelaire, 'The Painter of Modern Life, ' in L. Cahoone (ed. ), From Modernism to 
Postmodernism: An Anthology, op. cit., pp. 136-144. 
21 Ibid., p. 143. 
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resisted Enlightenment attempts to standardise thought into a set of universal truths? Z 
Rather, they acknowledged the contingency and diversity of moral and political ideas. 
The nineteenth century German Romantic Triestschke, for instance, noted how `the 
concept of sovereignty can be no rigid one; it is elastic and relative like all political 
conceptions'. 23 In reifying difference and contingency, Romantics had a clear grasp of 
the possibility of social conflict arising. 24 Many radical Romantic thinkers even saw 
this conflict as an inherent good in society and the cosmos. Baudelaire, for example, 
characterised his `dandy' philosophy as a search for `modernity' based on such 
notions of `the ephemeral, the fugitive and the contingent'. 25 
The Romantic challenge to Enlightenment thought thus established new 
concepts of the self, society and philosophy. They countered the Enlightenment view 
of the objective, rational self with the aesthetic, impassioned and creative one. They 
also rejected the view of a rationally ordered universe, recognising, instead, the 
plurality of values and societies. Finally, most Romantics recognised the historical and 
social contingency of thought and meaning. This view of philosophy contrasted with 
the predominant Enlightenment belief in the progressive, rational and universalisable 
development of human thought and knowledge. 
These nineteenth century Romantic views of contingency, diversity and 
complexity have distinctive echoes in contemporary postmodern views of the 
decentred self and the plurality of society and discourse. The postmodern tendency to 
conceive of the self as decentred links to the radical Romantic view of the self as 
expressive and complex. In both cases the rejection of the universalisable core self has 
led to, and has been developed from, a view of extreme diversity among individuals in 
a fluctuating and complex society. Second, both Romantic, as Trietschke's work 
showed, and postmodern thinkers stress the contingency of philosophical thought and 
22 A. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, (Cambridge (Mass. ): Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 
292-293. 
H. von Trietschke ,A Selection from Trietschke's Lectures on Politics, Trans., Adam. L. Gowans, 
(London and Glasgow: Gowans and Gray Ltd, 1914), pp. 14. 
24 A. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, op. cit., p. 296. 
23 C. Baudelaire, `The Painter of Modern Life, ' op. cit., p. 142. 
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concepts, questioning their status as universal truths. These postmodern concepts will 
be examined in more detail at a later stage, but the connection can be established. 
However, there are limits to how far the parallels between Romantic and 
postmodern thought can be taken. Most Romantics see society as a diverse but, 
ultimately, functioning, organic whole. 26 Many postmoderns, for example, Laclau and 
Mouffe, would dispute such a harmonious view of society, believing, instead, that 
society is irrevocably contradictory and fragmented. 27 The second difference between 
Romantic and postmodern discourses stems from the Romantic idea that the subject's 
inner nature and outer nature can be reconciled. Romantics see the attainment of this 
unification as a source of freedom. As Noel O'Sullivan puts it, `the Romantic 
conservative, in short, wants so much unity that nothing but the world of pure 
spirit... will satisfy him'. 28 In contrast, postmoderns such as Julia Kristeva reject both 
the possibility and the desirability of the permanently reconciled and united self. 
Given these differences between Romantic and postmodern views of the self, it is 
necessary to look at how Romanticism developed in early twentieth century thought, to 
fully understand the historical circumstances of contemporary postmodern theory. 
Making sense of the twentieth century: new modes of thought and new 
political problems 
By the dawn of the twentieth century, Enlightenment and Romantic doctrines had gone 
through several permutations. They were further developed by the ideological divides 
of the early twentieth century in which new forms of thought emerged responding to 
the industrialisation and scientification of society, totalitarian political ideology, and the 
growing diversity and complexity of Western societies. What characterises much early 
twentieth century thought - and directly streams into contemporary postmodern 
themes - is the idea that philosophy should reflect and respond to the crises of society; 
26 N. O'Sullivan, Conservatism, op. cit., p. 58. 
27 E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics, (London and New York: Verso, 1985) p. 96. 
Za N. O'Sullivan, Conservatism, op. cit., p. 69. 
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that is to say, philosophy should have the task of literally making sense of the 
twentieth century. Hence, new ideas again emerged about the self, society, philosophy 
and knowledge. 
The twentieth century self 
As it has been argued, Romantic thinkers challenged the vision of the rational, 
autonomous unified self, first theorised by Enlightenment thinkers such as Descartes 
and Kant. They suggested that the self was not purely rational but also wanted to be 
creative, passionate and authentic. They tended to believe that by living this authentic 
existence the self could be unified. It took the Freudian philosophy of the self to 
further question both Enlightenment and Romantic visions of unified subjectivity. Put 
briefly, Freud believed that the self had three constituent parts: the id, ego and 
superego. The id, the unconscious part of the self, was complex, passionate and often 
irrational, making self-unification difficult. Thus while Freud believed that the self, the 
ego, could be rationally ordered through the superego's acceptance of social rules, 
laws and norms, this ordering could only happen through the repression of the chaotic 
id. Hence, the self (ego) was always caught between the impulses of its id and the need 
to control its id because of social constraints, and it could never find authenticity as 
Romantic thinkers believed. The result was, rather, tremendous guilt and often a 
feeling of extreme unease at the need for repression. 29 
From the 1930s onwards, Jacques Lacan 30 further developed the 
psychoanalytic view of the self. His views will be examined in greater detail later but, 
for the moment, it can be noted that, like Freud, he believed the self was complex. Its 
complexity lay in the fact that it must make itself known to others through the use of 
29 S. Freud, `Civilisation and its Discontents, ' in L. Cahoone (ed. ), From Modernism to 
Postmodernism: An Anthology, op. cit., p. 215. If this unease was very severe, such that repression 
was difficult to achieve, then the patient needed psychoanalysis. Even then, therapy only aims at 
getting the patient to accept the necessary repression of their id. 
30 J. Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, Trans., Alan Sheridan, (London: Routledge, 1977). 
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language. 3' However, he rejected the Freudian idea that the self could order and 
regulate itself. According to Lacan, the self had no core unity and the self was beset by 
a feeling of lack because it could not live up to the social desire for complete unity. 
The self would thus remain decentred. The Frankfurt School of critical theorists, 
which included Marcuse, Adorno and Horkheimer, also picked up the psychoanalytic 
view of the self. They used the theory to supplement Marxist theories of revolution 
and suggested that modern man was disunified and in crisis, facing alienation from his 
very being. 32 According to their argument, modern man thus needed liberation through 
social revolution, not more repression as Freud had suggested. These views of the self 
are important as a background to the postmodernism rendering of the decentred and 
complex self. But there is a point of contrast between these positions in that 
postmoderns believe that the complexity of the self is inevitable, it can never be unified 
by revolution, as the Frankfurt School argued, or by therapy, as Freud suggested. 
The social order in the twentieth century 
Just as psychoanalyst thinkers developed a more complex view of the self, other 
thinkers were questioning Enlightenment and Romantic views of society. 
Enlightenment thinkers, such as de Condorcet and Kant, believed that society was 
progressive and rationally ordered. As knowledge developed, they argued, society 
progressed a stage further towards perfect human existence. Romantics also developed 
a view of perfect, unified society. However, they believed in an evolutionary and 
organic, or an aesthetically created, society rather than a linear, progressive one. In the 
early twentieth century structuralists such as Ferdinand de Saussure, philosophers 
such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, and phenomonologists such as Edmund Husserl and 
" For a good introduction to the relationship between Lacan and Freud's thinking see, chapter four of 
Ecrits, ibid., `The Freudian Thing, ' pp. 114-145. 
32 See H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Societies, 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), and M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno, Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, Trans., John Cumming, (London: Allen Lane, 1973). 
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Jean-Paul Sartre challenged these views of the unified society. 33 These thinkers 
questioned the idea of a single social discourse that could provide universal and 
transcendental meaning to existence. Instead they argued that there were a number of 
competing languages and social meanings in society. Diverse discourses thus found 
their meaning in the contingent social circumstances in which they arose: just as for 
Saussure, a word was only meaningful in its structural position in a sentence. 34 From 
these theories the following ideas developed: society was diverse, languages were 
contingent on society, and meaning was harder to objectify and universalise than was 
previously thought to be the case. However, these thinkers never denied the possibility 
of finding meaning; rather, they argued for new and better philosophical systems to 
discover it. Postmodern thinkers, by contrast, question even the assurance that new 
theory, new philosophy, can find meaning. Indeed, postmoderns doubt whether it is 
possible to create new philosophical systems of knowledge without some reference to 
existing traditions of thought. 
Philosophy and knowledge: finding meaning in the twentieth century 
The questioning of the self, society, language, and meaning that took place in the early 
twentieth century was reflected in a wider re-evaluation of Western philosophical 
traditions. These traditions faced two types of criticism. One, that they were founded 
on a now defunct metaphysical and rationalistic basis and, two, that they were logically 
valid, but had led to a diminished and impoverished human existence. Thinkers such 
as Nietzsche and Heidegger voiced the first, more wide-reaching, form of criticism. " 
They believed that the whole Western tradition of metaphysical humanism had failed. 
33 See F. de Saussure from, `Course in General Linguistics, ' pp. 177-184, E. Husserl, from, 'The 
Crisis in European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology', pp. 226-242, and L. Wittgenstein, 
'Lecture on Ethics, ' pp. 191-198 all in L. Cahoone (ed. ), From Modernism to Postmodernism: An 
Anthology, op. cit. For Sartre, see, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological 
Ontology, Trans., H. E. Barnes, (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1958). 
F. de Saussure, from, `Course in General Linguistics, ' op. cit., p. 182. 
3s See any of Nietzsche's works but in particular, On the Genealogy of Morality, Trans., Carol 
Diethe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), and Twilight of the Idols/The Anti-Christ, 
Trans. R. J. Hollingdale, (London: Penguin, 1990). M. Heidegger, Being and Time, Trans. John 
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (Oxford and Cambridge (USA): Blackwell, 1962). 
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It had not uncovered `Truth', as it purported to do, but had led to philosophical 
distortion and increasing disillusionment. Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality 
meticulously detailed this disillusion. 36 In this work he uses the genealogical method 
to consider the shifts and changes that have taken place in Western thought, and he 
objects to the Enlightenment idea that thought is a historically progressive, 
improvement of values 37 He therefore sees history as a set of random events as 
opposed to the progressive uncovering of justice: 
the whole history of a `thing' , an organ ,a tradition can to this extent be a continuous chain of signs, continually revealing new 
interpretations and adaptations, the causes of which need not be 
connected even among themselves, but rather just follow and replace 
one another at random. The `development' of a thing, a tradition, an 
organ is therefore certainly not its progressus towards a goal (his 
italiCS). 38 
Nietzsche concludes that his disillusion with the metaphysical tradition of humanism 
was a positive development, allowing the West to mature and realise its lack of 
progressive values. Heidegger, who also questioned the humanist tradition, retreated 
into a more romantic and mystical desire for a `homeland' where meaning could be 
refound. 39 
The second critique of the Western tradition was directed at its reliance on 
scientific values. These values were seen by Max Weber to strip meaning from man's 
existence. He saw these processes culminating in `disenchantment' and the loss of 
meaning from the world 40 This critique found further development in Adorno and 
Horkheimer's work The Dialectic of Enlightenment. Unlike Nietzsche who remained 
thoroughly anti-humanistic, these thinkers conceived of their thought as an attempt to 
provide meaning for the world again in the face of secularism, scientism and 
36 F. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, op. cit. 
37 Nietzsche, ibid., pp. 51-54, does not see humanistic progression, as the Enlightenment tradition 
would have it, but a more random process of change brought about by revenge, resentment and the 
desire for power. 
38 Ibid., p. 55. 
39 M. Heidegger, `Letter on Humanism, ' op. cit., p. 291. 
°° L. Cahoone, From Modernism to Postmodernism: An Anthology, op. cit., p. 157. 
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industrialisation. "' While postmodernism is part of this general tradition of thought 
that questions modem humanist philosophy', it tends to align more with Nietzsche's 
rejection of truthful meaning than Weber, Horkheimer and Adorno's accounts. 
Consequently, in the early twentieth century a number of themes have 
developed that are influential in contemporary postmodern thought. The complex and 
fragmented view of the self propagated by Freud and Lacan influenced the 
postmodern view of the decentred and anti-essential self. Saussure's and 
Wittgenstein's questioning of unified social knowledge and discourse has led 
postmodems to consider the radical contingency of social discourse and events. 
Furthermore, the crisis in philosophy, theorised by Nietzsche and Weber at the turn of 
the twentieth century, set precedents for postmoderns to radically question the idea of 
foundationalist thought and the possibility of philosophical transcendence. These 
themes will be examined fully in the next section. However, some differences between 
postmodernism and its recent historical tradition must be considered. 
Most of the twentieth century thinkers examined here questioned both 
Enlightenment and Romantic philosophy, but still held out the hope that they could re- 
value or restate the basic premises of Western thought. Even Nietzsche believed that 
he could transform the current state of knowledge. Rorty has recognised this situation 
and argues that Nietzsche and Heidegger replicated a sort of metaphysician's `trap', 42 
they both despised, by presenting their own theories as the final stage of the Western 
tradition. For Rorty these thinkers face a trap because they continue to desire utopian 
finality, even when they have criticised other forms of thought for the same desire. To 
avoid this mistake, he believes that postmodern thinkers should embrace the radical 
contingency of existence and always bear in mind the question, "who is going to 
" M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, op. cit., p. 30, suggest that scientific 
positivism and mathematical thinking is the final attempt by the Enlightenment to secure itself 
against myths and magic. 
42 R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, op. cit., p. 104. 
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redescribe me ? s943 So how do postmoderns escape this theoretical `trap' and 
recognise their contingency? 
The answer is to be found in postmodernism's roots in twentieth century 
material political events and circumstances. The first event was the twentieth century 
experience of totalitarianism and, the second, the last gasp of radical movement politics 
in the late 1960s and 1970s. It is with some irony that contemporary postmodern 
theory appears to have been given definition by two concrete events because 
postmodernism, with its emphasis on text, discourse and language, is often written off 
as the `modern name for idealism'. "' Surprising though it may be, thinkers such as 
Foucault, Lyotard and Kristeva first started writing in the twenty years after the Nazi 
totalitarian regime ended. Like many theorists, they were keen to understand how such 
monolithic thinking had come to dominance. In an echo of Nietzsche, they questioned 
how such a `progressive' and benevolent tradition could have produced such 
domination 45 
However, in the 1960s and 1970s these thinkers still tended to hold on to the 
hope that radical revolutionary movements and new ways of thinking could rescue the 
humanist tradition from the road to domination. Lyotard, for example, tried to 
reformulate Marxism and Foucault supported radical activist movements 46 It was the 
failure of these movements that eventually prompted many postmoderns to abandon 
their dreams of radical, utopian politics 47 They began to write without the promise of 
utopian political settlements or philosophical transcendence and felt themselves limited 
by the contingent conditions of their existence. Indeed, this process has been 
replicated with the end of activist feminist politics, with thinkers such as Linda 
43 Ibid., p. 104. 
44 E. Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion, (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 
66. 
'See for example, M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, Trans. Alan Sheridan, (London: Penguin, 
1977) in which he documents how the decline in punitive punishment cannot be justified in terms of 
'humanity' given that new, less explicit, but equally punitive, forms of punishment have emerged. 
J. Simons, Foucault and the Political, (London and New York: Routledge, 1995) p. 10. 
" J. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, op. cit., p. 66, writes that the 
experiences of the 1970s radical movements showed there were no feasible political alternatives. 
Foucault, The Foucault Reader, op. cit., p. 386, also suggests that Marxism did not have the answers. 
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Nicholson and Nancy Fraser using postmodern discourses to account for the 
fragmentation of the movement48 and recognise the contingency and limits of feminist 
thought. It is this political view of postmodernism that deserves consideration and is 
useful for understanding feminism after fragmentation. It conceives postmodernism as 
a critical strategy for fragmented radical activist movements, asking necessary 
questions about selfhood and subjectivity, society, philosophy, and knowledge to 
understand their demise. 
Postmodern theories of the self, society and knowledge 
Attempts to define postmodern discourses are notoriously hard because of the diverse 
nature of the discourse and the unease some postmoderns, Foucault is a good 
example, feel in being labelled in this manner. It is possible, however, as was shown 
earlier, to define certain postmodern discourses as critical strategies. Following 
Cahoone, these strategies `question the validity of modern methods without making 
explicit claims on their falsity'. It is this type of postmodern approach that is useful 
for feminism in a new wave. It does not assert the falsity of the theories of the second 
wave, but it does ask contingent questions about their validity - their usefulness and 
relevance - for feminist theorising and politics in a new wave. When postmodernism is 
viewed as a critical strategy, it is possible to identify a number of postmoderns who 
take this approach. The most relevant postmodern thinkers in this regard are Foucault, 
Kristeva, Rorty, Lyotard, Laclau and Mouffe. From their works it is possible to find a 
characteristic set of theories of the self and agency, society and language, and 
philosophy and knowledge that are useful as a critical strategy for contemporary 
feminist thought. 
Postmodern theories of the self 
48 N. Fraser and L. Nicholson, 'Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter Between 
Feminism and Postmodernism, ' op. cit. 
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Most postmodern thinkers start by conceptualising the self in a non-essential and 
decentred manner. Like Romantic thinkers before them, in challenging the idea of the 
unified self many postmoderns have necessarily questioned the idea of universal 
human nature. They also challenge individual attempts to find coherent and authentic 
self-identity, believing that the self cannot be unified in this manner. In this view of 
selfhood, postmoderns have been influenced by Lacan's psychoanalytic theory of the 
decentred, complex self who has no essential core of reason or even creativity. For 
Lacan, the two crucial elements that constitute self-identity are its relations with 
`Others' and its use of language to describe and understand itself. As he writes, `the 
Other is, therefore, the locus in which is constituted the I who speaks to him who 
hears, that which is said by one already being the reply' 49 In other words every time 
the subject speaks - uses language - it does so to answer another person and 
automatically confirms its intersubjective status. What emerges from Lacan's work is 
not a fragmented self, a self that is incapable of relating to itself or others, but a 
decentred self who is dependent on both its social relationships and its ability to use 
speech, to define itself. The self is thus decentred because, quite literally, it can never 
be itself, it can only be itself relating, replying, to `Others' S0 The self thus finds itself 
with a number of different identities as it interacts with different people, in different 
circumstances. 
For postmoderns such as Kristeva, Rorty, Lyotard and Foucault, this view of 
the decentred self has wide social and philosophical implications. Socially, it indicates 
the contingency of, what Kristeva comes to refer to as, `the speaking subject' on the 
social structures of language, laws, power relations and relationships with others. 
These social structures are inescapable because they pre-exist each subject. As 
Lyotard writes, `even before he is born ... the 
human child is already positioned as the 
a9 J. Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, op. cit., p. 141. 
"Ibis idea is of course akin to the existential idea of existence preceding essence, but Lacan did not 
share the existentialist's belief that the lack of self-unity was a negative condition leading to bad 
faith, ibid., p. 6. 
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referent in the story recounted by those around him'. ` However, the self is not 
entirely powerless before these structures and thus decentring does not mean the 
complete loss of autonomy: the same social structures that decentre the subject also 
provide the conditions for its agency. 
According to Jon Simons, who traces the decentred self in Foucault's work, 
the self both contributes to and is subjected by these social processes because, 
The subject is neither wholly subjected nor entirely self-defining and 
self-regulating. The subject is indebted to the limits, however 
oppressive, imposed on him or her for the possibility of being anyone 
at all, having an identity and capacities to act. 52 
In other words, the subject is only a subject because of its social relationships. Yet, 
these social relationships that constitutes it subjectivity, also provide the limits to its 
actions as it faces and interacts with other people. Hence, for many postmoderns, there 
is always an ambiguity about the possibilities of subjectivity, given its dependence on 
social structures that it can never fully determine or control. 
Postmodern theories of society and language 
It has been shown that for many postmodern thinkers social laws, relationships and 
language are instrumental in constituting the subject. They believe that selfhood and 
subjectivity are radically contingent on the social conditions of existence into which all 
subjects are born. Consequently, many postmodems agree with Heidegger's notion of 
the `thrownness' of being: 53 the way in which we find ourselves inescapably in a 
world that pre-exists us. The idea that subjectivity and selfhood is contingent on social 
conditions is not a new concept; Marx, for example, understood the contingency of 
existence. What differentiates the postmodern view of contingency from the Marxist 
one, is that they see society itself as complex, plural and fragmented. There is no 
single social process, such as the capitalist economy, that determines society in its 
totality. Thus, for most postmoderns society is irrevocably a plurality of discourses 
s' J. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, op. cit., p. 15. 
52 J. Simons, Foucault and the Political, op. cit., p. 4. 
53 M. Heidegger, Being and Time, op. cit., p. 174. 
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and material conditions and has no single, social essence. As Lyotard argues, `I am 
not claiming that the entirety of social relations is of this nature [governed by language 
games] but there is no need to resort to some fiction of social origins to establish that 
language games are the minimum relation required for society to exist'. 34 What is 
more, according to postmodems, attempts to explain and understand society are likely 
to multiply and increase social complexity. 
In the postmodern stance itself there are several different views of society. 
Thinkers such as Kristeva take a very conservative approach to society, believing that it 
constitutes itself through social laws. Although these laws can always be subverted or 
transgressed, this very transgression sets itself up as the new, authoritative social 
law. ss Foucault also sees society conservatively, as a network of power relations. 
According to Foucault, the social subject both dominates and is dominated by these 
relations. 56 Again, his analysis does not understand society in terms of one 
relationship of power, such as men dominating women, but envisions it as a mass of 
social practises and laws. Other postmoderns have a more celebratory view of social 
diversity and fragmentation. For example, Lyotard believes that the openness of 
society should be fostered and celebrated and he demands that we `activate the 
differences' within it. 57 Despite their different positions, most postmoderns agree that 
society is a complex mass of processes and as such cannot be rationally ordered or 
objectively understood by a single theoretical principle. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe sum up the general postmodern attitude towards society, stating, `there is no 
sutured space peculiar to `society', since the social itself has no essence'. 58 Hence, for 
most postmoderns the only way to approach society is through a critical strategy that 
accommodates plurality, contingency and contradiction. 
sa J. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, op. cit., p. 15. 
ss J Kristeva, The Kristeva Reader, op. cit., p. 41. 
sb Foucault, The Foucault Reader, op. cit., pp. 61-65. 
J. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, op. cit., p. 82. 
06 E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics, op. cit., p. 96. 
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The end of knowledge and philosophy? 
Philosophy and knowledge are contingently generated within these complex societies. 
Not least, because the author and subject of these discourses is a contingent product of 
his or her social existence. Hence, most postmoderns believe that the theorist cannot 
philosophically `found' knowledge and discourse; he or she can only add to a 
discursive tradition that pre-exists them. They also believe that knowledge cannot 
uncover or shape `Truth'. In Lyotard's famous phrase, postmodernism is 
characterised by `incredulity toward metanarratives' or, put more simply, disbelief in 
overarching philosophical theories 59 According to this argument, the most the theorist 
can do is contingently construct a discourse. Rorty argues that even the language the 
theorist might use in this process is contingent, it is not `out there' as a mediator 
between theorist and reality. Thus, it will not reveal the essence of the world, society or 
knowledge because, as Rorty writes, `the world does not speak. Only we do'. ' 0 
Postmodernism places the theorist in the sway of language, constructing narratives that 
aim, not to uncover `Truth, ' but serve to create better `redescription' of the world as it 
presently stands 6' 
The philosopher is therefore situated in the society she seeks to describe. 
Hence, she can only ever provide a partial understanding and interpretation of the 
world: what is rightly called a `perspective'. She can neither step outside of the society 
of which she is a contingent product nor escape her political language. 62 For Foucault 
this embeddedness means that the individual is displaced as the master of thought, 
such that political theory and practise cannot be understood simply by examining 
individual or collective consciousness. Rather, Foucault believes that understanding 
political knowledge means understanding how individuals, social groups and political 
s9 J. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, op. cit., p. xxiv. 
60 R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, op. cit., p. 6. 
61 Ibid., p. 90. 
6Z A. Camus, The Rebel, (London: Penguin, 1971), pre-dating postmodern, summed up the 
philosopher's embeddedness, noting, `the impossibility of man['s] grasping totality, since he lives in 
the midst of this totality, ' p. 253. 
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behaviour are interwoven by discursive practises that pre-exist them. 63 Accordingly, if 
Foucault's approach is followed, postmoderns develop a critical strategy towards 
theory and knowledge that will, 
look for a field of regularity for various positions of subjectivity. Thus 
conceived, discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of 
a thinking, knowing subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the 
dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be 
determined. 64 
The postmodern scepticism towards objective knowledge, therefore, does not entail the 
rejection of theory. Rather, it suggests that philosophical projects are limited, they are 
no more than the perspective of the embedded theorist and as such they will not 
always be treated as truth and will often be contested. 
Consequently, postmodems who create critical strategies believe that the self, 
society and knowledge are contingently produced. This leads to a general 
philosophical position that seeks out the limits, contradictions and possibilities of 
traditional methods of thought. It looks at how knowledge and discourse can be both 
enabled and constrained by the fragmented nature of the self and society. It is not the 
end of philosophy or knowledge, because, as Noel O'Sullivan writes, `what it ends is 
only philosophy as the traditional Western search for a completely transparent, non- 
metaphorical language of presence, with all the arbitrary dualisms... that search 
creates' (his italics). " There are three clear political implications from this critical 
strategy that need to be examined. Firstly, it questions the possibility of finding 
essential identity. Secondly, it imposes limits on the search for an overarching and 
objective political theory. Thirdly, it rejects utopian political settlements. 
63 M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, Trans. A. M. Sheridan-Smith, (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1972) p. 194, believes this is a better indicator of political behaviour than looking 
at how it might be determined by ahistorical economic forces and thus ignoring the actual interplay 
of politics. 
64 Ibid., p. 55. 
6s N. O'Sullivan, 'Political Integration, the Limited State, and the Philosophy of Postmodernism, ' 
Political Studies, Vol. XLI, p. 29. 
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The political implications of postmodernism 
To return for a moment to Habermas's thoughts on postmodernism, it will be 
remembered that he argued that the theory was at best politically conservative and at 
worst apolitical and nihilistic. However, it was stated that many postmoderns, 
particularly those who create a critical strategy, often began writing postmodern theory 
in light of the developments in twentieth century politics. They reacted to both the 
experience of totalitarian politics and the decline of radical activist movements and 
tried to make sense of these developments. It would be useful therefore to reconsider 
postmodernism as a political theory with several implications for political practice. 
Put briefly, postmodern theories have three implications for political projects 
that can be derived from their views of the self, society and philosophy. Firstly, they 
are sceptical of the possibility of identity politics because they believe that the political 
subject is decentred and defined in terms of a number of different identities. Secondly, 
they stress the plurality of all political concepts and thought so that a concept such as 
gender or patriarchy has no true or inherent meaning. Thirdly, postmodern theories 
emphasise the contingency and conditionality of all political thought, given that 
utopian and transcendental political projects are impossible. Given these 
characteristics, it is then possible to see how feminist politics develops within a 
postmodern political framework. 
Anti-essentialism and the problem of identity politics 
The postmodern view of the self feeds into its view of political and social agency. The 
last section suggested that many postmoderns believe the self, as a political and social 
agent, is constrained and constituted through society and its social relationships. It is 
decentred and multiple, and does not have an `authentic' human identity and agency to 
which rational appeals to action could be made. Indeed, the subject never achieves the 
unity or finality of authentic being. While authenticity demands that the subject be true 
to itself, postmoderns believe decentring makes this type of selfhood impossible. As 
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Kristeva says, the self is always a 'subject-in-process'. 66 It is never completed and can 
only experience being in relation to others. Thus, the postmodern scepticism towards 
the possibility of authentic identity has implications for its view of identity politics and 
collective political activity. 67 Most postmoderns do not reject the possibility of 
collective political activity but, first and foremost, reject the idea that such agency can 
be founded on a vision of common authentic identity. Hence, they are sceptical of 
identity politics that seek to uncover, find or affirm essential identities. 
Kristeva applies her postmodern scepticism towards identity politics to the 
feminist example 68 For Kristeva any politics based on the quest for essential identity 
becomes increasingly arbitrary and dogmatic so that it can `fix' the identity in 
question. As she writes: 
each time, the mobilisation takes place in the name of a... human 
essence imagined as good and sound; in the name, then, of a kind of 
fantasy of archaic fulfilment which an arbitrary, abstract and thus even 
bad and ultimately discriminatory order has come to disrupt... exposes 
one to the risk that the so-called good substance, once it is unchained, 
will explode, without curbs, without law or right to become an absolute 
arbitrariness 69 
Kristeva observed this process happening in the second wave movement and warned 
that as long as the feminist movement continued its quest for essence, it would fail to 
recognise that neither males, females, or humans have a core united identity. She went 
on to argue that feminists, instead, needed `to bring out - along with the singularity of 
each person... the multiplicity of every person's possible identifications' 7° 
Postmoderns thus reject identity politics and essentialism, but still believe in 
the possibility of political agency. They open up the possibilities of agency that radical 
activist movements, such as feminism, closed down in becoming more authoritarian. 
The subject's agency opens up because it has a number of possible identifications. It 
Toril Moi, 'Introduction, ' in T. Moi (ed. ), The Kristeva Reader, op. cit., p. 15. 
sý I have deliberately used the rather jargonised and lengthy 'collective political activity' to 
differentiate it from the more traditional idea of solidarity. This distinction has been made to avoid the 
connotations of authentic, collective political action that underpin the idea of solidarity, and of which 
many postmoderns are sceptical. 
68 See especially J. Kristeva, 'Women's Time, ' in J. Kristeva, The Kristeva Reader, op. cit., pp. 187- 
213. 
69 Ibid., p. 204. 
70 
is no longer defined in relation to one social process such as patriarchy and in terms 
of which it is always the victim. Kristeva captures this sense of multiple identity, 
stating that it is necessary to conduct an 'analysis of the potentialities of 
victim/executioner that characterise each identity, each subject, each sex' (my italics). ' 
What Kristeva is suggesting here is that if the subject is only a victim of oppression, 
then it cannot act. To act it must have some autonomy, some potential for agency. But 
this potential, in turn, means that they are never fully victimised. Her stance can be 
contrasted with the radical feminist position that often portrayed women as the 
complete victims of patriarchy, making it difficult to understand how these same 
women could then come together for a revolution. In the postmodern view, the subject, 
in response to its dual position, still has possibilities for agency, but accepts the 
contingency of these on existing political practices. 
Contingency and anti-foundationalism 
The status of knowledge and philosophy is, as has been seen, a central issue in 
postmodern theory. They tend to reject the possibility of rational and objective 
founding knowledge and philosophy. They emphasise instead the contingency of 
philosophy and the contextual - not the subjective - location of the 
philosopher/theorist 72 The latter must in effect make sense of a world in which they 
already live, in which they are already present, and which has already constituted them 
as a subject. The belief in the contingent nature of philosophy and knowledge has 
three implications for political discourses and concepts. One, that political discourses 
are vested with interests and power relations. Two, that political discourses can never 
be overarching or foundational. And three, that the plurality of political discourses and 
concepts leads to an agonal sense of contest and conflict in all political processes. 
Ibid., p. 210. 
" Ibid., p. 210. 
'Z Postmodems do not simply replace objective theory with subjective theory, they see the subject 
herself as being situated in a wider social structure which determines their philosophical outlook. 
Hence, postmodern theory is not endorsing solipsism. Indeed, in many respects, postmoderas hope to 
overcome dualisms such as objective/subjective. 
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Theorists construct political discourses by using their contingent traditions of 
political thought and practice as resources. These existing traditions are the only 
resources available to theorists, as Rorty has argued, `if there is no center to the self, 
then there are only different ways of weaving new candidates for belief and desire into 
antecedently existing webs of belief and desire'. 73 Hence, political discourses are 
constructed and legitimated within existing traditions of thought. It was shown, for 
example, how postmodern themes are themselves the products of several traditions of 
Western thought. On these terms, political discourses are constructs that are invested 
with interests and power relations as opposed to rationality and `truth'. Discourses 
become strategies and tactics to mobilise people and to voice interest claims. Indeed, 
many postmodems have gone on to salvage the rhetoric tradition; noting that it is often 
more important to political discourse and opinion than 'Truth'. 74 Hence, once political 
discourses are seen as constructs, and rhetorical ones at that, they are assessed in a 
more limited manner. Postmodems see their political theories as limited and 
temporary, running their course and facing new circumstances and other political 
discourses. 
The modern humanist traditions and radical doctrines of activist politics have 
not always recognised competing political discourses. They have tended to write 
dissent off as irrational, inauthentic or the product of false-consciousness. Chapter 
One illustrated how many active feminists in the 1970s forced out dissent to protect 
`true' theory. In contrast, by recognising the contingency of political discourses and 
concepts, postmoderns develop a different response to contest and dissent. It is seen 
as both inevitable and desirable. Foucault's work, The Archaeology of Knowledge, for 
example, uses a historical method of `archaeology' to assess how seemingly 
competing discourses overlap and develop. He believes that, compared to the methods 
of traditional histories of thought which attempt to summarise the `general spirit of the 
73 R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, op. cit., pp. 83-84. 
" For example, Chantal Mouffe, Return of the Political, (London and New York: Verso, 1993), p. 
14, cites with approval Arendt's belief that politics is governed by `doxa' (opinion) and not truth, and 
thus re-asserts the role of rhetoric in political discourse. 
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age, ''' archaeology has a `critical role'. He says, 'archaeology ... is not intended to 
reduce the diversity of discourses, and outline the unity that must totalise them, but is 
intended to divide up their diversity into different figures' 76 For Foucault archaeology 
challenges discourses and their constitutive elements and has ramifications for the 
analysis of political knowledge. Its methodology can accommodate the simultaneous 
existence of many discourses - for example, the existence of both Romantic and 
Enlightenment discourses in modernity. Given this plethora of discourses, the 
same concept can be used in a number of distinct discourses, often in contradictory 
ways. For example, the concept of gender is interpreted differently by humanist and 
gynocentric feminist positions. Humanist feminists view female's gender identity as a 
distorted and denied human essence, whereas gynocentric feminists view it as a source 
of positive, feminine values. Foucault would not argue that all descriptions of gender 
are equal, and he would allow for the fact that some have been more dominant at times 
than others. He would only suggest that no concept of gender can be privileged as the 
true or authentic one. Nor does Foucault's work abandon conceptualising and 
theorising. It is rather, as David Owen states, an attempt to `unsettle the seemingly 
natural and necessary character of our epistemic perceptions, '" i. e. our belief 
systems. Hence, feminists who applied this principle to their work would not be able 
to provide a definition of gender that assumed the inclusion of all women. They would 
instead characterise the concept as `a space of multiple dissension, a set of different 
oppositions whose levels and roles must be described'. 78 
Consequently, in acknowledging the contingency and thus the plurality of 
political discourse and concepts, two interesting attitudes to thought emerge. Firstly, 
the theorist owns up to, or takes responsibility for, their particular construction of 
political discourse. They do not see it as the product of universal law, universally held 
rational principles or authentic ways of being. Secondly, the theorist realises that 
's M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 15. 
76 Ibid., p. 159-160. 
" D. Owen, Michel Foucault: Power, Knowledge and Ethics, an unpublished paper, (University of 
Southampton, 1998), p. 4. 
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political discourses cannot be controlled once they have been disseminated, because 
they are then open to new interpretations and developments. 79 By taking responsibility 
for a political discourse, the theorist acknowledges that it is vested with interests and 
power relations, as O'Sullivan notes, `from the postmodern standpoint, therefore, 
politics can only seek to canalise power and use it constructively; to aim at abolishing 
power is futile and potentially destructive'. 80 If political discourses are always seen in 
this way, then it is harder to suggest that those who disagree with a particular 
discourse are irrational as opposed to being contingently or materialistically opposed 
to the discourse. In this sense postmodernism endorses value-pluralism, or, as 
Foucault suggests analogously, a sense of `polysemia' in which `the same group of 
words may give rise to several meanings, and to several possible constructions; there 
may be, therefore, interwoven or alternating, different meanings operating on the same 
enunciative base'. 8' For example, feminism gave rise to many different theories, 
strategies and objectives. 
So what is the status of the theorist in relation to these discourses? On the one 
hand, the theorist is extremely important in the providing the meaning of discourses. 
The intentions, interests and social status of the theorist infuse the thought and need 
acknowledgement; they need to be seen to take responsibility for their own discourse. 
On the other hand, the theorist also experiences a radical separation from their ideas 
and concepts as they interact with other discourses and social structures. 82 For 
example, the feminist discourses of the 1970s interacted with Marxist and liberal 
discourses, and with the demographic changes in society happening at that time, to 
78 M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 155. 
79 Mouffe and Laclau, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, 
op. cit., have theorised how discourses interact with social structural factors and other discourses to 
give rise to different meanings, further pluralising them. They used the example of how the growing 
importance of the idea of liberty in the 1980s became tied to the atomised individualism of New 
Right doctrines because the left, at the time, only concentrated on equality and the struggle for 
cultural liberty. Hence, liberty needed to be theorised according to leftist theory to give the idea a 
different discursive interpretation and to break the New Right hegemony, p. 164. 
80 N. O'Sullivan, 'Political Integration, the Limited State, and the Philosophy of Postmodernism, ' 
op. cit., p. 31. 
81 M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 110. 
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take on a very different character to either first wave feminist theories or standard 
Marxist and liberal accounts of politics. 
Such separation may initially appear to be a loss of control. The discourses 
appear to simply speak through the theorist, descending into relativism, whereby a 
number of equal political discourses seamlessly mingle in society, none having any 
normative dominance over the other. However, the postmodern theorist, rather than 
fear the loss of control, accepts that her discourses will be contested because they are 
open to a plethora of interpretations. Jon Simons has also recognised, with particular 
reference to Foucault's work, this sense of constraint and openness, where thought is 
both constrained by the role of the theorist, yet open to new discourses. He refers to 
this situation as an inescapable ambiguity between the `poles of unbearable heaviness 
and lightness'. 83 The `heaviness' being the limits to thought because of the social 
embeddedness of the theorist, and the `lightness' being the transgression of thought 
through its interaction and conflict with other discourse. In other words, an agonal 
view of political discourse emerges in which political discourses relate to, and conflict 
with one another. This sense of agonism is examined in greater detail in Chapter Five. 
It is not relativism, but the recognition of the impossibility of having the final say 
because political concepts will continue to be contested. Rorty defends himself against 
a similar charge of relativism by citing Joel Schumpeter's view that, `to realise the 
relative validity of one's convictions and yet stand for them unflinchingly, is what 
distinguishes a civilised man from a barbarian'. Rorty goes on to make the point that a 
belief must be considered to be minimally relative - something to be judged in relation 
to other concepts - if it is to be defended; after all, if everybody agreed with the belief, 
why does it need to be justified? 84 Postmodems who see their discourse as critical 
strategy thus recognise the limits of political discourse and favour temporary and 
82 Foucault describes how discursive and non-discursive factors interact, The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, ibid., pp. 44-47. 
83 J. Simons, Foucault and the Political, op. cit., sees this polarity as a constant theme of Foucault's 
work and discusses it in relation to thought on p. 88. 
84 R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, op. cit., pp. 46-47. 
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piecemeal political settlements. They therefore espouse anti-utopianism and localised 
political activity as opposed to large-scale revolutionary activity 8S 
The end of utopian dreams 
The postmodern stress on the contingency of thought and the plurality of political 
discourses implies political anti-utopianism. If all thought is contingent on existing 
social and political discourses, then these cannot be transcended by utopia. Utopia - 
seen as the complete transcendence of the existing order - would remain impossible, 
always contaminated by the very practices it was seeking to go beyond. Albrecht 
Wellmer recognises the anti-utopian implication of postmodernism, stating: 
With postmodernism, ironically enough, it becomes obvious that the 
critique of the modern, inasmuch as it knows its own parameters, can 
only aim at expanding the interior space of modernity, not at 
surpassing it. For it is the very gesture of radical surpassing - 
Romantic utopianism - that postmodernism has called into question. 
6 
Postmodems also question the possibility of utopia because it signals finality, the end 
of contingency and with it the possibility of politics. Kristeva notes the impossibility 
of going beyond social laws to set up an `a-topia'87 - which she defines as a space 
beyond law - because to do this would also mean the end of politics. There would be 
no politics because there would be no laws to subvert, nothing to resist or contest. 
Many postmoderns therefore not only believe that utopia is impossible, but also feel it 
to be undesirable. 
In the end, postmodernism is not about transcendence, it is an immanent 
critique. It is this that puts it at odds with many philosophical traditions, particularly 
the radical humanist one, which aim to be transcendent in their critique. As an 
immanent critique it outlines the constraints brought about by the historic and social 
contingency of existence, the diversity of these conditions of existence and the limits 
of social interdependence. Indeed, as Mouffe has recognised, postmodernism is 
as M. Foucault, The Foucault Reader, op. cit., p. 384. 
86 A. Wellmer, The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics and Postmodernism, 
Trans., D. Midgely, (Cambridge (Mass. ): The MIT Press, 1991), p. vii. 
$ý J. Kristeva, `Women's Time, ' op. cit., p. 202. 
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concerned with limits. 88 Whereas, a thinker such as O'Sullivan interprets this 
postmodern sense of limits as a return to political `modesty', 89 other thinkers, like the 
later Foucault, look for the limits of possibility, the point at which the subject can still 
act, still resist. " Hence, for postmoderns who create critical strategy, utopia is 
impossible. There can simply be no space beyond laws and power, no space in which 
a final human condition can be founded. Political settlements are themselves 
contingent and thus utopia cannot be grounded beyond this. It is now necessary to 
take these three political implications of postmodernism - its anti-essential view of the 
political subject; its emphasis on the contingency and plurality of political discourses, 
and its anti-utopianism - and spell out in detail their influence on feminism in a new 
wave. 
Postmodernism in a new wave of feminism: new theories, old problems 
Postmodernism's influence on feminism developed in the 1980s. Although many 
feminists were initially sceptical about postmodernism, it was clear by the early 1990s 
that some feminist had begun to incorporate it into their thinking. Few of these 
feminists actually saw themselves as `postmodern-feminists', and for most it was an 
exercise in appropriation and not wholesale endorsement. Given that many feminists 
have used postmodernism in a limited manner, it has been necessary to see 
postmodernism as a critical strategy to fully understand its impact on feminism. 
Hence, once postmodernism is seen as a critical strategy - questioning the validity and 
usefulness of certain methods of thought - its influence in a new wave of feminist 
thinking becomes clear. It becomes necessary to give a detailed account of how the 
postmodern themes of anti-essentialism, contingency and anti-utopianism, identified in 
the previous section, have led to new ways of theorising feminist political agency, 
collectivity and movement politics. 
88 C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., pp. 15-16. 
89 N. O'Sullivan, 'Political Integration, the Limited State, and the Philosophy of Postmodernism, ' 
op. cit., p. 34-35. 
90 J. Simons, Foucault and the Political, op. cit., p. 82. 
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The place of anti-essentialism in the new wave of feminism 
It is easy to see the influence of anti-essentialism in contemporary feminist thought. 
Diane Fuss and Elizabeth Spelman were among the first feminists to theorise the 
implications of anti-essentialist discourse 9' They indicated how second wave attempts 
to look for authentic femininity or authentic human identity were both essentialist and 
exclusionary. They called instead for new ways to appeal to women without 
essentialising them. Different feminists however have applied this idea in different 
ways. Iris Young, for example, suggests that any future feminist movement must have 
separate sections for women, in accordance with age, ethnicity, religion etc., 92 to avoid 
charges of essentialism. Elizabeth Spelman, in contrast, warns against an overly simple 
approach to anti-essential, multiple identities, arguing that it is not possible to neatly 
separate out, for example, gender identity from ethnic identity. For Spelman our 
identities are interdependent. 93 Chantal Mouffe is in accord with Spelman's approach 
and argues that feminists, in light of anti-essentialism, need to ask different questions 
that do not assume a common identity or a set social group of `women' 9a 
According to these debates, the postmodern view of the decentred, anti- 
essential self has two consequences for feminism. Firstly it effectively undermines the 
idea of the subject determined entirely by its gender identity. Secondly, it suggests that 
the subject is actually made up of an ensemble of identities. As Nancy Fraser argues, 
the postmodern view of decentred social identity means that `no-one is simply a 
woman' and, moreover, `one is not always a woman to the same degree'. " Hence, 
women will not always politically act as feminists and when they do so, it will be from 
different perspectives. Feminists coming to terms with feminist fragmentation have 
91 D. Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference, (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1989), and E. Spelman, Inessential Women, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988). 
9Z I. Young, 'The Five Faces of Oppression', Justice and the Politics of Difference, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990) pp. 39-65. 
93 E. Spelman, Inessential Women, op. cit., p. 133. 
94 C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., pp. 78-79. 
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thus found the anti-essentialist critique invaluable. It allows feminists to admit the 
differences between women and to search for ways to give them adequate 
representation without calling into question the validity of a feminist project. 
However, anti-essentialism is still controversial. Humanists fear that anti- 
essentialism reifies the differences between men and women, as well as between 
women, thus validating gynocentric views of women's intrinsic gender difference. 96 
This fear is misguided and can be refuted once the differences between the 
postmodem and gynocentric positions are properly understood. To reiterate, 
gynocentric feminists are keen to assert women's differences from men. Contrary to 
most humanist feminists, they do not see this difference as something that feminists 
should seek to overcome. Rather, gynocentrics, such as Susan Bordo, tend to see 
women's differences as a source of positive, feminine values that need to be 
protected. 97 For many gynocentric feminists, women should thus seek recognition for 
these different values in the hope that a new ethical perspective can be formed that 
does not privilege rationality and autonomy above care and interdependence. Hence, 
while most gynocentric feminists and most postmodernists do question the dominance 
of the values of rationality and autonomy, and agree that our intersubjective relations 
are crucial in defining our identities, there are still grounds to distinguish between the 
two positions. Rita Felski has provided one of the best distinctions between the 
difference emphasis of gynocentric feminists and the difference emphasis of 
postmoderns and post-structuralists, stating, `it is hard to see how a quasi-utopian 
vision of authentic, self-defined femininity [the gynocentric position] can be reconciled 
with a semiotic model that defines meaning as fundamentally relational, unstable and 
99 N. Fraser, 'The Uses and Abuses of French discourse Theories for Feminist Politics, ' in N. Fraser 
and S. Lee Bartky (eds. ), Revaluing French Feminism: Critical Essays on Difference Agency and 
Culture, (Bloomington and Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 179. 
11 Susan Moller Okin, `Gender Inequality and Cultural Differences, ' Political Theory, Vol. 22, No. 
1, (February 1994), p. 20 believes that the anti-essentialist position risks becoming a reactionary, 
`worship of difference'. 
97 S. Bordo The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought, ' in L. Cahoone (ed. ), From Modernism to 
Postmodernism: An Anthology, op. cit., pp. 653-655, gives a good account of recent gynocentric 
feminist thinking on the relation between `masculine' and 'feminine' values. 
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impure'. 98 In other words, gynocentric feminists admit differences between men and 
women only by formulating essentialist theories about the historic construction of 
femininity and gender. However, most postmoderns question all constructions of 
essential subjectivity in favour of decentred selfhood, thus recognising the differences 
between women, as well as between men and women. Consequently, postmodern 
theories of anti-essentialism radically question the possibility and validity of identity 
politics in ways gynocentric ones do not. Hence, postmodern feminists do not reify 
the essential difference of women from men in the same way gynocentric feminists do. 
Their position is thus useful for feminists after the fragmentation of the second wave, 
and it is not - as humanist feminists tend to fear -a return to theorising an 
essentialistic feminine identity. 
Humanist feminists also believe that the anti-essentialist critique only 
concentrate on the differences between women and undermines the common sense of 
solidarity needed for extensive political action. 99 To answer this sort of concern, it is 
necessary to understand anti-essentialism as part of the postmodern critical strategy. It 
is a starting point for theory, a way to come to terms with fragmentation and consider 
its implications for a future feminist movement. According to the anti-essentialist 
debate, there is no `authentic' feminism - no benchmarks against which we can 
measure all claims to oppression - that could ground women's solidarity in an 
inclusive political movement. On the contrary there are a number of competing claims 
to identity and a concomitant number of interpretations of what liberty and equality 
mean for women. These differences undoubtedly make feminist collectivity harder to 
achieve, but they still need to be acknowledged. 
Thus, the move to incorporate anti-essentialism into a new wave of feminist 
thinking leads to a twofold strategy to politically mobilise women and feminists. 
Firstly, anti-essentialism in the current debate allows feminists to re-conceptualise the 
98 For example, Rita Felski, 'Doxa of Difference', Signs, Vol. 23, No. 1, (Autumn 1997) p. 6, 
notes that the utopianism of much recent gynocentric thought such as Drucilla Cornell's is at odds 
with post-structuralism, that precludes this type of utopian thinking. 
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future feminist movement as an alliance or coalition as opposed to a sisterhood. 
Georgia Warnke, Iris Young, Nancy and Judith Butler, among others, have suggested 
feminist coalitions. ' 00 As Nancy Fraser argues, given the diversity of women and 
feminists, the most that the feminist movement can be is a set of alliances, `rather than 
one of unity around a universally shared interest or identity'. 1°' In the alliance a 
number of different strands of feminist thinking come together while remaining 
distinct positions. Not only does this sense of alliance recognise the differences 
between women, it also allows individual women to change, and move between 
different sectors of the movement. Conceiving of the movement as an alliance also 
acknowledges that the movement is not representative of all women. It is only 
representative of those women involved and even then it must continually negotiate its 
claims to representation, to ensure that it is not ignoring certain groups of women. 
Secondly, given the limited nature of the alliance, feminists must ensure that women 
have many spaces for political action and participation. They must protect and promote 
women's identities as citizens for those times when the alliance does not speak for 
them. Anti-essentialism therefore suggests new strategies and political practises, which 
open up political spaces to women as both feminists and citizens. 
Postmodern contingency and plurality in feminist political discourse 
It was shown earlier that postmodern thinkers emphasise the contingency of political 
thought. This emphasis has important implications for how feminists construct 
political discourses. It allows feminists to understand the multiplication of feminist 
theories, especially in the light of the second wave failure to unify feminist theory, and 
to understand women's common oppression. Iris Young, for example, no longer 
" M. Nussbaum, 'Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings, ' in M. Nussbaum and J. Glover 
(ed. ), Women, Culture and Development, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) p. 63. 
10° See G. Warnke, 'Discourse Ethics and Feminist Dilemmas of Difference, ' in J. Meehan, (ed. ), 
Feminists Read Habermas: Gendering the Subject of Discourse, (New York: Routledge, 1995) PP" 
258-260, J. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, op. cit., and I. Young, 
Justice and the Politics of Difference, op. cit., p. 162. 
101 N. Fraser and L. Nicholson, 'Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter Between 
Feminism and Postmodernism, ' op. cit., p. 391. 
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assumes women's common social oppression and recognises that different women 
have different experiences of oppression. She also argues that oppression is itself a 
multiple concept; and she finds that what is oppressive for one woman, is not for 
another. 102 
However, there are again feminist criticisms of this stress on contingency and 
plurality in the construction of political discourse. Many humanist feminists believe 
that the postmodern critique of reason and rationality will further undermine women's 
social position. In their view women share a core set of human characteristics with 
men, 103 and, thus, feminism should continue to secure for all women the human right 
to make autonomous decisions about their life, free from dependent relations on men 
or children. Humanist feminists thus fear that postmodern theory will undermine the 
idea of a human nature based on rationality and autonomy and leave women 
subordinated. Consequently, for many humanist feminists, postmoderns no longer 
allow the individual to shape and decide their own identity, but leave the self passive 
and ineffective before social processes. Sabina Lovibond has summed up humanist 
feminist fears of postmodernism, asking, `How can anybody ask me to say goodbye 
to `emancipatory metanarratives, ' when my own emancipation is still such a patchy, 
hit-and-miss affair? ' 104 Behind Lovibond's fear is the belief that it is still necessary to 
create grand, emancipatory theory. Any other action threatens to further oppress 
women and impede women's attempts at autonomous selfhood. 
Gynocentric feminists share these fears about theory. Nancy Hartsock believes 
that the construction of a specific women's standpoint or point of view is necessary to 
found a feminist knowledge that will be the basis of women's positive contribution to 
thought and politics. She has suggested that postmodern views of theory and 
knowledge do not allow for the construction of alternative, coherent theoretical 
102 I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, op. cit., p. 42. 
103 Martha Nussbaum has provided one of the most sophisticated attempts to reformulate universal 
human characteristics after the anti-essentialist critique. For a discussion of this, see M. Nussbaum, 
`Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings, ' op. cit., pp. 72-86. 
104 S. Lovibond, 'Feminism and Postmodernism, ' in New Left Review, No. 178, 
(November/December 1989), p. 12. 
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perspectives because they question the possibility and validity of objective and 
universal knowledge and, on this basis, reject all attempts at knowledge. Consequently, 
Hartsock believes that postmodernism again leaves women oppressed: 
For those of us who have been marginalised and subjugated in various 
ways and who need to understand the world systematically in order to 
change it, postmodern theories at their best fail to provide an alternative 
to the Enlightenment. ' os 
Yet these criticisms seem to doom feminism to repeat the battles of the second 
wave, searching for the universal sisterhood in a society, in which it has to be said, this 
quest is even more of a distant dream than it was in the second wave. It hardly needs 
repeating that women are not a cohesive minority group, they cross ethnic, class and 
religious divisions. In other words women are rooted in wider society and have many 
social roles. It thus follows that they have different levels of marginalisation as well as 
demands and interests. To respond to this dynamic social situation, it is necessary act 
with flexibility and contingency. Indeed, according to Felski, the divides between 
difference (gynocentric) and equality (humanist) feminists could be broken by a more 
contingent view of feminist politics in which feminists strategically operate using both 
positions. Hence, she calls for, 
a double strategy... a deconstructive reading of the equality/difference 
distinction as philosophically unstable... combined with a pragmatic 
analysis of the contingent political utility adhering to either side of this 
dialectic for specific groups of women. 06 
On these terms, it is not possible to prescribe in advance exactly who will be involved 
in a future feminist movement, what issues will concern it or what its political strategy 
will be. But it is clear that the second wave's predisposition to create `seven point 
manifestos' needs to be replaced by a less rigid reading of what particular women 
need at a particular point in time. 
The recognition of contingency also consolidates new wave feminism's 
concern with alliance rather than sisterhood, which was outlined in the section above. 
The diffuse and diverse structures of a political alliance can reflect the call for 
105 N. Hartsock, 'Postmodernism and Political Change: Issues for Feminist Theory, ' Cultural 
Critique, No. 14, (Winter, 1989-1990) p. 21 
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contingency, changing to meet different women's needs in different political 
circumstances. Jon Simons has summarised the strategic implications of the new 
feminist concern for coalition thus: 
Coalition is depicted by some feminists as an unsafe and unsettling 
space in which differences have to be dealt with. It is a space fit for 
agonal subjects for whom difference is not something to overcome in 
order to establish a common identity, but a resource for resistance. 107 
On these terms, the feminist alliance is not a kind of loose sisterhood, it is a forum for 
constructing political strategies. Further, if feminists are seriously calling into question 
this notion of idealised solidarity, then they must be realistic about the potential of a 
coalition. A coalition based feminist politics then is always open to the threat of 
factionalism and even disintegration. Feminists must thus be ready to accept other 
modes of politics for those times when the alliance has broken down or is dormant. 
Moreover, following the postmodern emphasis on decentred, multiple identities, 
feminists hoping for coalition politics must realise that some women will not want to 
be involved in specifically feminist politics. It seems vital therefore to ensure women 
have other political options and other viable political identities for those times when the 
alliance may be fractured. 
With these provisos, the limited view of the feminist movement as a contingent 
alliance, seems a more realistic prospect than humanist and gynocentric feminists' 
continued hope for a united movement of all women. An alliance suggests that 
feminism operates as a political strategy. It would be a temporary coming together of 
different perspectives to push through a single issue or a limited agenda as opposed to 
establishing ideological notions of the sisterhood or visions of feminist authenticity. 
This alliance system has good precedents because historically feminism has always 
been at its most politically effective when it has operated as a loose alliance. 
Anti-utopianism in the new wave 
106 R. Felski, `Doxa of Difference', op. cit., p. 18. 
107 J. Simons, Foucault and the Political, op. cit., p. 108. 
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Many second wave feminists believed in the separation of women from men, at least 
until the conditions for women's equality and liberation had been achieved. At its most 
extreme, feminists such as Adrienne Rich theorised `women-centred' political and 
social spaces in which women could find their true and authentic identities. Other early 
second wave humanist feminists such as Shulamith Firestone had a different vision of 
utopia, seeing it as a society in which the differences between men and women had 
been eliminated. Postmodernism has been the first discourse since conservatism to be 
explicitly anti-utopian. Its theorists stress the contingency of subjects and discourses 
on existing social processes and philosophic traditions. These processes are simply 
inescapable, there are no other sources of political thought. Indeed every utopia would 
have to have its social conditions in existing society. It is the postmodern scepticism 
towards the possibility of founding coherent and objective knowledge and theory that 
lies behind more general feminist objections to postmodernism. Both gynocentric and 
humanist feminist theories agree that they need to find a unified feminist theory and 
movement for emancipation. Without a sense of shared identity, feminism would, on 
their accounts, be politically ineffective. As Patricia Waugh warns, `feminism must 
posit some belief in the notion of effective human agency, the necessity for historical 
continuity in formulating identity and a belief in historical progress' 108 if it is to 
secure its political efficacy. At the level of theory and knowledge, many feminists thus 
continue to believe that postmodern doubts over the viability of objective and truth 
giving knowledge preclude a feminist theory of women's emancipation. 
However, the postmodern rejection of utopian politics does not prevent 
feminist theorising, as these feminists fear. Rather, it suggests that feminists can no 
longer present their theories as neutral, innocent discourses. They must recognise that 
as feminist discourses contribute to society, so their discourses are also constituted by 
society. Their theories stop being rigid assertions of dogma, demanding ideological 
adherence as they did in the second wave, and become flexible political strategies. 
108 P. Waugh, `Modernism, Postmodernism, Feminism: Gender and Autonomy Theory, ' in P. 
Waugh (ed. ), Postmodernism: A Reader, (London, New York, Melbourne, Auckland: Edward Arnold, 
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Strategies to get themselves heard, to present their ideas to those who may not be 
sympathetic and to take them into the most conventional political spaces if need be. 
Felski realises the power of political strategies, stating, `both the construction of 
commonality among subjects and the assertion of differences between subjects are 
rhetorical and political acts, gestures of affiliation and disaffiliation that emphasise 
some properties and obscure others'. ' 09 
By ruling out utopian hopes, the new wave of feminism can politically centre 
women as citizens. They cannot expect a separate sphere for their politics, it will take 
place inextricably in modem, Western society where its objectives will be contested. 
Valerie Bryson supports this view that postmodern discourses can introduce 
conventional political strategies and centre women. She believes that by reinterpreting 
the state as a collection of power networks they promote, `the idea that power is 
dispersed rather than concentrated in a unitary state'. Moreover, according to Bryson, 
this idea `also opens up the possibility of subversive activity [by feminists] within its 
fragmented structures: rather than tackling an oppressive monolith'. '10 Thus, there can 
still be many feminist groups, devoted to many political strategies, but they must 
engage with existing political models, not in some future utopia. 
Feminist thinkers such as Iris Young, Chantal Mouffe, Seyla Benhabib, Anne 
Phillips and Rita Felski have attempted to close the gap between feminism and 
postmodern discourses. They are sympathetic to postmodernism, attempting to re- 
conceptualise feminism as a middle ground between the claims of humanist feminists 
and gynocentric feminists. According to these feminists, postmodern theories are very 
appropriate for negotiating the theoretical problems that arise from conjoining diverse 
feminist theories. Postmodernism's anti-essentialism also means that women could be 
both humanist feminists and gynocentric feminists, because they have decentred and 
multiple identities. Furthermore, these thinkers recognise that feminism from now on 
will be a twofold process in which feminists seek to promote a distinctive feminist 
1992), p. 195. 
109 R. Felski, 'Doxa of Difference', op. cit., p. 105. 
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politics, at the same time as they seek to secure women's citizenship in conventional 
democratic institutions. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to suggest that the starting point for the interpretation 
of postmodernism and its implications for politics is to examine the intellectual 
sources of this thought in modernity. In terms of the intellectual sources, it was seen 
that most postmodern ideas about of self, agency, society and language discourses 
have their precedents in Enlightenment, counter-Enlightenment, Romantic and early 
twentieth century concepts and discourses. In the twentieth century, postmodem 
discourses have been among the first discourses in the West to have emerged after the 
fascist and Soviet experiments of totalitarianism and the decline of radical activist 
politics. The post-totalitarian nature of postmodern discourses often leads to a strong 
seam of pessimism about the possibilities of utopian politics. Moreover, it is the 
reason why most postmodern theorists attempt to philosophise without recourse to 
`metanarratives, ' objective, universal theories of history and philosophy. 
Instead of metanarratives, postmodern discourses accept the contingency of 
thought and knowledge, the decentring of subjectivity and the diversification of society 
in the West. It is a critical strategy, with clear political implications, to understand the 
pitfalls of modem, activist movements such as feminism. Postmodern theories of the 
self, society and philosophy were thus seen to question the possibility of identity 
politics, the quest for unitary theory and the demand for utopian political settlements 
that were commonplace in much second wave feminist thought. 
Out of these implications a new wave of feminist thinking has emerged. These 
feminists have used postmodern discourses to point out the plurality of feminist 
discourses and concepts of gender identity. In terms of the movement politics, the new 
wave recognises that any points of commonality between women will necessarily be 
transitory as women hold other social positions that may be important to them and that 
110 V. Bryson, Feminist Debates: Issues of Theory and Practice, (London: Macmillan, 1999), p. 100. 
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are not reliant on their gender identity. Feminist politics thus becomes strategic, tactical 
and, indeed, powerful. Consequently, when postmodernism is applied to a new wave of 
feminism, two processes appear to be crucial. It must, firstly, concern itself with 
building the movement as a coalition or alliance. This sort of movement will 
continually be re-negotiated and in that sense political. However, it is the second 
function of new wave feminism that leads it back to politics and the political. It is this 
second function that concerns the political status of women: that they must co-exist 
with others who do not share their identities and who may not be sympathetic towards 
them. The second function of feminism therefore is to create a strictly political 
strategy. It is the political strategy that will emphasise the importance of citizenship for 
women, allowing women to politically engage and to get their interests heard in a 
political manner. Hence, this second function of feminism needs to theorise women as 
both citizens and feminists and find out which model of democracy is most amenable 
to feminism. The works of Benhabib, Young and Mouffe have led the way into this 
new wave, placing feminism in the framework of citizenship and democracy. Their 
work will be examined in the next three chapters. 
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Chapter Three. A Dialogue with Postmodernism: Seyla Benhabib 
and the Model of Deliberative Democracy 
Introduction 
So far it has been shown that postmodern themes have become increasingly influential 
in feminist analysis after the second wave. While few feminists have adopted an 
unmodified postmodern approach, many have appropriated it as a critical framework 
in which to reassess the second wave movement and move it into a new wave in which 
questions of women's citizenship are paramount. By using postmodern theory to 
question the essentialism, theoretical universalism and utopianism of the 1970s 
movement, feminists are now taking a more limited approach to their politics. In this 
approach feminists are trying to establish two things. Firstly, a new political alliance of 
feminists that will account for the differences between women. Secondly, because they 
realise that recognising diversity will make any alliance precarious, they want to situate 
women in a variety of political spaces and re-position them in the centre of democratic 
politics. On this account, once women become involved in democratic politics they can 
seek political inclusion as both citizens and as feminists, reflecting the multiplicity of 
their concerns. 
Seyla Benhabib has been at the forefront of the new feminist thinking. She 
believes that postmodernism along with feminism is an important critique of the 
dominant Western tradition. ' For her both discourses modify the modern view of the 
self and philosophy as objective, monistic and rational structures. By contrast, they 
posit the self as contingent and relational, and philosophy as contextual and 
constructed, not foundationalist. Following the postmodern and feminist critiques, 
Benhabib wants to revise the Habermasian model of deliberative democracy to 
challenge its view of objective and abstract, rational debate and thus make it more 
inclusive of women. For Benhabib this means retaining the models emphasis on 
' S. Benhabib, Situating the Self. - Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics, 
(Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press and Blackwell, 1992) p. 3. 
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universal procedures for debate and inclusion, but modifying the models emphasis on 
the individuality and rationality of public actors, and its conception of a single, neutral 
public space. With these modifications, she believes that deliberative model can meet 
women's collective concerns as feminists and their democratic concerns as citizens. 
While Benhabib acknowledges the postmodern critique, she is not a 
`postmodern-feminist' in the vein of, say, Nancy Fraser. She is particularly wary of 
conflating the postmodern and the feminist critiques warning that 
Postmodernism is an ally with whom feminism cannot claim identity 
but only partial and strategic solidarity. Postmodernism, in its infinitely 
skeptical and subversive attitude toward normative claims, institutional 
justice and political struggle, is certainly refreshing. Yet, it is also 
debilitating. 2 
One of her primary concerns about the debilitating affects of the discourse is that its 
theories of the self and philosophy will deny the possibility of autonomous social and 
political action. She argues that such action is essential if women are to be liberated. 
To ward off the postmodern threat to women's agency, she remains committed to a 
notion of the unified self and to minimal universal theories with which to ground 
women's political action. 
Hence, it is necessary to examine Benhabib's dialogue with postmodernism 
and how her concept of gender and feminist identity fits into the postmodern 
framework. From here Benhabib's view of women as a collective movement will be 
considered to assess the basis of women's participation in the public political sphere. 
This question leads into her model of deliberative democracy and the issue of whether 
even a revised version of this model can allow women to find political inclusion as 
feminists as well as citizens. 
A dialogue with postmodernism 
Benhabib engages with postmodern discourses to explore two areas of thought. 
Firstly, she addresses the affinity between postmodern and feminist discourses in their 
2 Ibid., p. 15. 
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critiques of the Cartesian subject. 3 Secondly, on the basis of such affinities, she 
considers how central political concepts can be re-conceptualised according to 
postmodern theory. To answer these questions, Benhabib considers two versions of 
postmodernism: `strong postmodernism' and `weak postmodernism'. While she sees 
the former as purely nihilistic, she does accept a reading of what she terms `weak 
postmodernism' that has many similarities with the view of postmodernism outlined 
in the last chapter, questioning the validity of modern ideas of essentialistic and 
authentic identity, universalism and rationalism. ' 
Strong postmodernism 
Benhabib uses the example of Jane Flax's work to define 'strong postmodernism'. 
She thus characterises it as the `death of man', the `death of history' and the `death 
of metaphysics'. 5 On Benhabib's reading, if such a view of postmodernism is taken 
seriously, it results in theoretical nihilism. This nihilism presents itself primarily in the 
`death of man'. According to Benhabib, the `death of man' is the result of strong 
postmodernism rejecting the rational, autonomous and transcendental Cartesian 
subject. The subject is effectively `dead' in this process, because it is stripped of all 
autonomy of thought and action and then abandoned to discourse, becoming - in 
Flax's phrase - one more `position in language'. ' Benhabib's fear is that the subject 
is now no longer a unique and active individual with its own life history, but a void that 
is passive before these linguistic and textual definitions that it does not control. In 
terms of the `death of metaphysics' a similar sense of nihilism emerges because 
strong postmodernists refuse to provide `meta' philosophical theory or accept the 
objective status of the philosopher. For Benhabib this vision results in a philosophical 
relativism that, when applied to feminism, denies the objective status of feminist 
discourse as a theory that is able to transcend and systematise current social 
3I realise that not all feminists have critiqued the Cartesian tradition, but my use of 'feminist' in the 
singular is to mirror Benhabib's own use of the term. This usage can be seen as indicative of her 
general neglect of the immense diversity of feminist discourses that were delineated in chapter one. 
° S. Benhabib, Situating the Self, op. cit., p. 213. 
Ibid., p. 211. 
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conditions. She believes that it is important for feminists to continue to produce these 
objective social and philosophical descriptions of reality if they are to bring about 
change. 7 The strong postmodernist thesis of the `death of history' continues this 
nihilistic theoretical situation, making it impossible for feminists to recount coherent 
historical stories about women's oppression that could serve as the moral imperatives 
for their political and social action. 8 
Of all these theses, Benhabib is particularly concerned about the `strong' 
postmodern conceptualisation of subjectivity. She believes that it leaves the subject as 
an `empty position in language', replicating the very abstract characteristics of the 
Cartesian Cogito it sets out to refute. According to Benhabib, the strong postmodern 
self, like the Cogito, becomes an abstract entity that does not accommodate any of the 
features that make a `human' identity, such as class, ethnicity or gender. Hence, the 
strong postmodern subject is simply a linguistic construct with no material reality. As 
she writes, it is `merely a blank slate upon whom are inscribed the social codes of 
culture, a kind of Lockean tabula rasa in latter-day Foucauldian garb! '. ' In contrast to 
these views, Benhabib wants to take account of the subject's bodily particularity and 
social embeddedness. Thus she posits a view of `weak postmodernism' that criticises 
the abstractness of the Cogito without sacrificing the subject to language. Before 
addressing whether Benhabib has painted an accurate picture of the `strong 
postmodern' view of the self, it is necessary to look at her portrayal of `weak 
postmodernism' in some detail. 
Weak postmodernism 
Benhabib classifies `weak' postmodernism by reading it through and against strong 
postmodernism. Like strong postmodernism, it is sceptical towards foundationalist 
rationalism and it distrusts universal metanarratives. However, rather than reject 
philosophical knowledge, weak postmodernism still seeks new ways of formulating 
6 Ibid., p. 214. 
7 Ibid., p. 224. 
8 Ibid., p. 220. 
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theory. Thus Benhabib engages with weak postmodernism to consider its claims 
about rationalism, universalism and subjectivity. 10 Although she does not think that 
these claims are unique to postmodernism, she acknowledges the impact of the 
discourse in current thinking and believes that it needs serious consideration. She 
concludes that elements of postmodemism, namely the weak version, `entail premises 
around which critical theorists as well as postmoderns and possibly even liberals and 
communitarians can unite'. " 
Scepticism towards rationalism and utopia 
For Benhabib a `weak postmodern' position is sceptical to what she terms, 
`legislating reason'. " In other words, it is sceptical towards the type of Enlightenment 
reasoning, described in Chapter Two, which sought to consider moral and political 
dilemmas in an entirely abstract and objective manner. She believes that this type of 
reasoning is extremely problematic in terms of its claims to objectivity and its 
response to difference, stating that, 
the illusions of a self-transparent and self-governing reason, the 
illusion of a disembedded and disembodied subject, and the illusion of 
having found an Archimedean standpoint, situated beyond historical 
and cultural contingency. They have long ceased to convince. ' 3 
Therefore, according to Benhabib, the illusions of 'legislating reason' deny difference 
and ignore the social context of moral and political dilemmas. What is more, the 
transcendental premises of this type of reason also need to be questioned. Reason can 
never achieve the transcendental status of an `Archimedean standpoint, ' it is always, in 
Benhabib's words, `the contingent achievement of linguistically socialised, finite and 
embodied creatures'. 14 
Benhabib's scepticism towards `legislating reason' also has implications for 
her recent retreat from utopia. Benhabib no longer theorises her model of deliberative 
9 Ibid., p. 217. 
1° Ibid., p. 3. 
Ibid., p. 213. 
Ibid., p. 3. 
13 Ibid., p. 4. 
14 Ibid., p. 6. 
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democracy as an `utopian-ideal': as an Archimedean guide to how society should be 
ordered. 'S Rather, she believes that the model can be justified and given rational 
authority in terms of existing political circumstances. Hence, she claims that `the 
deliberative theory of democracy is not a theory in search of a practice, rather it is a 
theory which claims to elucidate some aspects of the logic of existing democratic 
practices better than others'. 16 In other words, her model of democracy, reflecting her 
scepticism towards `legislating reason', loses its utopian character and is contingently 
theorised in the context of Western democracy. " 
Subjectivity and contingency 
Benhabib also addresses the Enlightenment and Cartesian view of the subject in the 
light of her new emphasis on contingency. For Benhabib the ideal of the abstract, 
autonomous and rational ego has been called into question by both feminist and 
postmodern discourses. The feminist discourse exposed the `human' ego of modern 
thought as inherently male, while the `weak postmodern' discourse has questioned the 
autonomous and abstract nature of this ego, arguing, in contrast, that selfhood is 
contingently produced. Consequently, for Benhabib, instead of theorising the 
autonomous, sovereign subject as master of the world, weak postmoderns find 
subjectivity through `the study of contingent, historically changing and culturally 
variable social, linguistic and discursive practices'. '$ Benhabib welcomes this idea of 
contingent, socially produced selfhood, but does not endorse it as a purely linguistic 
construct. The subject is equally as dependent on concrete social relations for its sense 
of selfhood. 
Moving from universalism to pluralism 
's In Situating the Self, ibid., she remains vociferously in favour of utopian thinking stating that, 
'postmodernism-should not lead to a retreat from utopia altogether. For we, as women. have much 
to lose by giving up the utopian hope in the wholly other, ' p. 230. 
16 S. Benhabib, 'Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy, ' Constellations, 
Vol. 1, No. 1, (1994), p. 42. 
" In the last chapter, cf., pp. 75-77, it was noted that the postmodern emphasis on the contingency 
of thought and identity contributes to the rejection of utopian theories 
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Benhabib also uses weak postmodernism to challenge the Enlightenment view of 
universalist philosophy. She believes that the universalist claims of modem 
philosophy have met with increased value-pluralism in Western democratic societies 
to which they must respond. This value-pluralism produces, in her words, `the 
indeterminacy and multiplicity of contexts and life-situations in which practical reason 
is always confronted'. '9 She argues that liberal tolerance is not sufficient to deal with 
this sort of value-pluralism because it cannot be kept privatised. Entrenched value- 
pluralism of this nature spills out of the private and into the public-political sphere 
because embodied individuals `carry, ' so to speak, the plurality of values into public 
deliberations. Consequently, liberal attempts to deal with diversity by relegating 
difference to the private sphere and leaving the public space neutral in regard to plural 
goods appear illegitimate and authoritarian. They depend on the actual exclusion of 
actors whose values and bodily difference threaten the neutrality of the public sphere. 
Hence, the presupposition of value-pluralism is central to her re-working of the 
deliberative model of democracy. Her new model is thus conceived as a challenge to 
those liberal political models that ask the individual to bring nothing to debate but their 
rationality. 20 
Benhabib therefore uses `weak postmodernism' as a set of themes to modify 
the core concepts of the modem, Enlightenment political project. In this regard it is 
very similar to the view of postmodernism as a critical strategy, outlined in Chapter 
Two, in that it questions the validity and relevance of certain modern methods of 
thought but does not want to abandon a philosophical project. On her reading, the 
weak version does not reject all attempts at philosophy and social criticism, it seeks, 
instead, `an epistemology and politics which recognises the lack of metanarratives and 
foundational guarantees but which nonetheless, insists on formulating minimal criteria 
18 S. Benhabib, Situating the Self, op. cit., p. 212. 
19 Ibid., p. 3. 
20 I am aware that liberal thinkers such as Isaiah Berlin were also proponents of value-pluralism but, 
as John Gray shows, in Enlightenment's Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern 
Age, (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 73-80, liberals who accept this idea form a 
distinct tradition in liberalism which he refers to as `agnostic liberalism'. He sees this as different to 
the liberalism, being referred to here, of thinkers such as Kant and, more recently, Rawls. 
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of validity for our discursive and political practices'. " According to Benhabib, these 
minimal criteria, like modernist philosophical foundations, still require normative 
precepts of rationalism, universalism, and autonomous subjectivity. She thus attempts 
to conceive of these normative precepts in non-foundationalist ways. 
The dialogue with postmodernism: outcomes and new directions 
Benhabib appropriates `weak postmodernism', alongside feminist critiques and 
communitarian discourses, as a critical strategy to rethink and revalue modem 
concepts of subjectivity, rationalism and political reasoning, and universalism. In each 
instance, she attempts to formulate the concept as non-foundational and contingent. 
These new conceptualisations have important implications for her view of feminism 
and deliberative democracy and need close examination. 
Rethinking the subject of modernity 
Benhabib believes that modern views of the self are inadequate because they ignore 
the extent to which the self is a product of its social relationships. As she states, 
The Enlightenment conception of the disembodied Cogito no less than 
the empiricist illusion of a substance-like self cannot do justice to 
those contingent processes of socialisation through which an infant 
becomes a person, acquires language and reason, develops a sense of 
justice and autonomy, and becomes capable of projecting a narrative 
onto the world of which she is not only the author but the actor as 
well. 22 
Hence, Benhabib stresses the contingent constitution of subjectivity. Once the subject 
is contingently situated in a concrete social context, a new philosophical view of 
selfhood emerges. 
Her view of identity formation, like that of the communitarian thinker Charles 
Taylor, draws on Hegel's idea that self-consciousness is socially produced. On these 
terms, selfhood emerges from an amalgam of two processes: particularistic self- 
21 S. Benhabib, 'Epistemologies of Postmodernism: A Rejoinder to Jean-Francois Lyotard, ' in L. 
Nicholson (ed. ), Postmodernism/Feminism, (New York and London: Routledge, 1990), p. 125. 
" S. Benhabib, Situating the Self, op. cit., p. 5. 
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definition and universalistic recognition by others. 23 Hence, identity formation is never 
the product of an abstract and transcendental mind, as the Cartesian view suggests, 
because the subject is always contingently and materially situated in its body and 
social relationships. As she puts it, the self is situated in `that web of narratives in 
which human beings' sense of selfhood unfolds'. 24 In effect, then, the self is always 
defined in relation to others on whom it depends for recognition and, because the self 
is produced in the context of its social relationships, it. is always developing as it 
moves through life experiencing many different social relationships. 
In many respects this view of the situated, relational and developing self 
seems to mirror the postmodern view of the anti-essential self discussed in Chapter 
Two. In both cases the subject finds definition primarily in relation to others and is in 
a constant process of development. 25 However, Benhabib fears that by stressing the 
social contingency of subjectivity, she is replicating the `strong postmodern' view of 
the anti-essential, linguistic and textual self, which she believes to be passive and 
dehumanised. She thus wants to ensure that the subject has control over these social 
processes by reconciling the relational self, theorised by `weak postmoderns', and the 
autonomous self of the modem tradition. Such reconciliation means that, as she 
argues, `the situated and gendered subject is heteronomously determined but still 
strives toward autonomy'. 26 On these terms, the subject, if it is to be autonomous, 
must be able to bind its diverse roots into a coherent lifestory and create for itself a 
`narrative unity'. 27 The narrative, in turn, must be coherent if the individual is to have a 
sense of agency and efficacy in relation to her life and her relationships with others. 
Benhabib therefore rejects the modern version of abstract identity formation in favour 
of intersubjective selfhood, while remaining committed to a modern concept of 
autonomy. This view of subjectivity has clear implications for her view of rationality 
and reasoning. 
23 Ibid., p. 52. 
24 Ibid., p. 198. 
Cf., Chapter Two, pp. 63-65. 
26 S. Benhabib, Situating the Self, op. cit., p. 214. 
27 Ibid., p. 5. 
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Rethinking reason 
According to Benhabib the tradition of `practical philosophy' has always been more 
attuned to context and contingency than standard modem universalist philosophy. Z" 
Hence, `weak postmodernism' may have made the issue of contextual reasoning more 
salient but it fits into a wider tradition that has favoured `interactive reasoning' over 
foundationalist reasoning. She argues that `interactive reasoning' takes place in 
specific social and cultural contexts. 29 Further, those who exercise `interactive reason' 
do not need to step outside of their social conditions, as the modern universalist 
tradition demanded, to deliberate on moral and political dilemmas. In fact they should 
refer back to existing values and rules and see dilemmas in relation to actual people 
suffering from actual problems. As Benhabib argues, `reasons are of such a kind that 
they require to be understood; they can only be described from the participants' or 
actors' own perspectives'. 30 `Interactive reasoning' is not therefore an abstract mental 
exercise resting on natural laws or objective principles. Once reason and the use of 
reason to philosophise are reconceived as contextual processes, Benhabib is able to 
modify the modern liberal concept of universalism. 
Rethinking universalism 
For Benhabib both postmodernist and feminist criticisms of modern universalism 
have exposed the purportedly objective status of Western liberal philosophy as a front 
for the viewpoint of privileged males. On these accounts, it was not just inherently 
gendered, it failed to accommodate any form of social difference. Benhabib believes 
that Western philosophy ignored difference because it undertook political and moral 
deliberation purely from the standpoint of the "generalized other". In this viewpoint, 
she argues, `we abstract from the individuality and concrete identity of the other' and 
28 Ibid., p. 3. 
29 Ibid., p. 6. 
30 Ibid., p. 131. 
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look for `what we, as speaking and acting rational agents, have in common'. 31 
Unfortunately, for Benhabib, and here she agrees with feminist and postmodern 
discourses, by relying purely on this type of deliberation, modem philosophy was 
exclusionary. It merely reflected the stance of those who engaged in it: namely white, 
middle class males. However, Benhabib's response to such exclusion is not to reject 
all attempts at universal theorising. She does not see it as indicative of universal 
thinking in general, but as a result of a certain type of universalist thinking. 
Consequently, she wants to re-formulate universalist thinking so that it takes account 
of the "concrete other"32 - the particularised standpoint of specific individuals and 
groups - as well as the, already privileged, standpoint of the "generalised other". 
She calls this new type of thinking `interactive universalism'. Like her concept 
of rationality, it is `interactive not legislative, cognisant of gender difference not gender 
blind, contextually sensitive and not situation indifferent'. 3 Such universalism 
ultimately seeks to apply locally generated principles, which have taken account of 
social differences in their formulation process, to universal cases. 4 Hence, 
`interactive universalism' starts from the particular and the concrete and works up to 
the universal rule, rather than abstracting out from the particular to find an objective 
and universally applicable law. This process is intended to allow for the creation of 
minimal universal theories without traditional universal theories' denial of difference. 
It must therefore be the outcome of a contingently generated debate underpinned by 
procedures of practical `interactive reason, ' which open deliberation up to diversity3s 
Hence, like practical rationality, it occurs in a particular social and cultural 
context and is the result of a debate between many different groups of people. To 
ensure that the `concrete other' is listened to in this process, Benhabib wants it to have 
31 Ibid., pp. 158-159. 
32 In Benhabib's words, to take account of the "concrete other" is 'to view each and every rational 
being as an individual with a concrete history, identity and affective-emotional constitution', ibid., p. 
159. She believes that this has traditional been seen as the antithesis of universal thinking. 
33 Ibid., p. 3. 
34 Ibid., p. 227-228. 
35 Ibid., p. 167. 
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an institutional and procedurally protected presence36 In practice, this means ensuring 
that previously excluded social groups such as women participate in political 
deliberation. For Benhabib, even if these political and procedural conditions are met, 
any `universal' standpoint that emerges from debate is a temporary outcome of a 
particular process; it is not a prescriptive foundation for all future action. 
Consequently, any decisions taken in terms of this concept of universalism are 
revisable in a future process of deliberation. 
Benhabib thus uses a vision of weak postmodernism as a framework to ask 
critical questions about the modern tradition. On this basis she revalues sovereign 
subjectivity, transcendental rationalism, and universalistic and foundationalist 
philosophy. In this project she makes three amendments to the modern tradition. 
Firstly, she amends its view of the isolated, sovereign subject, taking into account the 
contingent location of the subject and the implications of this for political reasoning. 
Secondly, this reasoning, in turn, becomes a situated process, contingent on particular 
public actors debating particular social issues, which amends the modern idea of 
objective, abstract reasoning. Thirdly, she believes that the outcomes of such reasoning 
are temporary and revisable universal rules, not foundationalist universal laws 
governing all future action. Consequently, these views of political reasoning and 
universalising have clear implications for her model of deliberative democracy. In this 
model the political process is used to validate and legitimise normative criteria which 
are continually threatened by diversity. However, before this model is examined, it is 
necessary to look at her feminist theory and to consider the extent to which her 
revaluation of the modem tradition transforms the concepts of gender, female 
subjectivity and female agency. 
After postmodernism: women, feminists and identity 
So far it is clear that Benhabib classifies second wave feminism as a critique of the 
modem tradition, that rests alongside postmodernism and critical theory. However, as 
36 Ibid., p. 168. 
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is shown in Chapter One, feminism is itself influenced and in some instances 
constituted by modern ideas of reason, subjectivity and universal thinking. By taking 
this view of second wave feminism as a critique of, rather than a part of, the modern 
tradition, Benhabib leaves it untouched by her theoretical shake-up of modernity. 
Hence, a tension emerges in her work whereby she revises her political model of 
deliberative democracy to accommodate difference, contingency, indeterminacy and 
value-pluralism, but does not subject feminism to the same theoretical process. 
Feminism, on her account, thus remains deterministic, unified and universalistic. It is 
therefore necessary to explain her feminist theory and consider the tensions it exposes 
in Benhabib's work in relation to postmodernism. 
Issues of identity 
Benhabib's exceptional treatment of feminist thought is particularly apparent in her 
reading of women's identity formation. Here she explicitly privileges the autonomy of 
the self over its intersubjective relations with others. Put simply, for Benhabib women 
don't need to recognise their intersubjectivity - they have historically been defined and 
defined themselves in this manner - they need to assert their autonomy. The `strong 
postmodern' critique of subjectivity, moreover, has made this assertion of autonomy 
even more necessary for women. Thus, she argues that feminists need to be extremely 
wary of the idea of the strong postmodern idea of the fractured self, as she writes, 
given how fragile and tenuous women's sense of selfhood is in many 
cases, how much of a hit-and-miss affair their struggles for autonomy 
are, this reduction of female agency to a `doing without the doer' at 
best appears to me to be making a virtue out of necessity 37 
The importance of autonomy for women is explicit in her work on feminism. 
Benhabib believes that the female subject achieves a complete identity when she is able 
to be fully autonomous, ordering other people's responses to her subjectivity: `the 
identity of the self is constituted by a narrative unity, which integrates what "I" can 
do, have done and will accomplish with what you expect of "me"' . 
38 This is at odds 
37 Ibid., p. 215. 
38 Ibid., p. 5. 
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with her view, stated elsewhere, that the subject is contingently situated and embedded 
in its social relationships. Therefore, in spite of her general claims about the 
contingency of selfhood, Benhabib ultimately privileges the autonomous self over the 
intersubjective self, as her own summary of her feminist position implies, 
I have subscribed [since Critique, Norm and Utopia] to the notion that 
autonomy is not autarchy but rather the ability to distance oneself from 
one's social roles, traditions, history, and even deepest commitments 
and to take a universalistic attitude of hypothetical questioning toward 
them. 39 
While this may not be a view of the completely isolated self and she does expressly 
reject the connotations of `autarchy', it is still a departure from her previous 
assertions. " She is effectively suggesting that autonomy is about escaping one's 
subjective contingency. Behind this view of selfhood and subjectivity, with its apparent 
renewed commitment to autonomy, is Benhabib's continued fear of `strong 
postmodernism'. This fear rests on a misunderstanding of the `strong' postmodem 
view of the self and its relationship to the intersubjective view of the self. 
She misunderstands the postmodern view of the self because she believes that 
it is the polar opposite of the relational self. As she writes of Jane Flax and Iris Young, 
two postmodern-feminists, they `strive to develop a "decentred" and "fractured" 
concept of the self in the place of the "connected" or "relational" self' (my 
italics). 41 However, as the analysis of the last chapter suggested, the postmodern view 
of the `decentred' self is not necessarily a fractured self. It is actually similar to the 
view of the intersubjective self that she has some sympathy for in her non-feminist 
work. Both views place the self in a mesh of social relationships that define and 
sometimes constrain the self but without which no human self can exist. 
To overcome this misunderstanding it is necessary to distinguish between the 
fractured self and the decentred self. The two are not synonymous. As Chapter Two 
39 S. Benhabib, 'Sexual Difference and Collective identities: The New Global Constellation, ' Signs: 
Journal of Women in Culture and Society, Vol. 24, No. 2, (1999), pp. 353-354n. 
40 Indeed, I would take the view that if we subscribe to the idea of the intersubjective self then it is 
not possible to have the 'ability' to achieve this distance in any meaningful sense. And if we were to 
make a decision whilst having this 'distance', then it would seem to amount to an overly abstract 
one of the type that Benhabib has stated she wants to avoid. 
°1 S. Benhabib, Situating the Self, op. cit., pp. 196-197. 
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suggested, postmodern theories of the self consider the decentred self to be a result of 
the relational basis of the self. It is not as Benhabib claims a replacement for seeing 
the self as connected. Consequently, for postmoderns such as Foucault, Kristeva and 
Mouffe it is because the self is a product of diverse social relationships, or 
`heteronomously determined' as Benhabib puts it, that unity and autonomy are 
elusive. Hence, the distinction between the `decentred' and the fractured self becomes 
crucial. On the one hand, there is the concept of a decentred self, in which each subject 
comfortably holds a number of different identities reflecting the diversity of its social 
relationships. It may or may not consciously reflect on these to place them in a 
narrative unity. Further, even if the subject does undertake such a process, the narrative 
unity will not define the self in its entirety. On the other hand, it is a concept of the 
fractured self that is, as Benhabib recognises, characterised by crisis and that can leave 
the individual feeling meaningless. Hence, although postmoderns recognise the 
possibility of the fractured self, few advocate it as a way of being. Indeed, Jane Flax, 
who Benhabib cites as a bastion of the concept of fractured self, has concerns about it 
and argues that if permanent fragmentation of the self did occur, there would be a 
`terrifying slide into psychosis' 42 
Hence, the postmodern view of the decentred self does not so much reject the 
possibility of narrative unity, but indicates the ambiguity of selfhood that is relational 
and developing. The basic problem with Benhabib's view of the self is that she does 
not accept that the complex and tenuous process of identity formation, that she herself 
theorises, can end in conflict and indeterminacy. This is to say that, at the very least, 
the heteronomously determined self of Benhabib's work is likely to have a 
heteronomous identity that cannot be woven easily into a narrative unity. 
Hence, Benhabib cannot reconcile the autonomous self and the intersubjective 
self and expect the resulting view of the self to be a harmonious and centred one: `the 
one who succeeds in integrating these tales and perspectives into a meaningful life 
42 J. Flax, Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism and Postmodernism in the West, 
(California: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 218-219. 
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history' 43 For what is the self that has both intersubjective, care oriented elements and 
autonomous, justice oriented elements, but a decentred self? And like any decentred 
self it must accept that there will be times when its different concerns conflict - for 
example, when a women (or man) feels torn between the care of her family and her 
responsibility to the workplace. As a result of such a conflict, that Benhabib would 
recognise as valid, it is perfectly possibly that the decentred self could become 
fractured, not irrevocable so, but temporarily unresolved. Iris Young, moreover, shows 
how this sort of identity crisis can result in the positive affirmation of one's identity 
and concrete political action. As she notes, `for people to become comfortable around 
others whom they perceive as different, it may be necessary for them to become more 
comfortable with the heterogeneity within themselves'. 44 
Further, in her unwillingness to endorse the decentred nature of identity in her 
view of feminism, Benhabib risks essentialising women in two ways. Firstly, by 
suggesting that women are determined by an essential sex-gender system that sees 
them, in a very de Beauvoirian analysis, `remain in a timeless universe, condemned to 
repeat the cycles of life' 45 And secondly, by arguing that women ought to seek out an 
autonomous life, as the only good life, if they are to be truly liberated. Thus, it is 
necessary to examine the implications of this view of women's identity in terms of her 
statement of feminist politics. 
Movement politics: second wave legacies 
Benhabib in her vision of the feminist movement remains committed to second wave 
notions of universal sisterhood and identity politics. She continues to believe that any 
feminist movement must hold the objectives of `enhancing the agency, autonomy and 
selfhood of women' 46 For Benhabib it is the ability to be autonomous that allows 
a3 S. Benhabib, Situating the Self, op. cit., p. 198. 
I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 
153. 
as S. Benhabib, `The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and 
Feminist Theory' in S. Benhabib and D. Cornell (eds. ), Feminism as Critique, (Oxford and 
Cambridge: Polity Press and Blackwell, 1987), p. 86. 
46 S. Benhabib, Situating the Self, op. cit., p. 214. 
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women to achieve agency and selfhood. However, it is deeply problematic to assume, 
as she does, that these objectives of autonomy and unified selfhood should be, or 
could be, the core objectives of a feminist movement, particularly in the light of the 
disintegration of the second wave movement and the diversification of feminist theory. 
But Benhabib is highly suspicious of those who criticise identity politics. She believes 
its detractors undermine autonomous subjectivity and fail to realise that `social 
criticism of the kind required for women's struggles is not even possible without 
positing the legal, moral and political norms of autonomy, choice and self- 
determination'. 7 To this end, Benhabib argues first for an integrated theory of, 
`women's oppression across history, culture and societies' and second, for a utopian 
ideal of `new modes of togetherness, of relating to ourselves and to nature in the 
future'. 8 
An `integrated theory of oppression' 
The starting point for her continuing support for identity politics is her belief that 
women are determined by an all-pervasive `gender-sex' system. This system, 
according to Benhabib, `is not a contingent but an essential way in which social reality 
is organised, symbolically divided and lived through experientially'. " Women's 
sense of selfhood is affected by this system in two ways. First, it leaves women and 
their experiences privatised so that important elements in women's selfhood such as 
their greater concern for the care of others are undermined or ignored by dominant 
views of the self. Second, because women's selfhood is privatised, women are left to 
be defined publicly by others. To be defined by others on Benhabib's reading is to 
lack autonomy and so women become defined by dominant, modem discourses in 
terms of this lack, further restricting their actions S° Given the essential nature of the 
`gender-sex' system, and women's common subordination under it, her idea of an 
`integrated theory of oppression' appears viable. For Benhabib, this theory should be 
" Ibid., p. 16. 
48 Ibid., p. 152. 
`' Ibid., pp. 151-152. 
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unmistakably universalist, having both cross and infra-cultural applications' Such a 
theory, she argues, would then provide the moral and political imperative for a 
solidaristic feminist movement. 
The analysis of Chapters One and Two, however, questions whether this 
model of feminist theory and feminist movement politics is possible in the light of the 
fragmentation of the second wave. Not only does this level of fragmentation mitigate 
against an integrated feminist theory, it also casts doubt on the validity of the concept 
of universal oppression. Fragmentation has indicated that women and feminists are 
socially diverse, with different social positions and problems. To suggest moreover 
that after two periods of movement politics all women lack a sense of agency is to 
miss the theoretical boat, so to speak. Indeed, it is not even clear that increasing 
women's sense of autonomy and agency necessarily brings about emancipatory gains 
in equality. Vicki Randall and Joni Lovenduski refute this idea by citing the distinction 
Esther Breitenbach makes between autonomy and equality. Hence, they suggest that 
while Western women's autonomy to make decisions about their lives may have 
increased, their equality with men is still compromised. 52 On these terms, increased 
autonomy does not necessarily end subordination. Benhabib therefore needs to do 
more to show that it is autonomy that women lack as opposed to more practical 
demands of equality. Furthermore, Benhabib should realise that enhancing the 
autonomy of women is not a straightforward universal objective. It too is open to the 
vacillations of women's differences in class, ethnicity, religion etc. Thus, for example, 
increasing the autonomy of educated, middle class women may see an increase in the 
exploitation of poorer women as domestic and childcare workers. 53 
`New modes of togetherness': a return to essentialism? 
so Ibid., p. 157. 
Ibid., p. 152. 
52 J. Lovenduski and V. Randall, Contemporary Feminist Politics: Women and Power in Britain, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 24. 
13 To avoid these sorts of accusations, Benhabib needs to give a clearer account of the objectives of 
feminism and to explicitly examine the concept of equality rather than assuming, as she does at the 
106 
Benhabib believes that an important part of the quest for autonomy is the creation of 
an inclusive political sphere to enable the formation of new solidaristic bonds. She 
argues therefore that, 
furthering one's capacity for autonomous agency is only possible 
within a solidaristic community that sustains one's identity through 
listening to one, and allowing one to listen to others, with respect 
within the many webs of interlocution that constitute our lives. "' 
She believes that feminism has been crucial in establishing this type of political 
framework. According to Benhabib, feminists of the late second wave have modified 
democratic models by emphasising, `embodiedness, intersubjectivity, caring, empathy, 
sexuality and desire'. " 
In this account of the relationship between feminism and democracy, 
Benhabib once again uses feminism as a 'corrective"' for the modem tradition and 
ends up generalising the feminist position itself as excessively gynocentric. Not only 
does this position ignore the conflict and fragmentation that has characterised 
feminism during the second wave, and more recently, but it also leaves her own rather 
humanistic call for women's autonomy without precedent in recent feminist theory. 
Hence, according to Benhabib, feminism as a discourse becomes a way to revalue 
citizenship in a more inclusive way. For women it becomes a route to citizenship and 
to the dividends that this inclusion will bring in terms of autonomous identity. In other 
words, for women, the feminist identity in the deliberative model is synonymous with 
their general quest as citizens for autonomous selfhood. 
Benhabib's model of deliberative democracy: issues of inclusion and 
exclusion 
Benhabib has been instrumental in modifying the Habermasian view of deliberative 
democracy. She wants to ensure that the free and unconstrained public debate the 
moment, that increasing women's agency and autonomy will necessarily lead to an increase in their 
equality. 
s' S. Benhabib, `Sexual Difference and Collective identities: The New Global Constellation, ' op. cit., 
p. 350. 
55 Ibid., p. 338. 
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model rests on is properly open to marginalised groups such as women. For 
Benhabib postmodern and feminist critiques have been crucial in this process. As she 
states, 
we must have the right to become members of a polity, and the rules of 
entry into a polity must be fair and in accordance with human dignity. 
To achieve this, we must indeed renegotiate the normativity of the 
`logocentric polity. ' The feminist theorist at present is one of the 
brokers in this com, plex renegotiation of sexual difference and new 
collective identifies. ' 
Hence, Benhabib opens up the deliberative model to value pluralism to reject its 
emphasis on the search for consensus and, even, to undermine its status as a 
regulative, utopian ideal. Once the polity has been made accessible to marginalised 
groups, Benhabib believes that the deliberative political process can establish three 
things. One, it legitimises society and its political institutions. " Two, it fosters 
collective identity and solidaristic bonds in the polity S9 Three, it allows individuals 
and groups to feel a sense of affirmation, agency and efficacy through political 
participation, this in turn consolidates the legitimacy and solidaristic nature of the 
polity. 60 To secure these political goods, her model is thus given a threefold basis 
consisting of discourse theory, liberal-proceduralism and agonal democracy. It is 
possible to address these three aspects of her model before considering whether her 
revised model of deliberative democracy successfully accommodates women as both 
feminists and citizens. 
Discourse theory in deliberative democracy: legitimacy and collective identity 
Benhabib continues to ground the model in Habermasian discourse ethics because she 
believes that public deliberation is essential to democratic societies that aim for `free 
s6 K. Hutchings, 'Moral deliberation and Political Judgement: Reflections on Benhabib's Interactive 
Universalism, ' Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 14, No. 1, (1997), p. 134. 
"S. Benhabib, `Sexual Difference and Collective identities: The New Global Constellation, ' op. cit., 
p. 357. 
S8 S. Benhabib, 'Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy, ' op. cit., p. 26. 
s9 S. Benhabib, `Sexual Difference and Collective identities: The New Global Constellation, ' op. cit., 
p. 357. 
60 S. Benhabib, Situating the Self, op. cit., p. 81. 
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and unconstrained public deliberation of all about matters of common concern'. 6' For 
this free and unconstrained deliberation to take place and to be truly inclusive, 
Benhabib stipulates a number of discursive guidelines drawn from discourse ethics. 
These principles allow every citizen in a democratic community to start a debating 
process, to change or introduce any topics to the debating agenda, to question the 
procedures that govern debates, and to challenge the outcome of any debate. 62 
However, she believes that these guidelines need modifying to ensure' that the public 
process of political deliberation is properly accessible to marginalised groups and not 
just disembodied, `rational' individuals 63 
In this revised model the aims of deliberation are both political and moral. 
Indeed, Benhabib makes few substantive distinctions between the two. Politically the' 
open process of debate allows agreement to be reached on common, civil concerns. 
Morally, the model hopes to transform social relations by allowing diverse and 
marginalised groups to confront each other and hear each other with respect and 
mutual concern. Moreover, in the course of this confrontation Benhabib believes that 
each group and individual is able to develop a coherent set of political demands and a 
sense of political efficacy, both of which will facilitate the process of identity 
formation and narrative unity. 64 
For the debate to proceed in this manner and be truly accessible, all actors 
must be sympathetic to those they may not agree with. They must be prepared to at 
least listen to the viewpoints of others and at most defer to the better argument. To 
secure this type of public relationship, she argues that those relations of care that are 
normally reserved for private interaction must be allowed to infuse the public sphere. 
For Benhabib relations of care balance the modem excessive emphasis on the 
`generalized other', the viewpoint of the objective, rights-bearing fellow human, with 
61 S. Benhabib, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, ' in S. Benhabib (ed. ), 
Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, (Princeton: Princeton 
University, 1996), p. 68. 
62 Ibid., p. 70. 
63 S. Benhabib, 'The Democratic Moment and the Problem of Difference, ' in S. Benhabib (ed. ), 
Democracy and Difference, op. cit., p. 7. 
' S. Benhabib, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, ' op. cit., p. 72. 
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the viewpoint of the `concrete other' - the particularistic nature of each other's 
identities. As Benhabib writes `in treating you in accordance with the norms of 
friendship, love and care, I confirm not only your humanity but your human 
individuality... the corresponding moral feelings are those of love, care, sympathy and 
solidarity'. "' It is through care and respect that public actors can confront otherness 
and see both its place in universal humanity and its particularity, bringing her concept 
of `interactive universalism' into the public-political sphere. In this way, social and 
political debates can accommodate otherness and still appeal to some form of 
universalist thinking with which to settle political questions. 
However, there are several problems with using even a revised discourse 
theory as a model for political deliberation. While such sympathy might be found in 
moral and social deliberation, political deliberation is characterised by power relations 
and conflict. Political deliberation takes place between people who may have nothing 
more in common then the fact that they must co-exist as citizens in the same state. It 
would thus seem that there is nothing to guarantee the relations of sympathy and 
understanding that are essential for the deliberative process to be inclusive. "" The only 
way to guarantee these relations would be, as Kimberly Hutchings argues, for 
Benhabib to privilege their `generalized' relationships as citizens over their 
particularistic, `concrete' identities so that any conflicts can be resolved by recourse to 
universal principles and procedures 67 However, as it was argued above, Benhabib 
wants to balance universality with particularity, not privilege one over the other. She 
only specifies universal procedures as minimal criteria for inclusion; the universal 
procedures govern the conditions and not the outcome of her political model. Thus, 
Benhabib is left to make no more than a leap of faith that her public process of 
confronting otherness and particularity will necessarily bring about conflict resolution 
and decision. 
65 S. Benhabib, S. Benhabib, 'The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan 
Controversy and Feminist Theory, ' op. cit., p. 87. 
111 accept that it might be possible to secure a procedurally inclusive process of deliberation but not 
that this will be transformative or solidaristic. 
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Another problem with her reworking of discourse ethics to include relations of 
care is that it leads to a general confusion in Benhabib's work about what should be 
the proper objectives of political discourse. Jean Cohen argues that it is a common 
feature of the deliberative models to conflate the objectives of the democratic process 
so that there is `[a] lack of differentiation between the analytic levels of normative 
justification, the empirical practices of deliberation, and a politics capable of generating 
binding decisions'. 68 Cohen believes that these three things cannot be combined in 
any single public process because the actual empirical practise of recognising all 
groups does not always create the best conditions for political decision-making. That 
is to say the more inclusive the political sphere becomes, the more protracted and 
unwieldy are its debates. For Cohen, moreover, using the public process of 
deliberation for identity affirmation and recognition is potentially problematic. It tends 
to squeeze out the private sphere, leaving subjects to seek self-affirmation in an 
exhaustive and open public debate. Consequently, Cohen wants to maintain a 
public/private distinction between the different objectives of deliberation, and she 
concludes that `some of the fundamental preconditions for building and defending 
different, unique identities will depend on maintaining the necessary political and legal 
protections of privacy'. 69 Hence, by expanding the objectives of political deliberation 
to involve identity formation and recognition, Benhabib's deliberative model 
undermines the private sphere and, as Cohen indicates, neglects the important and 
protective role this sphere plays in identity formation. The latter is often destroyed by 
the harsh processes of politics. 
The third problem with her use of discourse theory is that she fails to 
explicitly outline the way in which, according to its precepts, political decisions are 
made. Benhabib is aware that it will be difficult to reach political consensus in diverse 
Western democracies, stating, `the challenge to democratic rationality is to arrive at 
67 K. Hutchings, 'Moral deliberation and Political Judgement: Reflections on Benhabib's Interactive 
Universalism, ' op. cit,. p. 137 
68 J. Cohen, 'Democracy, Difference, and the Right of Privacy, ' in S. Benhabib (ed. ), Democracy and 
Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, op. cit., p. 190. 
69 Ibid., p. 191. 
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acceptable formulations of the common good despite this inevitable value- 
pluralism'. 70 However, she does not conceive that such value-pluralism might make 
any formulation of the common good impossible. Indeed, many theorists of value- 
pluralism would see this as an antithetical statement because they believe that value- 
pluralism replaces the idea of the `common good' with a number of valid but 
incommensurable visions of the good life. " John Gray describes the theory of value- 
pluralism as necessarily entailing a commitment to incommensurability, arguing that it 
is, 
an irreducible diversity of ultimate values (goods, excellences, options, 
reasons for action and so forth) and that when these values come into 
conflict or competition with one another there is no overarching 
standard or principle... whereby such conflicts can be arbitrated or 
resolved. 72 
In these circumstances political decisions will need to be governed by negotiation and 
compromise with some groups losing out. 
But compromise is not enough for Benhabib. She expressly separates the 
decisions made in the deliberative democratic process from those based on 
compromise: 
For what distinguishes discourses from compromises and other 
agreements reached under conditions of coercion is that only the freely 
given assent of all concerned can count as a condition of having 
reached agreement in the discourse situation (Benhabib's italics). " 
This type of agreement, characterised by the `assent of all', stands as a surprising 
vindication of consensus decision-making. As Kimberly Hutchings confirms, 
`Benhabib's argument is haunted by the idea of the possibility of resolving moral and 
7° S. Benhabib, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, ' op. cit., p. 73. 
" There is a wider philosophic debate as to whether value-pluralism always amounts to 
incommensurability, see John Gray's discussion of this in his chapter on 'Pluralism' in J. Gray, 
Berlin (London: FontanaPress, 1995), pp. 38-75. Here Gray outlines how in its most political usage 
by agnostic liberals, such as Berlin, the two are seen to be synonymous. Indeed, Benhabib appears to 
be responding to such a view of value-pluralism in her own work or in what sense would value- 
pluralism be a 'challenge' to 'democratic rationality' as she suggests? If value-pluralism did not 
suggest incommensurability, then surely the political task would be a relatively simple one of 
merging and ordering values that appeared to be plural but actually had a common root. 
72 J. Gray, Enlightenment's Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age. op. cit, pp. 
68-69. 
73 S. Benhabib, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, ' op. cit., p. 79. 
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political questions'. 74 It is thus necessary to question the extent to which Benhabib's 
endorsement of value-pluralism has any substantive impact on her political model. If 
value-pluralism is taken seriously, then surely the search for political consensus 
becomes invalid. On the other hand, if value-pluralism does not hinder the `assent of 
all' to political decisions, it is hardly a `challenge' to her deliberative model. 
Liberal proceduralism in deliberative democracy: legitimising deliberative 
democracy 
The proceduralist features of Benhabib's model do little to redress the problems of 
discourse ethics in indicating how political decisions might be made. She turns to 
proceduralism because she believes that `one needs principles, institutions and 
procedures to enable articulation of the voice of `others". " Benhabib argues that her 
appropriation of procedures differs from the work of liberal-proceduralists, such as 
Bruce Ackerman, because it uses them to open up the public space to group concerns. 
In contrast, according to Benhabib, liberal-proceduralists theorise procedures that 
maintain the neutrality of the political-public sphere by actively excluding `difficult' 
subjects and groups from the discourse agenda in favour of judicial, abstract and 
conflict free politics. 76 
Hence, she insists that the procedures in her model should reflect the 
principles of her revised discourse theory, making the political sphere accessible to 
marginalised groups. All procedures must thus ensure 'universal moral respect' and 
`egalitarian reciprocity' among participants in the political process. These entrench the 
right to similar treatment so that you treat those in the process as you would wish to 
be treated, and they also ensure equal rights vis-ä-vis speaking in and initiating 
discussion. " These rights are grounded in the procedure itself and have no 
foundationalist basis; they stand as both the conditions of a procedure-based 
" K. Hutchings, 'Moral deliberation and Political Judgement: Reflections on Benhabib's Interactive 
Universalism, ' op. cit., p. 141. 
 S. Benhabib, Situating the Self, op. cit., p. 168. 
76 Ibid., pp. 96-101. 
" S. Benhabib, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, ' op. cit., p. 78. 
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deliberation process and the outcome of this process. 78 Further, they have no validity 
beyond the particular discussion process happening at any one time and can always be 
revised in the course of future discussions. 
The problem is not that Benhabib identifies procedures, but that these 
procedures cease to be `minimal criteria of validity' necessary for a value-pluralistic 
society. In her argument, procedures become another part of her moral aim to achieve 
a `good' political practice based on care and sympathy and in which consensus can be 
achieved. Hence, she notes how deliberative procedures hope to increase the relevant 
social information for political decision-making, allow public actors to present and 
justify their views to others, thus self-reflecting on the validity of their ideas, and to 
face differences of opinion in the political process such that, `individuals become 
more aware of such conflicts and feel compelled to undertake a coherent ordering [of 
their beliefs and concerns]'. 79 The latter points to a wider problem in Benhabib's 
work on democracy is thus that she wants to be seen to be responsive to postmodern 
and postmetaphysical discourse and thus she embraces value pluralism, non- 
foundationalism and even removes the utopianism of her earlier work. However she 
does not want to carry through what these discourses mean for her view of politics. In 
other words, she wants to embrace diversity, but avoid any of the incommensurable 
and irresolvable political conflict this may bring. As Carol Gould points out, of 
deliberative models in general, `diversity may be the original condition of a polyvocal 
discourse but univocity is its normative principle'. 80 In short, deliberative models seek 
out `one voice', a common good. 
Stuart Hampshire, by contrast, suggests that minimal procedures of justice in a 
pluralistic society need to reflect differences and allow conflicts to be managed. As he 
states, 'we should look in society not for consensus, but for ineliminable and 
acceptable conflicts, and for rationally controlled hostilities' 8' The most these 
78 Ibid., p. 79. 
79 S. Benhabib, `Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy, ' op. cit., p. 32. 
80 C. Gould, 'Diversity and Democracy: Representing Differences, ' in S. Benhabib (ed. ), Democracy 
and Difference, op. cit., p. 172. 
81 S. Hampshire, Innocence and Experience, (London: Penguin Books, 1989), p. 189. 
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minimal criteria can do, for Hampshire, is ensure the emergence of conditions for 
compromise and acknowledge that, because of ineliminable conflicts, such decisions 
will not meet with consensus or the `assent of all'. The procedures Benhabib 
endorses seem well suited for this purpose of generating legitimate outcomes, if only 
they were uncoupled from her quest for social transformation. After all, her 
procedures are designed to get previously excluded groups into political spaces and 
get them heard. But Benhabib's intent to tie proceduralism to her discursive quest for 
relations of mutual sympathy and better understanding continue to substantiate her 
procedures as ethical tools, rather than discursive guidelines. Hence, Benhabib's 
neglect of political conflict is as much a result of her belief that the deliberative model 
will be transformative, as it is a result of misunderstanding the nature of value- 
pluralism. Thus her quest for transformation must be considered in relation to her 
view of agonal ethics. 
The spirit of agonism in deliberative democracy: revitalising public life 
Even when Benhabib introduces elements of the agonal model into her vision of 
deliberative democracy, she does not do so to acknowledge conflict but to further her 
moral hope that citizens will understand each other better in a process of public 
deliberation. Her belief that `politics is about something other than "neutrality", ' 82 
leads her to introduce Hanna Arendt's agonal emphasis on political activism and 
passion into her view of deliberative democracy. For Benhabib, Arendt is attuned to 
the `contestatory, rhetorical, affective, impassioned elements of public discourse, with 
all their excesses and virtues'. 83 She wants these ideas to be used to flesh out the 
rather stolid process of debate envisioned by liberal-proceduralists. With these 
elements on board, she envisions her model as `a deliberative vision of democratic 
politics which can also do justice to the agonistic spirit of democracy'. 84 
$2 S. Benhabib, Situating the Self, op. cit., p. 99. 
83 Ibid., p. 102. 
8d S. Benhabib, 'The Democratic Moment, ' op. cit., p. 9. 
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In such a democracy, she argues, political actors cease to be neutral and 
disembodied, and become concrete, embodied actors with gender, religious and ethnic 
identities. Political participation takes on a new meaning with citizens entering the 
public sphere to achieve a sense of affirmation, agency and efficacy. As Benhabib 
says, `individuals face each other neither as pure legal subjects nor as moral agents 
standing under ties of ethical obligations but as public agents in a political space'. B3 
When public actors are able to confront each other in this manner, in all their diversity, 
they are able to understand the perspective of others and increase social solidarity. 
Benhabib sums up this development of greater understanding thus, `perhaps the most 
valuable outcome of such authentic processes of public dialogue... is that when and if 
they occur, such public conversations result in the cultivation of the faculty of 
judgement and the formation of an `enlarged mentality". 86 `Enlarged mentality' is 
achieved when the public actor combines her universal perspective with a respect for 
diversity. In other words, it means that while all public actors share a citizen identity in 
the public space, they also legitimately hold different cultural identities. 
However, it is hard to understand how this public confrontation of citizens will 
actually result in `enlarged mentality'. What is to stop, in diverse societies, more 
negative mindsets emerging, governed by fear, anxiety and anger? Marginalised 
groups, especially, may feel many of these more negative emotions, particularly if they 
have struggled hard to be heard and included. Similarly for every person who 
transforms their particular perspective because they defer to the better argument, 
benefit from the increased social information or realise previously unseen similarities 
with others in the debate, there will surely be one person who finds his or her views 
are confirmed in the deliberative process. But Benhabib does not acknowledge these 
possibilities because in her account public actors in the deliberative model may 
confront each other's diversity, but they never run into any serious conflict. Instead, 
this confrontation results in the almost revelatory and redemptive process of `enlarged 
as S. Benhabib, Situating the Self, op. cit., p. 140. 
86 Ibid., p. 121. 
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mentality' in which the transformation of viewpoints, brought about by confrontation, 
only furthers understanding between participants. 
At root, Benhabib's introduction of the Arendtian agonal model of democracy 
does not fulfil its intended function of introducing diversity and conflict to the 
discourse model. This failure is because, as Hutchings notes, Arendt's model is itself 
rooted in Kantian universalism such that, 
the acknowledgement of difference in any concrete or fundamental 
sense is marginalised... and the fact of human plurality gains its force 
not from the recognition of concrete otherness [as Benhabib would 
assume] but from the regulative ideas of pure reason. "" 
Hence, for Benhabib, as for Arendt, it does not matter if citizens are embodied, 
passionate actors - one of the reasons she turns to the agonal model - because the 
Arendtian version submits them to `the regulative ideas of pure reason'. Ultimately, 
Benhabib would appear to endorse Arendt's denial of pre-constituted interest claims, 
citing with approval the latter's view of "enlarged thought" as `an anticipated 
communication with others with whom I know I must finally come to some 
agreement' (my italics). 88 In other words, Benhabib, like Arendt, sees public 
reasoning as the attempt to find agreement, with this attempt transforming any pre- 
political interests or demands even before they reach the public sphere of discussion. 
This seems a remarkably rational process, far removed from the `impassioned' and 
`contestatory' contributions of agonal politics. 
Consequently, in the model of deliberative democracy it is the public process 
of deliberation that is meant to enable the citizen to formulate her political concerns 
once he or she has confronted all the relevant parties, heard all the arguments and then 
decided which argument will best address common problems and not her own cultural 
values. Politics becomes a `wait-and-see' process that could exclude differences, just 
as easily as the liberal norms of neutrality Benhabib herself objects to, by forcing 
participants to undermine the specificity of their interests in favour of the force of 
deliberative opinion and, ultimately, the common good. As Benhabib herself notes, 
$' K. Hutchings, 'Moral deliberation and Political Judgement: Reflections on Benhabib's Interactive 
Universalism, ' op. cit., p. 138. 
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`the formation of coherent preferences cannot precede deliberation; it can only 
succeed it'. 89 Ultimately, both the deliberative democratic model and the Arendtian 
model of agonal democracy undermine the impact of agon and conflict in democracy. 
The result is that public actors might be embodied, but this is never substantial enough 
to resist transformation in the deliberative process. 
Thus, Benhabib's model of deliberative democracy has three general 
problems. Firstly, it introduces discourse ethics to create a transformative deliberative 
process that continues to seek political consensus and denies the specific nature of 
political decision-making. Secondly, the model is predicated on value-pluralism but 
does not seriously acknowledge that incommensurable conflicts of values could thus 
arise, ruling out the possibility of a transformative political process. Thirdly, it is not 
clear that the Arendtian agonal model opens up the deliberative model to diversity, 
given that it is still premised on transformative and universal principles. It is now 
possible to draw some specific conclusions about her model and whether it allows 
women to be politically present as both citizens and as feminists. 
Feminists in deliberative democracy: into a new wave? 
Three problems emerge with Benhabib's reconciliation of feminism and democratic 
citizenship, relating to both her view of feminism and her model of deliberative 
democracy. Firstly, her premise of unmodified identity politics leaves women in the 
same theoretical position they found themselves in the second wave, and as such does 
not allow them to make substantive political demands as feminists. Secondly, she 
gives politics a moral status and does not therefore understand that a properly political 
process of deliberation may not secure women's sense of autonomous selfhood, but 
may actually undermine it. Thirdly, given that she views feminism purely as a quest 
for women's autonomous agency as citizens, the citizen identity is privileged over the 
feminist one for women. Consequently, in the deliberative model women have to be 
citizens first and feminists second. 
88 Cited in S. Benhabib, Situating the Self, op. cit., p. 137. 
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Identity politics 
Given that identity formation remains the political impetus of feminism, women on her 
analysis participate in politics to secure selfhood and agency as opposed to concrete 
political demands. The latter are only vicariously achieved once women are political 
actors. Indeed, Benhabib believes that all finalised political demands must be the result 
of participation in a fair and inclusive deliberative process. 90 Demands cannot be 
known or made in any substantive way before this debate takes place. This stipulation 
effectively prevents feminists from formulating their political claims before entry into 
the political sphere. "' Benhabib's model of deliberative democracy moreover 
conceives of the process of debate as an attempt to reach common decisions as 
citizens 92 It becomes difficult therefore to understand at which point women could 
formulate their demands as feminists, as opposed to women seeking citizenship. 
She further undermines the specificity of women political demands as 
feminists by continuing second wave identity politics. Feminist politics for Benhabib, 
like her model of deliberative democracy more generally, remains a quest for 
humanistic identity affirmation and recognition. It is about enabling citizens to be 
autonomous in their political and moral deliberations and this, she argues, is 
particularly important for women who have been denied autonomous selfhood. 
Political processes in societies characterised by value-pluralism cannot secure identity 
affirmation in this manner. In these societies the political, as is argued in more detail in 
Chapter Five, becomes a process in which citizens confront those who are different to 
them but with whom they must co-exist in a polity. This process is often difficult and 
conflictual and thus is not an ideal space for identity formation. It should also not be 
assumed that the mere fact of inclusion will ensure feminists' demands are heard or, 
B9 S. Benhabib, 'Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy, ' op. cit., p. 32. 
90 Benhabib Situating the Self, op. cit., p. 81-82, cites with approval the communitarian and the 
critical theory emphasis on participation and the benefits this will bring in 'revitalising' public life 
and increasing the citizen's sense of 'efficacy' and 'agency'. 
91 In the Chapter Six, I discuss the need to promote an autonomous feminist alliance to allow 
feminists to formulate their demands before they enter into the mainstream political process. This 
stops co-option and allows feminists to confront each other in their specificity. 
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as is shown earlier in this chapter, that because women have more autonomy to 
politically decide their identities they have greater equality with men. Women as 
feminists must be able to enter the political sphere (wherever this may be) in their 
specificity, to make concrete demands and to acknowledge that they have substantive 
interests because they have previously been marginalised. Hence, feminists may have 
wider concerns than a desire for citizenship. 
Conflating the moral and the political 
Part of the difficulty Benhabib has in allowing women to formulate political demands 
as feminists is that she makes no substantive distinction between moral, social and 
political deliberation. She believes distinguishing between moral and political 
deliberation curtails the deliberative agenda and excludes certain topics from the 
discussion process. 93 In failing to make these distinctions, however, she denies the 
specificity of political deliberation that makes it separate to, though not wholly distinct 
from, social and moral deliberation. Thus, politics on her reading becomes a moral 
process of identity formation. This view of politics gives rise to a number of 
dangerous assumptions. Firstly, she assumes that politics, if it is properly inclusive, 
can be governed by relations of care. It is secondly presupposed that this inclusive 
process will radically transform how citizens treat, and listen to, each other in public. 
Thirdly, she believes that such a transformation will feed back into the citizen's feeling 
of narrative unity and identity formation. 
Consequently she creates an unrealistic and exhaustive picture of the political 
as a moral process guided by transformative relations of care and solidarity. Stephen 
White recognises that she emphasises relations of care in the deliberative process to 
ensure that all participants treat previously excluded issues with sympathy, but warns 
that the care we associate with close and personal relationships is not always 
appropriate to public discussion: 
92 S. Benhabib, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, ' op. cit., p. 68. 
93 S. Benhabib, Situating the Self, op. cit., p. 99-100. 
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When she endorses the standpoint of the concrete other as adopted in 
intimate relationships, she implicitly accepts the intensity of care and 
mutual expectation that is typical of such relationships. When that 
intensity is joined to her anticipatory-utopian orientation, one is hard 
pressed not to envision a society in which the bonds of community 
may be tied extremely tightly. 
In other words, by making politics a moral quest for transformative social relations, 
Benhabib's model is in danger of becoming authoritarian, leaving every individual 
identity to be subjected to and validated by public scrutiny. It does not help feminists 
at all by leaving them to settle important questions about their objectives in an 
exhaustive and wide political process. 
Privileging the citizen identity 
Benhabib's model of deliberative democracy therefore is ultimately Rousseauian. It 
assumes that individuals can subsume their particularistic identities in favour of 
collectively generated citizen concerns. Hence, women in her model may participate in 
deliberative democracy as impassioned and embodied individuals, even as individuals 
who bring in new relationships of care and concern, but they cannot enter the process 
with a set of concrete demands and interests. Benhabib does not specify women's 
distinct concerns as feminists in deliberative democracy because she continues to 
conceive of feminism as a quest for selfhood and identity, a quest that is to be fulfilled 
by her model of politics. 
She thus fails to understand the great diversity of women's and feminists 
views of selfhood that have emerged during and since the fragmentation of the second 
wave movement, theorising universalist concepts of autonomy and oppression and 
expecting them to encapsulate the social status of all women. Ironically, Benhabib 
criticises theorists such as Rawls, Kant and Hegel for assuming that when the self 
faces the other it confronts someone who is `just like oneself 9S Yet, she assumes the 
same sort of social similarity in her political work on feminists, arguing that all women 
94 S. K. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), p. 104. 
95 S. Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and 
Feminist Theory, ' op. cit., p. 85. 
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share the same relations of oppression and all women need to strive for autonomous 
selfhood. It seems that when she confronts other women, she too assumes someone 
who is just like herself. By contrast, a new wave of feminism must now learn how to 
acknowledge the differences between women and to take these into account at the very 
moment that they also fight for women's inclusion in democratic politics. This makes 
the task of democratic inclusion more complicated, but it is too fundamental to ignore. 
Ultimately it is hard to see what even a revised version of deliberative 
democracy has to offer marginalised groups such as feminists. At most, it offers 
inclusion into a deliberative process in which they must be prepared to revise their 
demands should they conflict with the common interests of all citizens. While it is 
easy to see that women can be citizens in Benhabib's model - they are theorised as a 
homogeneously oppressed group in need of inclusion - they cannot, on this reading, 
be feminists as well. It is also unclear how women could take in set demands as 
feminists, for example, demands for abortion rights, childcare, equal rights legislation, 
for fear that they will close off their ears to the demands of others. Hence, feminists 
appear to get stuck in the `open process of argumentation' that never focuses their 
demands as feminist demands. As Carol Gould has recognised, this process is futile 
because, although `decision without deliberation is blind, deliberation without decision 
is empty'. 96 In raising these issues it is not being suggested here that feminists should 
be rigid about their demands. It is simply to make the point clearly that women as 
feminists have practical interests needing political expression. Thus, Benhabib's 
model, as she has so far formulated it, is inadequate to deal with women as feminists. 
Political inclusion in itself will not end their marginalisation. 
Conclusion 
Benhabib's version of deliberative democracy fails to include women as feminists as 
well as citizens. For all her attempts to reconcile deliberative democracy with value 
pluralism and conflict, she has not followed through the full implications of these for 
96 C. Gould, 'Diversity and Democracy: Representing Differences, ' op. cit., p. 176. 
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political processes. The central problem in her work is that she conceives politics as a 
moral quest for selfhood and greater understanding with others. It is not seen as a 
dimension of human relationships that deals with power relationships, conflict and 
competition. Thus, Benhabib eschews political compromise and incommensurability 
in favour of moral transformation and consensus decision-making. In this project she 
does not fully answer her own question of how political decisions can be made in the 
face of conflict brought about by value pluralism; these decisions may involve 
compromise or zero-sum losses to one party in the discussion. 
Part of her problem in reconciling deliberative democracy with diversity and 
value-pluralism is that her model of deliberative democracy is also predicated on this 
assumption of universalism. Hence, although she amends the Habermasian model of 
deliberative democracy, in light of postmodern and feminist criticisms, she still 
privileges consensus decision-making and conflict-free politics. The implicit 
universalism of her political model ultimately undermines women's identities as 
feminists with specific political claims and interests. Instead she favours collective, 
citizen concerns. Women in her model are thus left to subordinate their feminist 
interests to their identity as citizens, an identity that is to bring them autonomy and 
agency. 
Part of Benhabib's problem in moving feminism fully into the new wave is 
that she underestimates the impact of the postmodern critique on feminist politics. Her 
view of feminism rests on the universalistic assumption that all women strive for 
autonomous and unifying selfhood. She does not consider how this concept of 
autonomous selfhood is problematic as a unifying principle of feminist movement 
politics or, even, as was discussed earlier in the chapter, how the search for autonomy 
is not necessarily the same as the search for equality. It will be useful to contrast her 
position with Iris Young's view of communicative democracy, which has a better 
understanding of feminist politics after the second wave than Benhabib's work. While 
Young keeps the strengths of the model of deliberative model in getting women 
included and in getting them heard, she is far more aware than Benhabib of the 
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diversity of women's experiences and the resulting divergence in feminist theory. She 
also makes a greater distinction between the moral and social process of identity 
formation and the political process of deliberation. Thus, for Young, the political 
process takes place between participants who are strangers to each other. By assuming 
a political relationship of alterity and not of sympathy, Young pays greater attention to 
the specificity of women's demands, and to how universal rights for participation 
might need to be supplemented with concrete rights that are especially tailored for 
women and other marginalised groups. 
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Chapter Four. Engaging Postmodernism: Feminism and 
Communicative Democracy in the Work of Iris Young 
Introduction 
In Chapter Three it was suggested that Benhabib privileges a concept of autonomous 
selfhood and wants feminism to empower women to achieve this sense of selfhood in 
a deliberative model of democracy. However, by privileging this view of selfhood, her 
model is inadequate for feminists after fragmentation for two reasons. Firstly, it 
presupposes a unitary feminist movement concerned with autonomous subjectivity 
and, secondly, it forces women to favour their citizen identity in the public sphere at 
the expense of their feminist one. To overcome these problems it is useful to compare 
and contrast her work with that of Iris Young's model of `communicative 
democracy'. ' 
In contrast to Benhabib, Young is much more open to postmodern discourse at 
all levels of her political theory. She uses it as a critical strategy to challenge 
essentialist views of identity and to question universalistic concepts of justice and 
oppression. Consequently, she attempts to theorise an alliance-based feminist 
movement that is not underpinned by a concept of the universal oppression of women, 
and she reconceives a wider communicative political process that is open to otherness 
and difference. While her political model has its roots in a broadly deliberative model 
of democracy, she amends the Habermasian version and, like Benhabib, also combines 
it with the communitarian emphasis on recognising and affirming all social groups 
that make up a community. Young therefore advocates a number of practical political 
policies to ensure that the public sphere is accessible to marginalised social groups. 
These measures include giving excluded groups such as women funding to organise 
into political groups, and introducing new types of political language that encompass 
' Young has written a number of articles outlining her vision of communicative democracy but 
among the most useful is I. Young, 'Justice and Communicative Democracy, ' in R. S. Gottlieb 
(ed. ), Radical Philosophy, Tradition, Counter-Tradition, Politics, (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1993), pp. 123-143. 
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rhetorical and non-rational modes of speech. With these amendments, Young wants to 
create a public sphere that is open and accessible to marginalised groups, reflecting the 
heterogeneous nature of society. 
The difficulty is that the more steps Young takes to encourage and ensure the 
participation and representation of diverse social groups, the more she institutionalises 
groups such as women. This institutionalisation risks re-essentialising women, 
denying the differences between them and tying them into a rigid political coalition. 
Judith Squires has summed up this sort of dilemma Young's work, stating that she is 
trying to work out `how to develop a politics of identity which both recognises the 
precariousness of identity and its necessity'. ' As yet, Young has not managed to find 
this balance in her democratic vision and she ends up with a political settlement that is 
the very reverse of Benhabib's. Whereas Benhabib could ensure women's democratic 
inclusion as citizens but could not ensure their status as feminists, Young's model is 
accessible to women as a fixed, feminist group but risks their broader democratic 
identity as citizens. 
To explore the dilemmas in Young's work the following areas will be 
addressed. Young's engagement with postmodernism and the implications it has for 
her view of women's group identity as affinity and political groups will be examined 
in detail. The chapter will then consider how she develops the communicative model of 
democracy to recognise and represent such marginalised affinity groups, before 
discussing the criticisms of essentialism and institutionalisation of difference this 
political settlement has faced. It is to be recognised, however, that Young has attempted 
to respond to these criticisms of essentialism. In a recent piece on feminism she 
restates the anti-essentialist basis of feminist collectivity, using Sartre's concept of 
`serial collectivity'. ' In a serial group women need have nothing more in common 
than a shared material status, if they are to form a political group. She also recognises 
2 J. Squires, 'Liberal Constitutionalism, Identity and Difference, ' Political Studies, Vol. XLIV, 
(1996), p. 627. 
I. Young, 'Gender as Seriality: Thinking About Women as a Social Collective, ' in L. Nicholson 
and S. Seidman (eds. ), Social Postmodernism: Beyond Identity Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), pp. 187-215. 
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that women often form issue-based political groups as opposed to solidaristic, 
identity-based groups. Hence, before coming to a conclusion, her view of serial group 
identity needs consideration. Given that she still bases her democratic model on 
affinity group representation, and not the representation of groups based on the series, 
it would be useful therefore to conclude with a speculative account of the implications 
of serial collectivity for women in her model of communicative democracy. This 
account will develop what her idea of serial collectivity might mean for women's 
democratic inclusion as feminists and as citizens. 
Engaging postmodernism and the question of identity 
If Seyla Benhabib's appropriation of postmodern theories was best described as a 
`dialogue', Young's endorsement has been more enthusiastic and could be termed 
`engagement'. Young believes that postmodern and poststructuralist discourses have 
particularly strong application in understanding both the existence of social difference 
and its inescapability. For Young, these discourses also usefully question 
universalistic discourses and concepts. In her account, therefore, postmodern thought 
can be used to pluralise concepts of modem thought such as impartiality, justice and 
oppression, recognising their contingent bases in particular social conditions. ' Hence, 
Young reconceives existing political models in terms of its emphasis on the 
contingency of political thought, its vision of anti-essentialistic identity, and its 
political anti-utopianism. Her engagement with postmodernism now needs to be 
examined in detail. 
The critique of the `logic of identity' and universal theory 
Young's concern with identity is rooted in postmodern theory. She believes, citing the 
postmodern thinkers Mouffe and Laclau, that many traditions of Western thought are 
based on a `logic of identity' that produces unity and universality in concepts of 
selfhood, theory and society. The theorist who follows the `logic of identity' attempts 
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to make diverse historical and social events intelligible by reducing them all to a single 
principle or a universal law. ' The theorist seeks out such universality because she or 
he wants to make the complexity of these events ordered and certain. 
Young thus engages Derrida and Irigaray's criticisms of this logic to illustrate 
its dangerous implications for social difference. On these terms the theorist who 
follows the `logic of identity' can only respond to difference by excluding or 
assimilating it. In excluding difference the theorist constructs it as `Other'- as a 
completely alien concept - and dismisses it. 
6 A relevant example of this process is the 
way in which dominant traditions of thought have treated women. These traditions, if 
Young's argument is applied, excluded women by defining them as everything that 
men were not. ' When the `logic of identity' attempts to assimilate social difference, 
usually in the benign hope of erasing the conflict brought about by diversity, it still 
ends up excluding the specificity of the difference. As Young writes of assimilation, 
`it inevitably generates dichotomy instead of unity, because the move to bring 
particulars under a universal category creates a distinction between inside and 
outside'. ' According to Young, the result of such dichotomising, like the cruder 
process of exclusion, is that it `turns the merely different into the absolutely other. " 
Postmodern discourses have criticised this `logic of identity' - the logic 
behind the quest for unity and sameness that has characterised the modern tradition of 
thought - problematising the philosophic dichotomising and universalistic political 
projects the logic produces. Young argues that in the light of the postmodern critique 
the philosopher should no longer assume that he is representative of those he 
philosophises for, warning, 
Those articulating and following the ideas of modern reason were 
white bourgeois men. In articulating their visual metaphors of reason 
I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 
7-8. 
s Ibid., pp. 98-99. 
6 Ibid., p. 99. 
' Young details how women are constructed as 'Other' in Justice and the politics of Difference, ibid., 
pp. 109-110. 
' Ibid., p. 99. 
9 Ibid., p. 99. 
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they spoke for themselves, unmindful that there might be other 
positions to articulate. 1° 
Instead, Young wants all theorists to consider how their discourses have been 
informed by their own social status. She demands not the end of philosophy but the 
acknowledgement that a philosopher's view is one perspective on theory. For Young 
the theorist is not an autonomous observer of social processes but is situated in a 
complex social world that pre-exists her and escapes her full understanding. 
By being cognisant of his or her own social position, the theorist is then able 
to recognise wider social difference. Consequently, Young envisions a Foucauldian 
pluralisation of philosophical concepts taking place as concepts such as justice, 
impartiality and oppression are re-formulated in socially contextual ways. According 
to Young, they will no longer indicate a universal state of being, but will account for 
how different groups and individuals are affected at different times by injustice and 
subjectification, and the different ways in which they experience these relationships. 
Indeed, Young argues that it is not possible to create a universal theory of 
oppression because there are different ways to experience oppression from outright 
abuse and violence to more hidden means of subordination and exploitation. " 
Hierarchically ordering these forms of oppression is exceedingly risky. It means 
replicating the `logic of identity' and denying differences of experience. Hence, the 
theorist must take account of these differences and describe relations of oppression as 
they manifest themselves in every social circumstance. As she writes, 
causal explanation [of oppression] must always be particular and 
historical. Thus an explanatory account of why a particular group is 
oppressed in the ways that it is must trace the history and current 
structure of particular social relations. '2 
In this way, Young reconceives the universalistic and foundationalist theory of 
oppression as a contingent, plural and flexible. In theorising oppression in such a 
manner, she, as a theorist, avoids the dangerous `logic of identity' and remains attuned 
to heterogeneity and social difference. 
10 Ibid., p. 159. 
" Ibid., pp. 53-63. 
12 Ibid., p. 65. 
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Engaging postmodernism: social difference and anti-essentialism 
The logic of identity, as is stated above, also pervades the modern concepts of 
selfhood and subjectivity. For Young this logic underpins the modem tradition's 
presumption of the autonomous and unified pre-social subject. ' 3 Young argues, by 
contrast, that the self is not a pre-social, autonomous unity because it is constituted by 
its social relationships with others. These social processes and relationships are 
themselves complex and contradictory and further decentre the subject by providing it 
with a range of identities and affiliations. She describes the process of identity 
formation thus: 
In a complex, highly differentiated society like our own, all persons 
have multiple group identifications. The culture, perspective and 
relations of privilege and oppression of these various groups, 
moreover, may not cohere. Thus individual persons, as constituted 
partly by their group affinities and relations... themselves are 
heterogeneous and not necessarily coherent. '' 
In short, Young believes that the self finds self-definition through membership of one 
or more social groups. These groups can be based on ethnicity, religion, class or 
gender and some of them might overlap, However, the group identity can never 
`centre' the self because no single group identity can fully determine or define it. 
This idea of a decentred but social subjectivity can be contrasted with Seyla 
Benhabib's fears, outlined in Chapter Three, that the decentred self is incapable of 
relationships or agency. ` Hence, whereas Benhabib saw decentred subjectivity as the 
antithesis of political agency and efficacy, Young believes that the differentiating and 
decentring gaze of `others' - those who are not like oneself - can actually inspire 
political action and self-assertion. To support this point, Young uses the example of 
how black people and women have been able to 'maintain a sense of positive 
subjectivity' despite experiencing decentred subjectivity in the form of `double 
consciousness'. 'Double consciousness' is a split in identity that oppressed groups 
feel when they are culturally excluded, but are still able to positively identify with other 
" Ibid., p. 45. 
14 Ibid., p. 48. 
130 
members of their social group. '6 Thus, in the 1970s and 1980s, these groups 
reclaimed their differential status from the dominant culture and revelled in their 
differences, going on to create alternative political spaces and methods. " In other 
words, their negative experiences of decentred subjectivity became the springboard for 
political action and assertion. Of course, as Chapter Two showed, there can be 
problems with this sort of self-assertion. It too can be essentialising and authoritarian 
towards difference. However, her work indicates how the experience of decentred 
subjectivity is no bar to subjects identifying with each other and forming political 
bonds. The exact nature of these bonds will be considered next. 
Social and political groups: theorising relations of affinity 
Part of Young's postmodern attempt to theorise identity as non-essentialistic is to see 
the subject as a decentred product of its social relationships. In Young's work, identity 
formation is contingent upon membership of social groups. The subject in forming 
these bonds remains decentred because no single association can fully determine or 
constitute its identity. Young conceives of this social definition as both a passive and 
active process of identification. On the one hand, she believes that it is passive process 
because the subject is born into and finds itself in a number of social groups; it has no 
pre-social existence prior to social group membership. On the other hand, she also 
believes that the subject actively identifies and aligns with social groups. Thus, Young 
attempts to forge a path between the inescapable basis of social group membership 
that can feel constraining on the subject if they feel trapped by such categorisation, 
and the powerful desire to form common bonds and value social group membership 
that can be liberating and affirming of subjectivity. For Young, it is the latter desire, the 
active process of identification, which transforms the affinity group into a political 
group. 
Cf., Chapter Three, p. 103. 
's I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, op. cit., p. 60. 
17 Ibid., p. 159. 
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`Thrownness' and the social group 
In terms of the inescapable nature of social group membership, Young has been 
strongly influenced by the continental tradition of existentialism. Hence, she argues 
that the subject always finds itself within a social group, or a set of social groups, and 
thus feels an uncontrollable, Heideggerian sense of 'thrownness', a feeling that the 
subject has no mastery over its social location. The subject moreover is also placed in 
social groups by others' perceptions of its social position and, again, it has no control 
over these. `$ However, unlike existentialists such as Sartre, Young does not believe 
that there is an authentic identity to be found beyond the subject's social interaction. 
The subject does not simply act out its social group roles under the guise of `bad 
faith', but actively seeks out and values social group identity. So while the subject may 
have no choice in social group membership, in that everybody is a member of social 
groups, they also need them for affirmation and recognition. Indeed, the subject may 
consciously decide to identify and `affine' with certain social groups and reject 
others. 
The social group as affinity group 
Thus, while membership of a social group is to some extent uncontrollable, the social 
group is important for a subject's sense of self-identity and affirmation. The subject 
needs the recognition of its fellow members in the social group for its own sense of 
agency, as she puts it, `groups... constitute individuals'. " When the subject explicitly 
chooses to identify with a social group - as opposed to having the group as an 
unconscious background to their life - it becomes a member of an `affinity group'. 
For Young the importance of the distinction between the `affinity group' and 
the social group, is that the relationship of `affinity' is a consciously chosen, non- 
essentialising form of self-definition and definition by others. To identify with a social 
group and feel affinity the subject does not necessarily have to share common social 
18 Ibid., p. 46. 
19 Ibid., p. 45. 
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characteristics with other members of the group. Rather, the affinity group, as Young 
states, 
in a given social situation comprises those people with whom I feel the 
most comfortable, who are more familiar. Affinity names the manner 
of sharing assumptions... but not according to some common nature. "' 
Therefore, the crucial factor in Young's concept of the affinity group is that it 
recognises but does not determine a subject's identity. The subject thus remains free 
to drift away from the group and to seek out many other identifications. Indeed, the 
subject's membership of the affinity group lasts only so long as they are actively 
identifying with it. 
The non-essential basis of `affinity group' membership leads to another 
important element in the structure of the affinity group. When the social group is 
conceived as an `affinity group' it becomes a fluid, dynamic and flexible form of 
association. The subject in developing a relationship of affinity consciously chooses 
or accepts the group identity as a valid affirmation of their social identity. The group 
bonds can then be constructed as a social and political assertion of identity, taking on 
an emancipatory affect. For Young constructing the affinity group affirms and makes 
present group identities that are otherwise ignored, excluded or denigrated by 
dominant cultural processes. In her words, `the assertion of a positive sense of group 
difference by these [affinity] groups is emancipatory because it reclaims the definition 
of the group by the group, as a creation and construction, rather than a given 
essence'. 2' Hence, the affinity group becomes a freely chosen, active process of 
identification, removing the social group from the realms of Heideggerian 
`thrownness' and inescapability. 
However, by tying the social group to identity assertion via the concept of 
affinity, she reintroduces the risk of essentialising group members. As it was quoted 
above, Young tries to conceive of the affinity group as non-essentialistic. It does not 
need to be based on common identity just a desire to be aligned with a particular 
group. However, once the group passes from a form of social bonding to a political 
20 Ibid., p. 172. 
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unit of assertion and solidarity, the proviso that its members need not have a common 
identity becomes harder to maintain. The affinity group thus begins to become more 
substantial; it is not just about identification. Hence, according to her argument, it 
creates a sense of positive identity for its members and imposes on them a political 
structure. It now seems to demand deep bonds of solidarity to hold it together. As 
Young herself states, getting to the crux of the nature of affinity group bonds: 
Members of social groups exhibit everyday affinities for one another 
in the sense that they tend to live and socialize together and often feel 
more comfortable with members of their group than others because 
they share culture, languages, practices and experiences that others do 
not understand firsthand. 2 
Seen in these terms, the affinity group is not just about `sharing assumptions', it is a 
much deeper identification of shared culture and experience. Given this definition of 
affinity group relations, there is a question here of whether affinity group relations are 
really as fluid and undeterministic as Young has suggested. 
Consequently, what emerges in her view of the social group as an affinity 
group is that it can be formulated in a very unitary and potentially essentialising 
manner. While not denying that these sorts of groups develop, they do not, as will be 
examined next, extend readily and easily to gender groups. Women are highly 
dispersed throughout societies and do not share common perspectives on even their 
most minimum gender-related identities, such as the ability to bear children. Moreover, 
it is not clear how this sort of group is different from the type of essentialistic identity 
group definitions that Young is trying to escape. 
The `affinity group' as a political group 
For Young the affinity group gathers form and life when it is also seen as a political 
group. Without political impetus, the affinity group would be a mere association of 
individuals, or a kind of theoretical social club. Hence, Young conceives the affinity 
group's transformation into a political group as an active process of owning, claiming 
and asserting identity. An affinity group is most likely to form and be spurred into 
21 Ibid., p. 172. 
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political action because its members realise that they are discriminated against because 
of their social identities. The group therefore is not `founded' according to Young, 
nobody holds an inaugural meeting or sets out a founding constitution, its members 
instead become jointly conscious of their subordination, just as Jews in 1930s 
Germany realised their common status under Nazi oppression. As she writes, `these 
people "discovered" themselves as Jews, and then formed a group identity and 
affinity with one another'. 23 
By naming their identity in this manner, groups are able to reclaim it and 
define it in their own terms. This is the locus of the emancipatory affect of the affinity 
group as a political group. Young states that in this process, `oppressed, 
disadvantaged, or specially marked groups... organise autonomously and assert a 
positive sense of their cultural and experiential specificity'. 24 According to Young's 
account, women went through this process in the 1970s and 1980s, when they 
reclaimed their differential status and set about creating women-only spaces such as 
clinics, book stores and political forums . 
2' They indicated in this action the 
importance of affinity groups organising separately as political groups before seeking 
wider political representation. 2' However, Young's view that second wave feminist 
groups are useful models for affinity groups is a surprising endorsement of very 
traditional identity politics. This sort of identity politics was criticised in Chapter Two 
because of its tendencies to essentialise differences; such that the very act of asserting 
cultural identities demanded the cohesion and ideological adherence of those involved. 
Again, it would seem that Young re-introduces the essentialising trends of identity 
politic to her vision of affinity groups. It is necessary therefore to consider the 
example of women in an affinity group in greater detail and look for this drift to 
essentialism. 
22 I. Young, 'Justice and Communicative Democracy, ' op. cit., p. 133. 
23 I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, op. cit., p. 162. 
24 Ibid., p. 160. 
25 Ibid., p. 162. 
26 Ibid., p. 167. 
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Women, feminism and the concept of the `affinity group': a return to the 
politics of identity? 
It is important to examine Young's concept of the `affinity' group because it forms 
the basis of marginalised group's political representation in communicative 
democracy. The concept of the `affinity group', as is shown above, has the potential to 
transform the social group into a political unit that can make demands, interest-claims, 
and calls for representation for these oppressed and marginalised social groups. 
However, once the affinity group becomes a political unit there are problems of 
determinism, fixity and essentialism in regard to individual members' identities. 
Moreover, in terms of women as an affinity group in Young's work, there is 
confusion as to whether the `affinity group' is equivalent to a feminist group. At times 
she distinguishes between the two associations and at others she conflates them. Thus, 
it is necessary to examine the status of women in an affinity group, how the affinity 
group of women becomes a political group, and whether this political group of women 
is a feminist group. 
Women as an affinity group 
For Young, the attractions of the affinity group for women are clear. They allow 
women a haven from their oppression, marginalisation and subordination, empowering 
them to find solidarity and self-respect. 2' The very things that are denied to groups 
who suffer oppression, because they are classified into groups, essentialised and then 
excluded. Hence, according to Young, it is necessary to reclassify the group identity in 
a way that maintains solidarity without being deterministic of its members' identities 
and furthering their oppression. 28 Thus, affinity groups allow women to come 
together in a non-essentialistic way. It is not an `either/or' situation whereby a woman 
is either a member of the affinity group of women, or she is a member of, for example, 
the affinity group of black people. It is a politics of difference in which differences are 
I Young describes how oppressed groups are denied specificity and often denigrated as deviant and 
abnormal, ibid., pp. 164-165. 
28 Ibid., p. 47. 
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fluid, interrelated and dynamic. As Young states, `difference no longer implies that 
groups lie outside one another"' and thus there may be overlapping similarities 
among different groups. However, this non-essentialistic understanding of the group 
is lost as Young defines women's affinity group relationships in terms of the wider 
political process. 
Women in the 'affinity group' as a political group 
Young, as is shown above, attempts to conceive the political group that comes from 
affinity, without homogenising its members. Thus, for Young the group is structured 
as a movement, reflecting the differences between the members of the group. Indeed, 
she even suggests that movements based on affinity groups should have separate 
sections within them for intra-group differences. For example, women would need to 
have separate sub-sections in their group for differences in religion, sexuality, 
ethnicity etc. 30 Although this assertion of internal group differences is an attempt by 
Young to eradicate the charge of essentialism, it leaves her original concept of the 
affinity group in difficulty. If this level of diversity exists within a group, how can an 
`affinity group' be based on `common history' and `social status' as she has 
previously claimed? Furthermore, if the social group of women is so obviously 
socially dispersed in terms of religion, class and ethnicity, how can she identify a 
homogeneous, `highly visible"' social group of women who could then form the 
basis of an affinity group? 
Thus, to remain consistent with her anti-essentialist claims about the affinity 
group - that it does not depend on its members sharing a common nature - her 
theorisation of the affinity group loses shape. To be non-essentialistic it would have to 
take the form of a loose alliance in which issues of shared identity are much less 
important in group definition than her work indicates. However, Young is more likely 
to theorise the `affinity group' of women as an homogeneous political unit than a 
29 Ibid., p. 171. 
30 Ibid., p. 162. 
" Ibid., p. 44. 
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loose alliance, further undermining its status as a non-essentialistic, fluid collective. It 
is on this more substantial basis that women as an affinity group are given 
representation in her model of communicative democracy. 
Women as an affinity group and a feminist movement 
Young makes no distinction between the affinity group as a social group or as a 
political group. Indeed, it is the political impetus that can transform social groups into 
active affinity groups. What is harder to ascertain is whether on Young's reading 
women as an affinity group can be conflated with women in a feminist group. There is 
certainly a clear relationship between the two structures. According to Young, the 
experiences of the feminist movement in the 1970s and 1980s set a precedent for 
affinity group relationships. She argues that the feminist movement, along with other 
identity movements of the time, 'perfected the theory and practice of the "affinity 
group" which has become a model for democratic decisionmaking for subsequent 
protest movements'. 32 It was the positive process of group identification that made 
these movements good models for affinity groups. 
However, despite these similarities, Young does goes on to make a distinction 
between women as an affinity group and women as a feminist group. She designates 
the latter as an, `ideological group... a collection of persons with shared political 
beliefs'. 33 While such a group may become a social group and vice versa, she 
explicitly states that, `shared political or moral beliefs, even when they are deeply and 
passionately held, however, do not themselves constitute a social group'. 34 Here, 
Young is distinguishing between the social basis of an affinity group and the moral 
and political basis of an ideological group. The fact she makes this distinction again 
compounds the view, already stated, that Young has an essentialistic, identitarian vision 
of the affinity group. The affinity group has be more than shared belief, or it would be 
31 Ibid., p. 84. 
33 Ibid., p. 186. 
Ibid., p. 186. 
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equivalent to an ideological group, it needs to have deeper bonds in the shared history 
and identity of its members. 
Without clarifying the exact relationship between women in an affinity group 
and women in an ideological feminist group, two scenarios emerge in Young's work. 
Either the affinity group is equivalent to an ideological group or the two are distinct. 
Neither option is particularly appealing to women. First, if women's affinity group is 
also an ideological feminist group then it would need to be a unitary collective, 
because part of what would make the group identify with each other would be a shared 
belief in a common political project of feminism. Young herself, however, has been 
instrumental in illustrating the diversity of women, reflected in the second wave 
movement's splintering into humanist and gynocentric feminists. " Subsequently, it is 
hard to see how a unitary, feminist ideological group could develop from this 
diversity. 
If, on the other hand, the affinity group of women is to be distinguished from a 
feminist group, then Young would have to face the dilemma of whether she would 
privilege women's representation in communicative democracy in terms of affinity, or 
in terms of political feminism. If her answer is to allow for both sorts of 
representation then Young would face a situation whereby women in the affinity group 
might differ from women in the feminist group in their political decisions. This 
situation would seem to undermine the level of unity expected of affinity groups as a 
unit of political representation in communicative democracy. These concerns will be 
examined next in much greater detail. But, it will be contended at this stage that Young 
misses these dilemmas because she privileges women's representation as an affinity 
group and then, without explanation, she conflates the objectives of this group with 
elements of her feminist political project. Hence, women in an affinity group become a 
 I. Young, `Humanism, Gynocentrism, and Feminist Politics, ' Throwing Like a Girl, 
(Bloomington: Indiana Press, 1990), pp. 73-91, sets out her useful distinction between gynocentrics 
and humanist feminists and how the two have interacted to produce diverse feminist theories and 
views of politics. 
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political unit in need of representation in communicative democracy. 36 While Young 
does not conceive them explicitly as a feminist group, there are clear ties between the 
two and women's place in the affinity group forms part of a wider feminist political 
project of democratic inclusion. This political settlement will now be examined. 
Young's Political Settlement: the model of communicative democracy 
Like Benhabib, Young is interested in a modified version of the deliberative and 
communitarian models of democracy. She too wants to open these up to marginalised 
social groups. However, unlike Benhabib, Young modifies them in accordance with 
her postmodern strategy to end the `logic of identity' - the quest for sameness, 
certainty and unity - in social and political thought. Hence, she believes that both 
models, in their original forms, reflect this `logic' and thus aim at creating an 
homogeneous public sphere: the deliberative model because it privileges rational 
discourse as `proper' political language, excluding from the political process those 
groups who are seen to be non-rational, and the communitarian model because it 
assumes that all those in the same community should hold the same social values and 
excludes those who don't. 37 Young's model of communicative democracy, by 
contrast, assumes that in complex, Western societies the public will resist attempts at 
homogenisation of this sort. 38 Thus she wants to ensure that the public sphere is 
accessible to many marginalised groups and many types of political language and 
reasoning. More specifically, she wants to get women into the public sphere for two 
reasons. Firstly, to make demands and be heard as feminists and secondly, she 
believes that the inclusion of women will encourage public actors to confront the 
`Other'. This sort of confrontation, in her argument, leads to better understanding 
36 Indeed, the pattern of women's affinity group formation and the way women in such a group define 
their identity overlaps with the gynocentric feminist organisations of the 1970s and 1980s. Both 
groups value their specific culture, history and identity as women and both want recognition for this 
specificity. 
37 I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, op. cit., p. 229. 
38 I. Young, `Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, ' in M. Wilson and A. 
Yeatman (eds. ), Justice and Identity, (Bridget Williams Books: New Zealand, 1995), p. 140. 
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between groups in society. Hence, it is necessary to detail her model of communicative 
democracy before assessing women's place in it as both citizens and as feminists. 
The politics of difference, on Young's account, requires the political 
construction of a `Rainbow Coalition'. The `Rainbow Coalition' will give direct 
representation and participation to those affinity groups, including women, who have 
been disadvantaged and oppressed. It is aimed at securing justice for these groups 
once justice has been re-defined as a concept that is concerned with the cultural 
currency of social and political norms, as well as the distribution of economic 
resources. 39 The ultimate hope is that the coalition will replace the ideal of the 
impartial and homogeneous public, which on Young's reading underpins traditional 
liberal political models, with the ideal of the differentiated and heterogeneous public. 
For Young, the ideal of impartiality that is demanded by traditional concepts of 
justice and politics is nothing less than an 'impossibility'. 0 It is a product of the 
unifying `logic of identity' which means that impartiality can only be constructed by 
excluding those social groups whom the dominant culture designates as different. The 
ideal of impartiality, moreover, has had the effect of producing a public, political 
sphere that valorises norms of formality, professionalisation, bureaucracy and 
distributive justice that are not shared by all groups in society. "' Hence, these norms 
are theorised as `universal' forms of interaction, hiding both their roots in the 
subjective perspective of the `dominant culture' and their exclusion of groups such as 
women, who are deemed by these standards to be emotional and irrational. 
To overcome these problems, Young stipulates four conditions to ensure that 
communicative democracy is accessible to marginalised affinity groups. The first 
condition is a new cultural politics that can amend current political and social practises 
to include marginalised groups such as women. The second condition is a new set of 
`special' political rights and monetary resources for these groups in recognition of the 
particular problems they face in being excluded. The third condition is the common 
39 I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, op. cit., p. 34. 00 Ibid., p. 102. 
41 Ibid., p. 115. 
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agreement on the rules and procedures that will govern the communicative process. 
The fourth and final condition is the acceptance of a new principle of affinity group 
representation. 
A `new cultural politics' 
Young's advocates a `cultural revolution'42 at the level of the subject and society as 
one condition for communicative democracy. The subject prepares for this revolution 
by undergoing a process of 'consciousness-raising 14' and recognising and accepting 
the differences within itself and from other subjects. On her account, this process 
affirms the postmodern view of the decentred self that suggests, `rather than seeking a 
wholeness of the self, we who are subjects of the plural and complex society should 
affirm the otherness within ourselves'. 44 In affirming its own `otherness', that area of 
its subjectivity that is does not fully understand, the subject learns to view difference 
as a matter of degrees, an ambiguity, and not as essentialistic categorisation. At the 
social level, cultural politics examines society to ask `what practices, habits, attitudes, 
comportments, images, symbols and so on contribute to social domination and group 
oppression, and to call for the collective transformation of such practices'. "' 
Her emphasis on cultural politics also encompasses her new `non-distributive' 
conception of justice. According to Young, most Western thinkers have viewed justice 
as the equitable redistribution of wealth and general economic resources. Hence, on 
the distributive paradigm, justice is seen to reallocate things, `material goods', such as 
income and resources. "' While she agrees that these resources are important, she 
believes them to be useless unless justice also encompasses the re-distribution of 
power relationships, such as access to decision-making, and the chance to develop 
one's own life and capacities. "' These factors are often culturally, not economically, 
determined and are thus not remedied by legislative proposals and monetary aid. Thus, 
42 Ibid., p. 152. 
" Ibid., p. 153. 
04 Ibid., p. 124. 
'$ Ibid., p. 86. 
`ý I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, op. cit., p. 15. 
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before legislative policies can ever start to be effective, they require a group's 
particularity to be recognised and validated as part of the demand for justice. Justice, 
on these terms, means that difference itself is a claim for justice. 
According to Young, one way for society to open up to these cultural concerns 
is through its practices and modes of political argument. She therefore delineates three 
forms of debate and argumentation that will characterise political discourse in 
communicative democracy, take account of cultural difference, and challenge dominant 
and exclusionary political assumptions: `greeting, rhetoric and storytelling'. `$ They 
are designed with the hope of including groups who are perhaps not at ease with 
defining and talking about themselves in terms of abstract, formal language but who, 
nevertheless, want to give voice to the specificity of their experiences. She hopes that 
these three modes of argumentation will allow for trust to develop between participants 
in the political process and, more importantly, ensure that disadvantaged groups are 
listened to. In her words, `it is not enough to make assertions and give reasons. One 
must also be heard'. 49 Hence, according to Young, it is possible to use greetings, such 
as offers of food, handshakes and general politeness, to keep the dialogue open when 
it is threatened by conflict. SO Similarly, using rhetorical speech allows the speaker to 
refer to the specificity of their situation and therefore to move away from abstract 
political speech that can leave the audience feeling excluded? ' Finally, storytelling 
allows political viewpoints to be expressed in subjective and emotional ways. S2 This 
latter sort of speech was very important in radical feminist groups to allow women to 
bond and to bring into the open their private experiences of being women. Thus, these 
modes of political argument add to the cultural conditions of better affinity group 
representation because they create a more sympathetic political culture in which to 
hear the claims of those who have been excluded. 
47 Ibid., pp. 22-24. 
48 I. Young, 'Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, ' op. cit., p. 144. 
49 Ibid., p. 146. 
S0 Ibid., p. 145. 
51 Ibid., p. 146. 
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Group rights and resources 
However, cultural politics for Young needs to be reflected in a set of practical 
mechanisms that directly support the political organisation of marginalised groups. 
These measures include a revised system of rights, in which members of 
disadvantaged affinity groups are, in addition to their common rights, given a set of 
`special' rights that are tailored to their particular needs. " For example, women need 
to be given additional pregnancy rights to supplement their general rights to equal 
treatment in the workplace. The state must also encourage diversity by giving 
monetary resources and media access to disadvantaged affinity groups so that they 
can politically organise their group. However, the most controversial political measure 
is the idea that disadvantaged groups in communicative democracy should be given the 
power of veto over policies that specifically concern them. In this regard, Young 
believes that women should have veto power over "reproductive rights". " 
While these group rights are obviously particularistic, Young believes that they 
still have universalisable application in terms of inclusion. She defends this move, 
stating, 
the universalist finds a contradiction in asserting both that formerly 
segregated groups have a right to inclusion and that these groups have 
a right to different treatment. There is no contradiction here, however, 
if attending to difference is necessary in order to make participation 
and inclusion possible ss 
Hence, the special rights ensure that all groups have universal access to the political 
decision-making process. 
Political procedures of inclusion 
The third condition of communicative democracy is a set of commonly agreed rules 
and procedures governing the communicative process. According to Young, a 
communicative polity needs a minimal unity provided by procedures of equal respect, 
12 Ibid., p. 147. 
03 I. Young, 'Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, ' Ethics 
No. 99, (January 1989), p. 269. 
S0 I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, op. cit., p. 184. 
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a formal commitment to allow others to express their opinions, and procedural rules 
for fair discussion and decision-making. " These procedures are also necessary to 
ensure and enshrine affinity group representation and increase social 
'understanding'. 57 However, she believes that they are thoroughly minimal and are 
`much thinner conditions than those of shared understandings or the goals of finding 
common goods'. 58 If this is the case, it remains to be seen whether they would then be 
substantive enough to bring about the increase in social understanding, that Young is 
hoping for. 
Another problem that Young fails to answer satisfactorily, is whether these 
procedures can be generated in a binding manner as the condition of good 
communicative practise, without losing her postmodern concern with contingency. 
Young recognises this difficulty: 
An origin problem emerges... a public must be constructed to decide 
which groups deserve specific representation in decision-making 
procedures. What are the principles guiding the composition of such a 
"constitutional convention"?... No program or set of principles can 
found a politics because politics is always a process in which we are 
already engaged. 51 
Thus, Young is ultimately faced with a dilemma in which she either forgoes her 
commitment to contingency, guaranteeing universal procedures that could `found' a 
model of communicative democracy. Or, she admits that these necessary conditions of 
the communicative model can only be temporarily agreed on by some members of the 
public. 
The principle of affinity group representation 
The final condition of communicative democracy is her principle of group 
representation, based on the representation of marginalised affinity groups. Thus, she 
states, 
ss I. Young, 'Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, ' op. cit., 
p. 273. 
56 I. Young, 'Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, ' op. cit., p. 142. 
S' Ibid., p. 143. 
S$ Ibid., p. 142. 
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representation should be designated whenever the group's history and 
social situation provide a particular perspective on the issues, when the 
interests of members are specifically affected, and when its perceptions 
and interests are not likely to receive expression without that 
representation 60 
The principle of representation in her work is, not surprisingly, concerned to secure 
the representation of group particularity and difference as opposed to issues and 
ideologies. Her principle of group representation is central to her model of democracy 
because it has an important role in fostering a transformative political situation. This is 
driven by a Millian desire for democracy to be educative, with citizens listening to the 
perspectives of others and, from this increased social knowledge, having a clearer idea 
of common needs 6' As Young puts it: 
One function of discussion is precisely to transform people's 
preferences, to alter or refine their perception of their interests, their 
perceptions of the needs and interests of others, their relations to those 
others, and their perception of collective problems, goals and 
solutions. 62 
Hence, when Young conceptualises the affinity group as the basis for political 
representation of disadvantaged groups in the Rainbow Coalition, she expects more 
than a simple process of a group taking up its constitutionally guaranteed place in 
discussion. Rather, it is based on the desire for a transformative political situation in 
which many citizens will participate in their particularity as members of specific 
affinity groups. Young is sceptical as to whether traditional, formal, representational 
guarantees are much use in getting groups included and `heard' in this way. As she 
claims, `the democratic political imagination in the modem world would benefit from 
serious attention to the systems of representation that will best promote active and 
equal participation of citizens' 63 To this end, her principle of group representation is 
given two conditions to ensure it promotes `active and equal participation'. One it will 
only be extended to oppressed groups - it is their participation that needs equalising 
s9 I. Young, 'Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, ' op. cit, 
p. 266. 
60 Ibid., pp. 265-266. 
61 I. Young, 'Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, ' op. cit., p. 130. 
62 Ibid., p. 129. 
63 Ibid., p. 140. 
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and encouraging - and, two, these groups, since they are likely to be broad, must 
themselves have representative structures. "' 
Young's ideal political outcome would be for affinity group representation to 
transform existing liberal democratic models of individual interest-based 
representation into a communicative democratic model. For this process to take place 
in its entirety, all four conditions would have to be met. Firstly, a new cultural politics 
that would attend to difference would need to be established that would be assisted by 
the communicative process. Secondly, a set of particularistic rights and resources 
would need to be given to hitherto marginalised affinity groups. Thirdly, minimal 
procedural rules of inclusion would be required to ensure universality of access and 
outcome. These would be consolidated by the fourth condition of a non-proportional 
principle of group representation for affinity groups that have previously been 
marginalised. Young believes that once the groups have access, they will be consulted 
in many political spaces, at many political levels and over many political issues. They 
will even be given the power of veto on national policies that specifically concern 
them. However, while the exclusive veto rights may seem unduly divisive, Young 
hopes that ultimately group presence will contribute to a transformative political 
situation in which otherness and diversity is confronted and re-defined in non- 
exclusionary, non-assimilationist and non-conflictual ways. " 
Women in communicative democracy: institutionalising difference? 
It is now possible to examine the problems of women's representation as an affinity 
group in Young's model of communicative democracy. Three broad difficulties 
emerge: firstly, problems of essentialism, secondly, problems of political permanence 
and thirdly, difficulties of participation and representation. In each area she ends up 
undermining the social and personal diversity of women by institutionalising them in 
" I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, op. cit., p. 187. 
65 At the end of Justice and the Politics of Difference op. cit., pp. 226-25 6., Young refers to this ideal 
as 'city life, ' based on a celebration of differences, the play of diversity and the erotic confrontation of 
strangers and their otherness. 
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her political model. While these problems remain in her work, there are serious doubts 
over its usefulness as a model of citizenship for women and feminists. 
Problems of essentialism 
The criticisms concerning essentialism in Young's work centre on whether she fully 
eradicates the `logic of identity' from her own political vision. As it was argued 
earlier, Young believes that the `logic of identity' excludes social difference to create 
unitary and fixed forms of thought. At the social and political level, this logic results in 
a quest for conflict-free, impartial public institutions, further denying social difference. 
She wants to eradicate this logic from her political model by ensuring that excluded 
social groups are given representation as an affinity group that highlights their 
differential concerns. 
However, the very process of including affinity groups in the communicative 
model re-introduces this logic. The group organisation tends becomes rigid and fixed, 
so that the group can be given effective presence in communicative democracy, 
including the particularistic right to veto areas of national policy that specifically 
concern them. The exercise of the veto power is especially controversial because it 
would undoubtedly require substantive agreement, if not unanimity among group 
members, if it were ever to be implemented. As Melissa Williams has asked, `who 
would exercise this veto on women's behalf in the area of reproductive rights, for 
example - pro-choice women or women who oppose abortion under any 
circumstances? '66 Thus, to be an effective affinity group, women would need to be 
homogenised. 
Young's response to the charge of essentialism has been to structure the 
affinity group of women so that it has separate forums for women in terms of their 
age, religious identity, ethnic identity and so on. However, while this move may avoid 
the risk of essentialising the group, it only serves to further indicate how contradictory 
it is to suggest that, in the face of this level of differentiation, women could agree on 
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the use of the veto. Elizabeth Spelman, as it is noted in Chapter Two, also warns 
against essentialising women at the group identity level. For Spelman, women cannot 
simply `hive off' our religious, ethnic, sexual identities from their gender identities, 
they are too -interdependent. " What Spelman's view of identity suggests, when it is 
applied to Young, is that it is not enough for Young to promise infra-group diversity, 
along the lines of class and race, and then make it secondary to the base identity of the 
affinity group, such as `women' or `black', for the purposes of political 
representation. Young's solution misunderstands both the nature of ethnic identity 
and how it interacts with gender identity to produce distinct experiences that may go 
beyond the realms of the affinity group. 
Anne Phillips has best understood Young's difficulties with the affinity group, 
arguing that a of 'closure' takes place, in which, `people com[e] together to define 
themselves politically through what is only one frozen single aspect of their lives. " 
In other words, women who might want political representation in terms of a number 
of identities aside from their gendered one would be disadvantaged by being 
represented in an affinity group that takes gender to be their primary identity. In 
continuing with this type of identity politics, Young's model of democracy does not 
reflect her commitment to social diversity. Subsequently, by giving affinity groups 
powers of veto and institutional. representation she undermines her own stated aim to 
draw the affinity group as a fluid and dynamic affiliation. It characterises the tension 
between her emphasis on postmodern diversity and her political institutionalisation of 
the affinity group. 
The problem of institutionalisation and permanence 
The institutionalisation of affinity groups, that is required if the Rainbow Coalition is 
to achieve a degree of permanence, compounds the risk of essentialism. Affinity 
groups would quickly become institutionalised in her model because they would be 
66 M. Williams, 'Justice Towards Groups Political Not Juridical, ' Political Theory, Vol. 23, No. 1, 
(February 1995) p. 90n. 
67 E. Spelman, Inessential Women, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988), p. 133. 
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state-resourced, given organisational funding and media access, and because the 
increased participation of disadvantaged groups would bring about a lengthier political 
process. 69 In this process, the affinity group would need to maintain the stability of its 
organisation for the length of the democratic proceedings: from agenda-setting to the 
implementation of any resulting policy. 70 Hence, the affinity group would acquire a 
degree of permanence, forcing it towards a long-term rigid structure with a potentially 
hierarchical structure. As Chandran Kukathas has noted, in a similar criticism of 
Young's theory of group representation, 
it may, in the end, benefit the elites rather than the group as a whole. 
The more the elites of the group associate with their political 
counterparts in mainstream society, the more likely their thinking (and 
their interests) are to diverge from that of the group. " 
This political situation would be the antithesis of Young's vision of fluid, dynamic and 
potentially subversive affinity groups. 
While this drift to permanence once again contradicts her focus on the fluidity 
of the affinity group, it is especially problematic to assume that a diverse affinity 
group of women could achieve such long-term rigidity. Even on her own assessment, 
women have many differences that would need separate representative forums in the 
affinity group and much negotiation to allow the collective to operate. In these 
circumstances, how would women's common political stance be agreed upon? Would 
there be a leadership to report back to the affinity group at every stage in the decision- 
making process? Or, would the decision be made on the entire group's position 
before the political decision-making process began? If the latter were the case, the 
transformative affects of confronting otherness in communicative democracy would be 
futile because of such a prioristic will formation. Yet it does not seem practicable for 
" A. Phillips, Democracy and Difference, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), p. 116. 
69 Indeed, Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, op. cit., admits that decision-making could 
even be stalled and she defends this, stating, 'if... the alternative to stalled decisionmaking is a unified 
public that makes decisions ostensibly embodying the general interest which systematically 
ignore... particular groups, then stalled decisionmaking may sometimes be just', p. 186. 
70 C. Hunold and I. Young, 'Justice, Democracy and Hazardous Siting, ' in Political Studies, Vol. 
46, No. 1, (March 1998), p. 89. 
" C. Kukathas, 'Liberalism, Multiculturalism and Oppression, ' in A. Vincent (ed. ), Political 
Theory: Tradition and Diversity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 117. 
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the affinity group leadership to conduct their own internal debates for every moot 
point in the decision-making process. 
A second problem with permanence is that it also risks the fragmentation of 
the political sphere into a number conflicting power arrangements in which no-one has 
the ultimate authority to adjudicate between competing claims for representation. 
Melissa Williams believes that this vacuum is a result of Young's dismissal of 
impartiality such that: 
When the command to attend to particularity of perspectives on issues 
of justice enters the public sphere, we seem to be in danger of losing 
firm ground from which we can evaluate the competing justice claims 
of different social groups. 72 
Whilst such an arena would be heterogeneous, it would be at the cost of malting it a 
space in which all claims of oppression and claims to justice became validated. It 
exposes the fact that when diversity determines political interaction, there is a need for 
formal representative structures that can allow authoritative decisions to be made in the 
face of possible irreconcilable conflict. But Young's principle of group representation 
is concerned with inclusion and participation, not authoritative democratic outcomes. 
Difficulties of representation and participation 
Hence, while Young does detail the principle of group representation, it is clear that 
she privileges representational structures and mechanisms in so far as they allow for 
group participation and aim at an ideal of transformative communicative democracy. 
Judith Squires suggests that Young's principle of representation is primarily a 
`symbolic' concept and is based on the subjective assessment of whether a group is 
being fully recognised through representation. Squires is unhappy that Young does 
not detail who measures this `representativeness' or who has the authority to decide if 
a group needs recognition in the first place. " Squires's criticisms expose the 
insubstantial nature of Young's principle of representation. Young has no 
mechanisms to measure the success of group inclusion and is left relying on her faith 
72 M. Williams, 'Justice Towards Groups Political Not Juridical, ' op. cit., pp. 81-82. 
73 J. Squires, `Liberal Constitutionalism, Identity and Difference, ' op. cit., p. 633. 
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in the transformative process of communicative democracy to ensure that 
representation is fulfilled. 
This weakness of her principle group representative mechanisms becomes 
more overt in the light of her desire to increase participation, and it raises the question 
of whether her political model allows for authoritative decision-making at all. As the 
political process opens up to hitherto excluded groups, Young believes a 
democratisation of society will take place leading to a prolonged political process. For 
Young, protraction is a small price to pay to allow disadvantaged groups to be heard. 
However, Young does not make it clear how decisions will be made in a situation 
where there are many conflicting group demands. Indeed, she is not convinced that 
such competition will emerge in a communicative democracy, claiming that 
`often... conflicts of interest are more perceived than real'. "' It appears that Young, like 
Benhabib, privileges the transformative potential of deliberative democracy to make 
participants more sympathetic to each other. Hence, any procedural rules in her model 
of communicative democracy are designed to encourage participation rather than 
decision. 
Ultimately, it appears that without formally theorising these traditional 
principles of representation at the wider democratic level, Young's political settlement 
risks two problematic outcomes. One that the process of participation will be a 
success and too many groups will become involved in the deliberation. " This scenario 
is especially worrying since Young has no clear idea of who or what will decide on 
inclusion in the political process and thus, it could simply become impracticable. 
Conversely, the process could be a failure and participation might remain at low levels. 
In the latter scenario representative measures are necessary to imbue participants in the 
process with the authority to speak for others. 
74 I. Young, Justice and Communicative Democracy, op. cit., p. 136. 
's In her article with Hunold, C. Hunold and I. Young, `Justice, Democracy and Hazardous Siting, ' 
op. cit., p. 89, she mentions this possibility, but she does not detail the exact representative measures 
to deal with it or acknowledge how coming to a decision might exclude the wishes of some of these 
groups. 
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Unfortunately, participation in a protracted political process is especially 
problematic for many women. 76 Anne Phillips has expressed surprise that so many 
feminists have, like Young, heralded participatory democracy. As she states, `the 
alliance between feminism and participatory democracy looks strained, and, 
considering the intense pressures on women's time it is remarkable that feminists 
have been so wedded to a politics of meetings'. " If women's participation cannot be 
secured, and Young makes no good case as to why it should be, barring a widespread 
cultural revolution, then representative structures and mechanisms are instrumental in 
bestowing legitimate authority on a `leadership' to make decisions. Phillips notes that 
there are only two mechanisms to register opinions for this purpose. " One has been 
the vote, which Young would see as too minimal because it is confined to a private 
decision-making process as opposed to face-to-face deliberation. 79 The other 
mechanism is attendance at meetings, which falls into the same problems of the 
pressures on time. 
If representative structures and mechanisms are not in place at the level of the 
affinity group then two outcomes also appear possible. Either, Young recognises that 
the affinity group can only speak for a limited number of women, in which case it is 
legitimate to question its usefulness for representing anymore than a few committed 
and interested women. And, the next section will look at how Young herself looks at 
this possibility. Or, secondly, the affinity group must be broken down into its various 
sub-sections until unanimity among all members can be found. Young has already 
criticised other discourse theorists, notably Habermas, for demanding consensus, 
seeing it indicative of a desire for homogenising unity. However, without minimal 
76 Although it might be noted that this problem is not confined to women. As Mark Warren, What 
Should We Expect from More Democracy? Radically Democratic Responses to Politics, ' op. cit., p. 
243, warns, the tendency of many radical democrats is to presume that participation in politics will 
be of great appeal once democratic restructuring has been completed. 
" A. Phillips, Democracy and Difference, op. cit., p. 111. 
78 Ibid., p. 116. 
79 Young, 'Justice and Communicative Democracy, ' op. cit., believes that this sort of minimal and 
private mechanism undermines democracy and, thus, she criticises 'interest-based concepts of 
democracy' because it is a 'privatized understanding of democracy in which citizens never leave their 
own private and parochial pursuits, ' p. 126. 
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representative mechanisms, such as voting, there seems to be no other way to 
aggregate opinion and secure a decision at group level. 
What becomes clear in Young's view of communicative democracy is that she 
cannot match her engagement of postmodernism with her political settlement. As 
Judith Squires recognises it is presented with 
a tension stemming from an ontological position which understands 
identity as contextual and fluid and an advocacy position which 
recognises the need for formal procedures of political recognition, 
necessarily working to freeze identity in some way. 8° 
Thus, the three sets of criticisms of Young's political settlement suggest that she often 
avoids this tension by reversing some of her postmodern and feminist commitments. 
Firstly, the affinity group, in the face of decentred subjectivity, becomes more 
structured to fix identities of the group members for democratic representation and 
consultation. Secondly, the Rainbow Coalition of communicative democracy can be 
interpreted as requiring a degree of permanence that does not accord with her vision of 
the social flux and diversity in which groups emerge and dissipate. Finally, in making 
the democratic process dependent on prolonged participation, it becomes deeply 
unattractive to many women who simply do not have time for this level of political 
activity. In all, Young has continuing problems in conceiving of political identity. She 
continues to base her political project on a concept of political identity based on the 
affinity group and hopes that the representation of these identities will lead to a 
transformative political situation in which they are met with sympathy. 
Remedying essentialism: women and the series? 
Given these concerns with essentialism in her view of the affinity group, Young has 
responded by recently adopting the Sartrean concept of the `series' or `serial 
collectivity'. " She hopes that the concept of serial collectivity will `allow us to see 
women as a collective without identifying common attributes that all women have or 
80 J. Squires, 'Liberal Constitutionalism, Identity and Difference, ' op. cit., p. 628. 
$` I see this new concept as developmental in Young's political theory. It has not, as yet, impacted 
on her communicative model of democracy, which remains committed to affinity group 
representation. 
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implying that women have a common identity'. 82 Thus, the series is a form of 
collective in which the members are without organisation because they are `passively' 
identified by their common relationship to the same set of material conditions. 
Women in the series remain isolated individuals, but dominant interpretations of the 
body and heterosexuality constrain all of their choices. Consequently, according to 
Young, all women have a position in the series, but the diversity of women's 
experiences is maintained as `no individual woman's identity will ... escape the 
markings of gender, but how gender marks her life is her own'. 83 If women go on to 
recognise their common location in the series then one of two things happens. There 
is either an ephemeral moment of identification and they return immediately to the 
level of the series. Or, they organise themselves into a more permanent political 
grouping. 
The exact nature of this relationship between the series and the resulting 
political group is interesting. She distinguishes between the group and series in terms 
of identification, stating, `a group is a collection of persons who do mutually 
identify... A series, on the other hand, is not a mutually acknowledging identity with 
any common project... Women need have nothing in common in their individual lives 
to be serialized as women'. 84 In other words, there does not need to be a conscious 
recognition of group membership to be placed in the series. However, she goes on to 
say that, `a relationship between the series and groups does exist... groups arise on the 
basis of and in response to a serialized condition'. 8S By making these differences 
explicit, she removes the series from the domain of identity politics, something that 
she fails to do with the concept of the affinity group. Its basis is not a woman's sense 
of personal identity but her material conditions. Consequently, groups arising from 
the series begin to take on a very different form to the ones arising from affinity. 
In her work on the series, a group develops from the series on a far more 
limited basis. In not having the broad basis the affinity group of women was supposed 
82 I. Young, 'Gender as Seriality: Thinking About Women as a Social Collective, ' op. cit., p. 188. 
83 Ibid., p. 209. 
84 Ibid., p. 209. 
155 
to have, Young is able to make a useful distinction between women's position in a 
social group and their membership of a political collective. In her earlier concept of the 
affinity group, women's social position in the group becomes identical to their status 
as political actors, implying that affinity groups of women have the same sorts of 
concerns in both the affinity group and in the political process. She only makes a 
social/political distinction in so much as to suggest that affinity groups of women are 
not `ideological' feminist groups and even then she does not preserve this boundary. 
According to Young, therefore, groups based on the series `are always partial 
in relation to the series - they bring together only some women for some purposes 
involving their gendered serialized experience' (my italics). " Moreover, in setting the 
boundaries of membership in this manner, Young is more able to acknowledge 
irreconcilable differences between women, differences that would shatter the affinity 
group as she has conceived it. Thus, she is clear that groups based on serial 
collectivity will not always be feminist and indeed, some might be, `explicitly anti- 
feminist'. $' Once she stops searching for the exacting and impossible cultural, social 
and political identification required by affinity groups, women's political collectivity 
could be defined in a much more limited and fluid manner. 
Whilst these modifications are welcome, Young has not, as yet, substantially 
changed her political framework. Hence, the idea of the series remains a speculative 
piece. Young still sees her political settlement in terms of the political representation of 
unified, single affinity groups and not the limited groups suggested by her view of 
serial collectivity. Further, her political settlement continues to rest on the unity of ý the 
affinity group as a basic political unit for representation at local and state political 
levels. It would be interesting therefore to consider the implications of this view of 
serial groups for the democratic representation of women as women and as feminists. 
$S Ibid., p. 209. 
06 Ibid., p. 210. 
87 Ibid., p. 211. 
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The end of identity politics: new directions in democracy 
It was suggested that Young's concept of the series opens up the possibility of a more 
limited and realistic view of women in a number of political collectivities, not all of 
them feminist. As such, there are a number of parallels between Young's view of 
political groups of women based on the series and Fraser and Nicholson's view of 
postmodern-feminism, that was discussed in Chapter Two. To reiterate their position 
briefly, like Young, Fraser believes that certain postmodern theories have useful 
applications in feminist theory, particularly in relation to how women view their social 
identities and their place in social groups. Fraser believes that postmodems, such as 
Foucault, posit a view of social identity as being exceedingly complex and multi- 
faceted, with which she would agree. Thus, as it was noted, Fraser argues that `no one 
is simply a woman', 88 and that, moreover, 'one is not always a woman in the same 
degree'. 89 Hence, for Fraser women will not always act politically as feminists and 
when they do so it will be from different perspectives. 
In an article written with Linda Nicholson, she goes so far as to suggest that 
this view of politics might be termed or provide the basis for `postmodernist 
feminism' 90 This idea brings to fruition many of Young's ideas on women's serial 
collectivity. Hence, without unduly conflating the two views, Fraser believes that given 
the diversity of women and feminists, women can only form alliance-based political 
groups that do not assume a unity of women. 9' This view concurs with Young's 
desire, stated in her article on serial collectivity, that `feminist politics must be coalition 
politics'. 92 If Young expanded her account of feminist coalitions as opposed to 
affinity groups, she would be better placed to address the conflicts that arise from 
88 N. Fraser, 'The Uses and Abuses of French Discourse Theories for Feminist Politics, ' in N. Fraser 
and S. Lee Bartky (eds. ), Revaluing French Feminism. Critical Essays on Difference, Agency and 
Culture, (Bloomington and Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 178. 
89 Ibid., p. 178. 
90 N. Fraser and L. Nicholson, 'Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter between 
Feminism and Postmodernism, ' in Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 5, Nos. 2-3, (June 1988), p. 
374. 
91 Ibid., p. 391. See my discussion of their work in Chapter Two, p. 81. 
92 I. Young, `Gender as Seriality: Thinking About Women as a Social Collective, ' op. cit., p. 212. 
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women's diverse experiences. Fraser and Nicholson, however, do go on to describe 
how the alliance of women might operate in political practice, suggesting that, 
the underlying premise of this practice is that while some women share 
some common interests... such commonalities are by no means 
universal; rather, they are interlaced with differences even with 
conflicts. This, then, is a practise made up of a patchwork of 
overlapping alliances, not one circumscribable by an essential 
definition. 
With these revisions in mind, it is possible to apply some of the insights of the politics 
of the series to her general political settlement. At the core of this process are 
questions about the representative nature of her political settlement and related 
questions of how groups of women, who cannot necessarily be grouped in the affinity 
group, can pursue citizenship. Moreover these questions are also concerned with how 
groups of feminists might find their place in the political process when they cannot 
guarantee the cohesion or permanence of their collectives. 
New directions in democracy 
In other words, this is a return to Young's starting point to see what is left of her 
concept of the affinity group in relation to women. She should reassert its postmodern 
roots in diversity and fluidity, something that is lost as she begins to structure and 
institutionalise the group. Instead of theorising an affinity group based on `the 
manner of sharing assumptions', Young could then modify the actual concept of 
affinity with the idea of the series. To reiterate, her view of the series saw a collective 
of women arise in relation to a set of material conditions and not due to the need for 
identity recognition and affirmation. On the basis of this she expects only a few 
women to be interested in making the step to the group. The explicit limiting of the 
membership of the group means that Young cannot institutionalise it as a 
representative group of women. It is better interpreted as political alliance of feminists 
that cannot hope to politically represent an entire social group of women. 
93 N. Fraser and L. Nicholson, 'Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter between 
Feminism and Postmodernism, ' op. cit., p. 391. 
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It thus stands as a more limited approach to collectivity, requiring mechanisms 
to ensure that groups themselves are representative, having leaderships, decision- 
making procedures and formal rules of association. However, the fact that a grouping 
of women based on the series might be transitory and limited has some benefits over 
Young's original approach. It is more likely to remain an alternative force capable of 
being both adaptable and flexible. In requiring permanence, Young `sets' the affinity 
group and binds it into a set of very traditional power relations. Hence, once the group 
is established in the protracted political process of the Rainbow Coalition its potential 
to shift and change is subverted by the need to secure the agreement of the group to, 
for example, implement the veto or contribute the group's collective viewpoint to the 
agenda. 
In resisting institutionalisation in the communicative process, any grouping of 
women based on the series should remain open to change and fluidity and avoid the 
fixing or essentialising of women's identities. Of course, in avoiding 
institutionalisation Young would not be able to depend on her group to have any 
degree of permanence. It could not be built into the very fabric of a Rainbow 
Coalition. This is not to suggest that a particular grouping of women would be 
hopelessly ephemeral, but that permanence cannot be presumed and secured politically 
in a communicative model of democracy. On this view, it would be better to fight for 
women's inclusion as feminists and as citizens, two separate types of inclusion. In 
this way women can seek out democratic representation in terms of a range of their 
political identities, without putting at risk feminist representation. Moreover, it would 
ensure that women are not just democratically included in their affinity group, 
ignoring those women who disagree with the group. 
Finally, seeing the group as a limited alliance alongside other alliances helps 
remedy some of the problems of participation. Interested women would be free to 
commit themselves or withdraw as they pleased, again suggesting a degree of flux and 
fluidity. As there is no longer any need to make the alliance representative of all 
women, as there is with the affinity group, there would be no need to seek extensive 
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participation as the very foundation of the alliance, a process that is often a deterrent to 
women's involvement in politics. This reconceptualisation of women's political 
activity would again allow Young to reassert her commitment to decentred subjectivity, 
whereby the subject has a number of social and political affiliations. 
Conclusion 
It was shown that Young engaged postmodern theory in two ways. To reconceptualise 
individual and group identities in a non-essentialistic manner, and to eradicate the 
`logic of identity' - the quest for unity, sameness and certainty - from political and 
social thought. This engagement allowed her to theorise the subject as a socially 
constituted and decentred self that relies on its group memberships for self-definition 
and affirmation. Membership in many of these social groups is passive, with the 
subject unconsciously accepting it as an element of their self-identity. However, the 
subject, particularly when it has been oppressed, subordinated or discriminated 
against, may actively choose to identify with a social group or a number of social 
groups. This sort of social group is an affinity group. For Young, the subject does not 
necessarily have to share a common sense of identity with the group but they must 
actively chose to identify with it and find its common bonds affirming. 
The affinity group for Young transforms the passive social group into an 
active, dynamic and political group relationship. Its members refuse to be 
subordinated by dominant cultures and assert their differences, seeking political 
recognition and representation in terms of these. It was suggested that this move to 
politicise the affinity group re-introduces essentialism and the `logic of identity' in 
Young's work for two reasons. One, the group needs to have deep bonds of affinity to 
maintain this level of unity and, two, to maintain the affinity group for any length of 
time, it is necessary to fix the group in terms of one view of identity. 
These essentialising processes are compounded when Young applies the 
concept of the affinity group to women. She suggests that women, despite being 
diverse, are a `highly visible' group who could come together in the affinity group for 
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political action. Yet, Young never explicitly details how diverse women can come 
together to form solidaristic bonds based on identity, shared status and common 
history. Indeed, much of Young's work on women and feminism has pluralised them 
and noted how even the experience of oppression is contingent and divergent. Hence, 
with some inconsistency, Young ends up theorising women as a united affinity group 
in need of direct representation in communicative democracy and then conflates the 
objectives of this group with those of ideological feminists. 
This communicative model of democracy is a reworked deliberative model that 
believes in the transformative effects of discourse and confrontation of `others', those 
who are different to oneself. Young opens the model up to excluded affinity groups 
such as women by giving them special political rights, additional resources to organise 
politically and building a principle of group representation into decision-making. This 
process culminates in giving women the power of veto over reproduction policies, on 
the assumption that women could agree on these issues. In other words, she can 
theorise women as a specific, homogeneous political group in need of democratic 
inclusion but only at the expense of essentialising them. Hence, women are tied into 
their affinity group for political representation and participation, ensuring that the 
group is united enough to fulfil the rigours of an extended decision-making process 
and to exercise the veto. It was seen that Young has begun to remedy these charges of 
essentialism by theorising women as a serial collectivity -a group based on a common 
material rather than identitarian status. However, she has not modified her concept of 
communicative democracy, or her principle of group representation of affinity groups 
on which it rests, to include the idea of seriality. 
Ultimately, what is lost in her political view is a sense of women's wider 
inclusion as citizens. Citizens who may have individual interests that may conflict with 
those of their gender identity. For this citizen identity to be protected, more traditional 
forms of individualistic representative democracy need to be considered. Further, it 
was argued that Young has to rethink the whole idea of institutionalising group 
representation and social differences in the political process. It is necessary to develop 
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the implications her model of serial collectivity has for the whole concept of 
democratic representation. Moreover, the other implication of the series is that political 
identities are often conflictual and transitory which raises serious doubts over the 
transformative hopes of her democratic model. 
It is at this point that Mouffe's work can be introduced. She has made similar 
theoretical journeys to Young but, crucially, does not believe that radical democracy 
and the incorporation of difference has to be necessarily based on participation and 
discourse as both Benhabib and Young do. Instead, she has become increasingly 
concerned to explore agonal modes of politics and democracy and addresses the 
dilemma of finding a distinctive political identity that is informed by gender but not 
determined by it. 
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Chapter Five. Chantal Mouffe: Feminism, Agonal Democracy and 
the Construction of Political Identity 
Introduction 
In the last Chapter it was argued that Iris Young has substantially revised her view of 
women as an `affinity group' in favour of the concept of `serial collectivity'. The 
latter type of group is based on women sharing a common material condition and not, 
as was the case with affinity group membership, sharing deep bonds of common 
history and culture. However, she has not as yet altered her model of communicative 
democracy to accommodate this revision. It remains based on a principle of `affinity 
group' representation that essentialises women and institutionalises their presumed 
social status as a unified gender group. Hence, a gap opens up between her new view 
of feminism as a short-term, limited `serial group' and her model of democracy that 
still needs women's political organisation to be based on affinity and to have a degree 
of permanence. Chantal Mouffe's vision of agonal democracy, it will be contended, 
goes some way to fill this gap by introducing a concept of `the political' that can 
include women as a non-essential, flexible political alliance. 
Chantal Mouffe's model is so important for feminists in a new wave because, 
in contrast to Young and Benhabib, she does not assume that the democratic 
confrontation of difference will necessarily be transformative of social relations. 
Hence, she makes the possibility of social and personal conflict central to her model of 
agonal democracy. It is this emphasis on conflict that makes her the most successful 
of the three thinkers studied here in understanding the distinct nature of 'the political' 
and the pull between anti-essentialism and political identity formation. She states 
therefore that while the subject has no authentic, social essential identity that will hold 
true all of the time, they do need to understand themselves as a cohesive unit when 
they act politically. Hence the subject always oscillates between instances of 'unfixity' 
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(when it has no sense of a coherent identity) and `fixity" (when it predominantly 
identifies with one element of its identity such as gender or race). It is not possible, 
given this sort of flux, to assume that a political identity will necessarily or easily 
follow from a subject's social relationships and group membership, which are 
themselves diverse. Mouffe's work on feminism also adheres to this anti-essentialist 
stance. She argues that women can only be seen as a group in terms of their shared 
social construction and not in terms of any common inherent identity. For Mouffe, 
then, social identities must be developed and re-constructed for the political process. 
On these terms, any political coming together and identification as citizens is a 
precarious and artificial process of articulation and construction. Such construction 
takes account of `the political' as a distinct dimension of human relationships that 
cannot simply be conflated with social relations. 
In response to the need for a constructed political identity, Mouffe introduces 
her concept of radical democratic citizenship. This is a type of citizenship that seeks 
the democratisation of society, allowing radical movements such as feminists, 
ecologists, blacks etc. to align and question relations of subordination and dominance. 
These groups, according to her argument, can only form an alliance because they are 
non-essential, fluid and open. Hence, they can make alliances with other groups 
without feeling that their true and authentic identity has been undermined. To be 
successful the radical democratic project needs a political model that embraces it 
openness, possibilities for conflict, and the anti-essential identities of its members. 
Mouffe thus posits a model of agonal democracy to meet these demands? 
Hence, this chapter will address Mouffe's political postmodernism and its role 
in understanding political identity as a construction. It will then examine how the 
radical democratic view of citizenship is constructed on postmodern terms, and how it 
' C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, (London and New York: Verso, 1993), p. 76. 
Z It is only relatively recently that Mouffe has begun to consider a model of agonal democracy as 
opposed to radical democracy, the three best sources of this view are C. Mouffe, 'Politics and the 
Limits of Liberalism', ibid., pp. 135-154, C. Mouffe, 'Politics, Democratic Action, and Solidarity, ' 
Inquiry, Vol. 38, Nos. 1-2, (June 1995), pp. 99-108 and C. Mouffe, 'Democracy, Power and the 
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relates to women as a political collective in terms of their place as citizens and as 
feminists. Two vital questions need to be asked in this regard. First, does the concept 
of radical democratic citizenship collectivise women without essentialising them as she 
claims? Secondly, does the concept of radical democratic citizenship allow women to 
be feminists with specific political demands? Her model of agonal democracy will then 
be addressed as a political project that has at its root a concept of `the political' with 
important implications for feminists in a new wave. 
Theorising postmodernism: identity and society 
Postmodern theories are at the heart of Mouffe's concept of constructed political 
identity. She first engaged with postmodernism and poststructuralism in her work with 
Ernesto Laclau. 3 They explicitly theorised these discourses in a political way, applying 
them as strategies to understand post-Marxist socialist movements and thought in 
twentieth century Europe. They used the discourses to raise questions about the 
unified socialist political subject, the universalistic, Marxist economic view of society 
and also the Marxist idea of unifying and truthful discourse. In her own work she has 
taken this analysis further and has recognised a number of interesting links between 
postmodern theories and elements of conservative discourse. Thus, she notes that both 
discourses look for the limits of Enlightenment rationalism and universalism, view 
humans as limited and imperfect, and consider historic context to be vital to current 
political thought and practise. 
Thus, Mouffe, on Cahoone's schema mentioned in Chapter Two, 3 places 
postmodern discourses very much in the category of an attempt to find the limits of 
modem thought and politics, without rejecting the entire political project of 
"Political", ' in S. Benhabib (ed. ), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the 
Political, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) pp. 245-256. 
3 E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics, (London and New York: Verso, 1985). 
" C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., pp. 15-16. In terms of the importance of history, 
conservatives believe that tradition can be the only foundation of political theory and postmodern 
thinkers emphasise the contingency of political thought and action on historical conditions. 
S Cf. Chapter Two, p. 49. 
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modernity. ' For Mouffe the Western tradition is constituted by Enlightenment 
thought and the democratic tradition. While the former has relied on universalism, 
foundationalism and rationalism, the latter has been plural, open and complex. Hence, 
the democratic tradition has operated with the same objectives of equality and liberty 
that underpinned the Enlightenment project, but has seen these concepts move from 
being standardised, idealised criteria of action to contingent, pluralised and contested 
democratic practises. It is the tradition of democracy that Mouffe wants to defend, by 
separating it off from its last vestiges in Enlightenment thought. As she writes, `in 
order to radicalize the idea of pluralism, so as to make it a vehicle for a deepening of 
the democratic revolution, we have to break with rationalism, individualism and 
universalism'. ' Mouffe is thus attempting to construct a new radical democratic 
citizenship by restating elements of the modern democratic tradition in the context of 
social diversity and the rise of New Social Movements (NSMs) to further democratise 
society. It is thus fruitful to examine the political basis for her theory of radical 
democratic citizenship in her postmodern theorising of identity, subjectivity and 
discourse. 
Theorising a postmodern subject 
Ever since her writings with Ernesto Laclau, Mouffe has been faithful to postmodern, 
anti-essentialist views of identity, that were outlined in Chapter Two. Like Young, she 
uses the Lacanian theory of the subject to show that every subject has a plural and 
relational identity, writing that 
it is indispensable to develop a theory of the subject as a decentred, 
detotalized agent, a subject constructed at the point of intersection of a 
multiplicity of subject positions between which there exists no a priori 
or necessary relation! 
However, Mouffe does not suggest here that the subject is entirely fragmented by the 
multiplicity of its social relationships, only that any connection between the various 
6 The Return of the Political, op. cit., p. 12. 
Ibid., p. 7. 
e Ibid., p. 12. 
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social identities arises in response to a particular context. Nevertheless, Benjamin 
Bertram has criticised Mouffe, along with Laclau, for reifying 'unfixity' and anti- 
essentialism in her political vision of identity. He maintains that it is a sort of inverted 
romanticism in which she retains the romantic drive for certainty and `plenitude', not 
by searching for `Being' as nineteenth century romantics did, but rather by exalting 
dislocated and decentred subjectivity. ' 
Bertram's criticisms are not borne out by a close reading of Mouffe's work. 
She believes that every moment of flux and openness in the subject's identity is 
interpreted, understood and shaped by discourse so that it becomes partially fixed. 
Hence, the subject is not, as Bertram suggests, completely governed by dislocation and 
fracture. As Mouffe notes of anti-essential subjectivity: 
On the one hand, there is a movement of decentring that prevents the 
fixing of a set of positions around a preconstituted point; on the other 
hand, and as a result of this essential non-fixity, there is an opposite 
movement: the institution of nodal points, partial fixations that limit the 
flux of the signified under the signifier. '° 
In more concrete terms, this view of subjectivity means that each subject has a number 
of social identities, which cannot be unified into a cohesive identity: neither in the 
substantive idea of `Being' nor in Benhabib's minimal sense of narrative unity. " But, 
according to Mouffe, it is quite possible for a subject in response to a particular social 
context to momentarily fix her identity in accordance with one identification: for 
example, a woman might join a feminist group and identify herself as a feminist. Thus, 
the subject position, as Anna Marie Smith puts it for Laclau and Mouffe, `become(s) 
privileged such that the meaning of other subject positions becomes increasingly 
defined through their relations with that position'. 12 In this process one particular 
identity, such as a woman's feminist affiliation, becomes very important in how the 
subject conducts her life, subsuming other aspects of her identity under it. It is 
9 B. Bertram, 'New reflections on the 'Revolutionary' Politics of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe, ' Boundary 2, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Fall 1995), p. 91. 
C. Mouffe, `Citizenship and Political Identity, ' October, Vol. 61, (1992), p. 28. 
Cf. Chapter Three, p. 102. 
" Anna Marie Smith, Laclau and Mouffe: the Radical Democratic Imaginary, (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1998), p. 98. 
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important to note that even such a definite identification does not determine the 
subject's entire selfhood, it does not form its essential nature. For example, the woman 
in the feminist group is never simply a feminist, she may be a businesswoman, a 
mother etc. Consequently, the subject can only be identified with one element of their 
identity in the particular context that gave rise to it: the woman is a feminist only when 
she attends her feminist group or speaks about feminism. In this sense Mouffe's view 
of identity is performative, whereby the identity only exists insofar as it is being `acted 
out' by the subject. 
Theorising Postmodern Society 
For Mouffe anti-essentialism at the level of personal identity constitutes and is 
constituted by social relations that also lack any essential definition. In her work with 
Laclau she argues that social relations and their concomitant social identities are so 
diverse that it is impossible to understand society as an organic whole or in terms of 
one overarching social theory: `society never manages fully to be society'. 13 Thus, 
society cannot be objectified and understood in terms of one universal theory. Rather, 
it is a fragmented mix of social relationships between different groups and individuals, 
power relations, empirical existence and discursive understandings. In turn, these 
fragments are not themselves defined in an essentialistic manner, they have no fixed 
meaning. As Mouffe writes, `the fragments [do not] possess any kind of fixed 
identity, prior to the contingent and pragmatic form of their articulation'. " Put simply, 
diverse social processes have no essential order, at best the theorist can impose an 
artificial and temporary order on them, but this process will never define society as a 
whole. 
For Mouffe the idea of the fragmented society limits universalistic attempts to 
theorise society in terms of one social process or one set of underlying ideas, such as, 
for example, capitalist modes of production or patriarchy. Mouffe argues that society 
13 E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics, op. cit., p. 127. 
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is so complex that it escapes these sorts of theories and `what remains is a society 
without clearly defined outlines, a social structure that is impossible to describe from 
the perspective of a single, or universal, point of view'. 's Initially, her view of social 
theory and society seems to correspond to Benhabib's fear that postmodernism 
undermines social theory and the radical impetus it provides for political action. For 
Mouffe, however, the theorist has plenty of scope to consider social diversity and to 
produce theories, concepts and ideas. In very Foucauldian terms, therefore, the theorist 
looks for 'regularity in dispersion', order in diversity. t6 Indeed, it is only because 
social meaning is not fixed that it is necessary to produce social theory, for if social 
meanings were pre-determined, then theory would become defunct. There would be no 
need to try and understand or explain the social order. 
Theorising postmodern discourse: power relations and contingency 
The theorist, then, defines the relationship between the plural elements that constitute 
social relations, giving them temporary shape. " The resulting theory is postmodemist 
in that it is neither universalistic - applicable to any system of social relation - nor 
foundationalist - capable of prescribing a future set of social relations. Instead, Mouffe 
believes that all social theory is limited because it is contingent on existing social 
conditions and open to contest from other discourses. She argues that all discourses 
are contingent on the tradition in which they are formulated because `we are 
constructed as subjects through a series of already existing discourses, and that it is 
through this tradition which forms us that the world is given to us and all political 
action made possible'. " On these terms, the theorist cannot step outside of her 
tradition to produce universalisable discourse, and her theory thus remains partial, 
situated and perspectivist. 
" C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., p. 7. 
's Ibid., p. 11. 
16 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics 
op. cit., p. 106, cite Foucault in these terms. 
"Ibid., pp. 134-145, they describe process by which a theorist can produce a social theory. 
18 C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., p. 16. 
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For Mouffe, political theories are also limited because they are imbued with 
power relations and conflict, which means they will be contested and reinterpreted. She 
argues that this type of competition is `ineradicable' from discourse and gives it an 
inescapably political character. 19 Mouffe's definition of the `political' will be 
examined later in great detail, but at this stage it suggests the presence of conflict as 
discourses are contested by competing interpretations of the same principles and 
events. For example, feminist discourses have historically been challenged by both 
anti-feminist discourses and divergent theories of feminism. Mouffe believes that such 
political antagonism is productive as well as destructive, allowing new discourses and 
ideas to form. 
In general, her vision of discourse ties together her postmodern claims. 
Postmodernism, for Mouffe, is unequivocally political. She uses it strategically to both 
understand the fragmentation of radical political movements and to politicise 
traditional philosophical concepts. It questions the essentialism, universality and 
rationality of modern ideas of unified subjectivity, society and discourse and opens 
these areas up to contingency, conflict, antagonism and plurality. By submitting these 
concepts to such a process, postmodernism politicises them, showing their artificial 
and constructed roots in historical traditions and political discourses. It is now 
necessary to examine the political implications of this view in Mouffe's work, in terms 
of building contingent political identities, envisioning radical citizenship and 
formulating agonal democracy. 
Building political identity: the `hegemonic formation' 
Mouffe calls the contingent and artificial process by which diverse social forces are 
momentarily shaped and understood in terms of a social or political theory, 
`hegemonic formation'. 2° Hegemony in her account does not found a future political 
19 Ibid., p. 151. 
20 Mouffe first develops the concept with Laclau, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics, op. cit., p. 143, after borrowing the idea from Gramsci and, for the 
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action. Rather, the process of hegemonic formation presupposes plural, complex, 
social relations, such that `[it] will not be the majestic unfolding of an identity but the 
response to a crisis'. 21 In other words, it is only after fragmentation - of a social 
movement, a social group or an individual - has occurred that hegemony can forge a 
partial political unity. It is a discursive political strategy that works in a particular 
context, at a particular time, to draw groups of people together for political action 
according to common principles and aims. 
`Hegemonic formation, ' therefore, takes place by theoretically connecting the 
fragmented relationships in society. It constructs a relationship between fragmented 
subjects and social processes to create an alliance for political purposes. For example, 
to create a hegemonic formation about democracy, a theorist might consider how 
different left and right wing theories of democracy have common ideas that are also 
reflected in the institutional practises of democracy and in citizens' attitudes towards 
democracy. As Mouffe says, `a successful hegemonic formation signifies a period of 
relative stabilisation and the creation of a widely shared "common sense". 22 This 
hegemonic formation is only a temporary and partial stabilisation and new fragments 
and antagonisms emerge in relation to it. Indeed, these opposition factors can help to 
give it shape by providing an external standard for the formation to define itself 
against. 23 For example, during the Cold War, Western liberal democracies often 
defined themselves against communist regimes. 
In practice, Mouffe hopes that the construction of a `hegemonic formation' 
will create bonds between different social actors in society, developing a kind of 
political alliance or coalition governed by shared objectives and principles. These 
bonds can be created either between individuals in terms of one social characteristic, 
for example bringing women together, or by binding different political groupings such 
purposes of my argument, it matters not so much if this is a correct reading of Gramsci's account, 
but how it reads as a strategy for constructing political identity. 
Ibid., p. 7. 
Z2 C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., p. 53. 
23 Ibid., p. 14. 
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as environmentalists with feminists and other social movements. It can also be a more 
conventional political process carried out by political parties. 24 
Therefore the idea of hegemonic formation is like Young's more recent 
concept of the `serial group, ' with its members also coming together primarily to 
politically act rather than to build social bonds. It can be distinguished from Young's 
earlier idea of the `affinity group' which was shown to be essentialistic and 
identitarian. In the affinity group, political actors come together in terms of their 
shared social status and common history. The `hegemonic formation', by contrast, has 
no necessary relation to the social identities of the subject's involved in it. The political 
actors involved in the formation come together purely in terms of their identification 
with the hegemony - as a direct process of consenting to the ideas and conditions of 
the hegemonic formation - thus creating a specifically political alliance. 
According to Mouffe, what the hegemony sets up among these political actors 
is a `chain of equivalence', in which `a type of commonality is created that does not 
erase plurality and differences'. " Put simply, in her account hegemony also ensures 
that while the diverse groups are brought together they retain a degree of difference. 
Hence, the `chain of equivalence' produces common aims in terms of the hegemonic 
formation, with different groups and individuals consenting to the objective principles 
of the hegemonic formation. It does not depend on the actors involved having common 
identities, histories or social status. It simply establishes a political relationship 
between these actors, suggesting that they might come from their different positions to 
seek a common objective, for example, gay rights activists might join with feminists to 
end the relations of subordination they all suffer. Mouffe's theory of hegemony 
therefore displaces traditional radical, identity politics because the importance of 
identity in her political process is, as Kirstie McClure suggests, `not what one is, but 
24 Ibid., p. 5. 
Zs C. Mouffe, `Citizenship and Political Identity, ' op. cit., p. 32. 
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what one enacts'. 26 The political objective is not to defend a pre-existing identity for 
these are too complex, but to strategically create a new political identity for action. 
Consequently, these hegemonic connections are constructs requiring no more than a 
minimal sense of commonality between the actors in the alliance. Mouffe's own 
`hegemonic formation' of radical democratic citizenship will be examined next. 
Constructing the radical democratic citizen identity in liberal democracy: 
onwards to agonal democracy 
Once Mouffe has established the ideas behind the `hegemonic formation' - based on 
her postmodern assumptions of the contingency of discourse, the anti-essentialistic 
nature of subjectivity and the openness of society - she develops her own idea of 
radical democratic identity. This concept of radical democratic citizenship is a 
`hegemonic formation'; it is an artificial identity that is discursively and contingently 
produced for political purposes. Its contingent conditions are to be found in Western 
liberal democracies and its discursive basis means that it is open to conflict and 
competition from other theories of citizenship. As Mouffe puts it, `it aims at the 
construction of a "we" in a context of diversity and conflict'. " It is thus necessary to 
outline Mouffe's view of radical democratic citizenship, how she defines it against the 
background of liberal democracy, and its status as a non-essential political identity for 
both groups and individuals. Only then, is it possible to consider women's identities 
as radical citizens. 
Defining radical democratic citizenship in a liberal democratic context 
For Mouffe, the radical democratic citizenship identity is inescapably constructed in 
the context of liberal democratic politics and its underlying values of liberty and 
equality. Thus she writes that radical democratic citizenship will, `through a common 
26 K. McClure, 'On the Subject of Rights: Pluralism, Plurality and Political Identity, ' in C. Mouffe, 
(ed. ), Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community, (London and New 
York: Verso, 1992), p. 124. 
27 C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., p. 69. 
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identification with a radical democratic interpretation of the principles of liberty and 
equality, aim[s] at constructing a "we". 28 Ultimately, what comes to constitute the 
radical citizen identity is not an abstract legal status, but an act of identifying with the 
radical democratic version of these principles. 29 
While the base values of liberty and equality are also shared by other 
conceptions of citizenship, including liberal and communitarian versions, she wants to 
interpret these principles in a radical democratic way. In the radical democratic 
interpretation liberty and equality entail an end to domination and subordination 
through the further democratisation of society. Once these concepts are interpreted 
according to the radical democratic hegemony, they become the guiding `ethico- 
political principles' of all those who would call themselves `radical democratic 
citizens'. Mouffe believes that the radical democratic interpretation of these principles 
can be distinguished from standard liberal accounts of liberty and equality in two 
ways. Firstly, she conceives these principles as contingent. They are the products of a 
liberal-democratic tradition and thus they cannot be, as many liberals have attempted, 
universalised beyond this history. 30 Secondly, they are not neutral principles, as 
liberals believe, but are open to a number of different interpretations; the radical 
democratic version is only one interpretation among others. " 
Mouffe believes that it is important to emphasise the contingency and non- 
neutrality of these `ethico-principles' because they must be explicitly defended as part 
of a particular tradition if they are to operate as common political ethics in times of 
great social diversity. By recognising the contingency of these principles on a 
particular tradition and thus their partiality, Mouffe argues that we are better placed to 
defend and justify them. Thus for her: 
The recognition that [our liberal institutions] do not have an ultimate 
foundation creates a more favourable terrain for their defence. When 
we realize that, far from being the necessary result of a moral evolution 
of mankind, liberal democracy is an ensemble of contingent practices, 
28 C. Mouffe, 'Citizenship and Political Identity, ' op. cit., p. 31. 
29 C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., pp. 65-66. 
30 Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
31 Ibid., p. 84. 
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we can understand that it is a conquest that needs to be protected as 
well as deepened. 32 
In other words, it is only because these principles are explicitly partial that they must 
be defended. Furthermore, for Mouffe in being partial, the very status of radical 
democratic citizenship is not set up as an `empirically given' and it can be legitimately 
questioned by those who disagree with it. 
The radical democratic identity and non-essentialistic subjectivity 
The idea of anti-essential subjectivity is also a condition for the construction of radical 
democratic citizenship. It was shown in the last section on postmodernism that Mouffe 
assumes a radically decentred subject. For Mouffe, it is because the subject is 
decentred and has multiple identities that the radical citizen identity becomes 
important. It allows the dispersed subject to find temporary fixity in terms of which it 
can act in the political sphere, without putting into question its multiple `private' 
identities. Thus, she writes that radical democratic citizenship becomes `an articulating 
principle that affects the different subject positions of the social agent, while allowing 
for a plurality of specific allegiances and for the respect of individual liberty'. 33 It is 
apparent in this working of citizenship that Mouffe maintains the public/private divide 
such that the citizen identity becomes a construct demanded by the public-political 
process, while the citizen enjoys a `plurality of allegiances' in the private sphere. 
According to Mouffe, the radical citizen identity is thus never determined entirely by, 
nor is it determinant of, the subject's personal identities. 
This view of citizenship is very important for the anti-essentialist view of 
personal identity addressed in Chapters One and Two. It means that individuals can 
have more than one personal and political identity. Indeed, she makes it explicitly clear 
that they may even choose between different interpretations of citizenship. She says, 
`citizenship is vital for democratic politics, but a modem democratic theory must make 
32 Ibid., p. 145. 
33 Ibid., p. 84. 
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room for competing conceptions of our identities as citizens'. "' The important element 
in Mouffe's work therefore is how radical democratic citizenship works to move 
subjects from their individualistic, decentred and multiple identities into political 
collectives with shared concerns - either as members of specific political movements or 
as citizens in a polity - whilst still allowing for their 'plurality of allegiances'. 
The radical democratic citizenship identity and political collectivity 
For Mouffe the ethico-political principles constructed by the radical democratic 
hegemonic formation allow the subject to adopt a non-deterministic citizen identity. 
According to Mouffe, to be considered a radical democratic citizen, the subject must 
adhere to the values of radical democracy - the democratic interpretation of liberty and 
equality as an end to all relations of subordination through greater democracy. Beyond 
the sharing of these values, the subject does not need to share a common social or 
cultural identity with other members of the radical democratic formation. 
The openness and non-essentialistic construction of the radical democratic 
identity, according to Mouffe, allows many different social movements from feminists 
to ecologists, " to come together as radical democrats. This process is possible 
because: 
The common recognition by the different groups struggling for an 
extension and radicalisation of democracy that they have a common 
concern-should lead to the articulation of the democratic demands 
found in a variety of involvements: women, workers, blacks, gays, 
ecological, as well as other `new social movements'. 36 
In Mouffe's account, while these groups may have ostensibly different political aims, 
they will all acknowledge that the values and objectives of radical democracy are the 
best conditions for their realisation. Therefore, the movements come together for 
political action in the knowledge that they all share the same radical democratic 
concern to end oppression through greater democratisation. 
34 Ibid., p. 7. 
35 I am not so sure that New Social Movements exist at present in the form that Mouffe 
presupposes. The radicalism and unity of the black, gay and feminist movements did not extend past 
the 1970s and 1980s and there was very little unity between these movements. 
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Consequently, Mouffe's view of radical democracy is postmodern theory 
applied to liberal democratic citizenship to radicalise and re-politicise it. On the one 
hand, the hegemonic formation of radical democracy is contingently grounded in the 
Western tradition of liberty and democratic equality. On the other hand, it marries this 
tradition with the postmodern belief that the subject is decentred, having a number of 
different identities and thus holding a diverse range of social and political associations. 
Her view of hegemonic formation accepts moreover that any interpretation of political 
collectivity is artificial, partial and temporary because it has the precarious task of 
linking decentred political agents together, whilst acknowledging that each one has 
many different private allegiances. It is thus a promising model of political coalition 
for feminists in a new wave when essential female identities have, been called into 
question. In its initial formulation it allows a number of political and personal 
identities to be juxtaposed, enabling feminists to come to terms with the plurality of 
social and political identities and, at the same time, theorise a political alliance. It is 
now necessary to examine the place of women and feminists as radical democratic 
citizens to consider the extent to which she manages to maintain this plurality. 
Women, feminism and the question of identity: constructing women as a 
political collective 
So far it has been shown that the citizen identity is a discursive construct for Mouffe 
and can be interpreted in many different ways. None of these interpretations of 
citizenship identity can claim to have a vantage point over society because social 
relationships are themselves too diverse to be encompassed in a single concept of 
citizenship. Mouffe's particular vision of citizenship is the radical democratic one, 
which she believes is useful for women and other marginalised groups in liberal 
democracies, allowing them to come together in non-deterministic ways to end 
relations of subordination. It is thus necessary to consider Mouffe's view of the 
feminist movement in some detail and how the feminist identity will operate in terms 
I C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., p. 84. 
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of the radical democratic citizenship identity. It is thus necessary to look at the 
implications of radical citizenship for women coming together in terms of three types 
of political identity: as feminists, as radical democrats and as other types of citizens. It 
will then be possible to address whether the radical citizenship identity remains the 
`articulating principle' between these identities, or whether it becomes a privileged, 
substantive model of citizenship. 
Women as feminists 
Mouffe premises her analysis of feminism on her anti-essentialist concepts of self and 
group identity. In fact she is extremely critical of much second wave essentialism, 
arguing that: 
The whole false dilemma of equality-versus-difference is exploded 
since we no longer have a homogeneous entity `woman' facing 
another homogeneous entity `man', but a multiplicity of social 
relations in which sexual difference is always constructed in very 
diverse ways and where the struggle against subordination has to be 
visualised in specific and differential forms. To ask whether women 
should become identical to men in order to be recognised as equal, or 
whether they should assert their difference at the cost of equality, 
appears meaningless once essential identities are put into question. 37 
Hence, for Mouffe sexual differences should play no part in citizenship" and any 
unity between women is found not by returning to these essentialistic visions, but by 
looking across discourses to expose a `common effect' in the various ways in which 
woman/women are categorised. 39 Once this is found, she believes that, in her words, 
'partial fixations can take place and precarious forms of identification can be 
established around the category `women' which provide the basis for a feminist 
identity and a feminist struggle'. d° Consequently, Mouffe presents a picture of 
women's commonality as feminists that has much in common with Iris Young's 
31 Ibid., p. 78. 
's Ibid., p. 81. 
" C. Mouffe, 'The Sex/ Gender System and the Discursive Construction of Women's 
Subordination, ' in S. Hanninen and L. Paldan (eds. ), Rethinking Ideology: A Marxist Debate, 
(Berlin, New York and Bagnolet: Argument - Sonderband AS 84 and International General IMMRC, 
1933) p. 141. 
40 C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., p. 87. 
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model of serial collectivity discussed in Chapter Four. "' In accordance with this view, 
Mouffe argues that `unity [between women] should be the result of a construction of 
common interests and goals. It must be the result of a political struggle... to create a 
new political subject through hegemony'. 42 In this account feminism becomes a 
political identity and not a social bond of identification. 
Mouffe's rejection of essentialism allows her to portray feminism as a 
movement ripe for radical democratic hegemony. She believes that the second wave's 
essentialist concepts of identity are no longer valid, leaving the movement loose, 
fragmented and pluralised. This level of fragmentation is crucial if feminists are to turn 
to radical democratic citizenship. As she writes, 
for those feminists committed to a radical democratic politics, the 
deconstruction of essential identities should be seen as a necessary 
condition for an adequate understanding of the variety of social 
relationships where the principles of liberty and equality should 
apply. 43 
On these terms, radical democratic citizenship becomes the artificial political bond to 
unite feminists in the face of their fragmentation. For Mouffe, feminists groups are 
also suitable for radical democratic hegemony because, despite their fragmentation, 
they remain committed to its ethico-principles': they too want to further the democratic 
values of liberty and equality and end all relations of subordination through increased 
democratisation. 
Feminists as radical democratic citizens 
For Mouffe, feminists must seek out radical democratic citizenship to ensure the 
openness and anti-essentialist status of their movement. Indeed, Mouffe explicitly 
argues against the political specificity of the feminist movement, suggesting that to 
centre on anything other than an end to general. relations of subordination is to 
essentialise women, to chase a vision of inherent `womanhood' or femininity. As she 
" Cf. Chapter Four, pp. 155-157. 
42 C. Mouffe, 'The Sex/ Gender System and the Discursive Construction of Women's 
Subordination, ' op. cit., p. 142. 
43 C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., p. 76-77. 
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argues, 'feminist politics should be understood not as a separate form of politics 
designed to pursue the interests of women as women, but rather as the pursuit of 
feminist goals and aims within the context of a wider articulation of demands' 
(Mouffe's italics). "" According to Mouffe, feminists join with other movements by 
forming `chains of equivalence' with them and following common objectives. `s These 
`chains of equivalence' allow feminists to link with ecology, gay rights and anti-racist 
movements in an alliance. Hence, according to Mouffe, all share the desire to end 
relations of subordination and essentialism, and to increase democracy. "' However, 
within the alliance structure provided by the `chains of equivalence' the groups will 
remain distinct from one another. As Mouffe insists, `a relation of equivalence does 
not eliminate difference'. 47 For Mouffe there is no problem in undermining the 
specificity of the feminist movement through the `chains of equivalence', because she 
believes that radical movements will share a common sense of oppression. Yet, 
historical experience suggests that these movements often find their aims in conflict 
with each other and have thus resisted amalgamation into any kind of alliance. `8 
Ultimately, then, Mouffe's account of the radical democratic hegemony does not 
examine the serious possibility of incommensurable conflicts of interests between 
different radical movements. 
It would seem therefore that her radical democratic concept of citizenship, that 
will bind the groups in a political alliance, is more substantive than her idea of it as an 
`articulating principle' would suggest. 49 In this view, it will be remembered, 
citizenship is not itself meant to be a privileged concept of identity; it is merely a 
discursive device to order a subject's personal identity for political action. However, 
this idea of an insubstantive, discursive citizen identity does not hold when she 
" Ibid., p. 87. 
as C. Mouffe, `Citizenship and Political Identity, ' op. cit., p. 31. 
C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., p. 88. 
C. Mouffe, 'Citizenship and Political Identity, ' op. cit., p. 31-32. 
48 It is widely acknowledged, after all, that in America and Britain women felt excluded by male- 
dominated, radical movements in the 1960s and were further impelled into forming their own separate 
movement. 
49 C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., pp. 69-70. 
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theorises the radical democratic collective, whereby, to produce this collective, the 
radical citizenship identity must surely be substantive enough to, if not override, at 
least manage the differences between the ecology movement, the women's movement, 
the black movement etc. Thus, on her account, the differences between movements 
may remain, but they do not seem to matter in the political collectivity of radical 
democracy, becoming erased in the fight against opposition forces. S° Noel O'Sullivan 
shares these doubts about maintaining diversity in light of the ethico-principles of 
radical democracy and he suggests that Mouffe may be hankering after the same sort 
of utopian rainbow coalition that Iris Young has sought. s' 
It should also be noted that feminism itself is in need of some alliance building 
before it would be ready for inclusion in the wider radical democratic alliance. " The 
analysis of Chapter Two details the diversity of the feminist movement after the 
second wave. This diversity suggests that while most feminists would support a 
commitment to liberty and equality, it is not so clear that they would also support the 
radical democratic interpretation of these principles or the alignment with other social 
movements that is concomitant of a support for them. Consequently, by placing 
feminism in the radical democratic collective, Mouffe eliminates the differences within 
feminism. She moves the common basis for membership in a feminist movement from 
identity to the sharing of radical democratic values without realising that this itself 
might be essentialising. This vision is not feminist politics but feminism translated into 
radical democratic citizenship. Hence, Mouffe is right that feminism should 
not be based on essentialistic identities and that, moreover, a form of feminist 
movement can still exist without positing women as an essentialised social group. 
However, the possibility of a non-essential movement does not mean that feminist 
groups must give up their separate and specific struggles. Indeed, to take this 
so C. Mouffe, ibid., o. 84, writes, `it is only in so far as democratic differences are opposed to forces 
or discourses which negate all of them that the differences can be substituted for each other. 
s' N. O'Sullivan, `Difference and the Concept of the Political in Contemporary Political 
Philosophy, ' Political Studies, Vol. XLV (1997), p. 751. 
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approach is to undermine the differences between feminists and the need for feminists 
to continually renegotiate who they represent. There is also a danger that the 
specificity of feminists' interests and demands would be lost in the radical democratic 
hegemony: either being subsumed by vague objectives that would link say the ecology 
movement with the feminist movement, or becoming marginalised in a more general 
political struggle for greater democracy. 
Women as radical democratic citizens: maintaining their `plurality of allegiances' 
By undermining the specificity of feminism in the radical democratic `hegemonic 
formation, ' Mouffe eliminates a potential political allegiance for women beyond that 
of radical democratic citizenship. On her account, even in their feminist activities, 
women get channelled into a radical democratic collective. Thus, it was suggested that 
her propensity to override the specificity of the feminist, and other movements, for the 
radical democratic identity indicates that her view of citizenship is actually more 
substantive than this idea. Indeed, Mouffe goes on to explicitly defend her vision of 
radical democratic citizenship as a substantive, transformative political identity. She 
argues that it is a `common political identity that would create the conditions for the 
establishment of a new hegemony'. She adds that `this cannot be achieved without the 
transformation of existing subject positions'. 33 In this statement it becomes clear that 
for Mouffe the radical democratic citizenship identity is a transformative political 
identity. 
Once the idea of radical democratic citizenship is theorised in such a 
substantive manner, a problem emerges that make it less than ideal for women seeking 
a variety of political identities as both feminists and as citizens. This problem is the 
concern, first raised in relation to Benhabib and Young's works, that radical and 
deliberative political models cannot guarantee that the political process will be 
n C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., p. 88, does note that 'there are... by necessity 
many feminisms, ' which makes it even harder to understand how this multiplicity would link in with 
other social movements. 
33 Ibid., p. 86. 
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transformative. As it was shown with Young and Benhabib, any call for transformative 
political identities necessarily undermines pre-existing identities, interests and political 
claims. By insisting that the radical democratic hegemony is a transformative political 
identity, Mouffe undermines the contingent basis of political identity on private 
interests. Yet Mouffe also argues that these identities have validity, they are the 
contingent context of citizens' public, political claims. As she puts it `the wants, 
choices and decisions are private because they are the responsibility of each 
individual'. 54 If these private wants and choices are to be protected in the political 
settlement, then the transformative process to create the radical democratic citizen 
identity could never be completed. Thus, Mouffe needs to be more cautious in 
suggesting that the radical democratic citizen identity can be completely transformative, 
if she is to avoid denying the contingency of political identities and the strength with 
which people hold their social identities and interests. The best that can be achieved is 
that these sorts of identities can be strategically constituted for political engagement, 
but they cannot be erased by the political identity itself. 
Moreover, there is the worry that the `new identity', could it be created, would 
make it difficult for the political subject to hold a `plurality of allegiances' at the 
private and social level. Women, for example, might find that they hold a plurality of 
allegiances that need a number of outlets at the citizenship level. They might feel that 
these are compromised once they are submitted to the substantive project of radical 
democratic citizenship. Mouffe actually recognises the problem of balancing the new 
citizen identity with the private and diverse identities of each citizen, asking how people 
could be encompassed in a new construction of citizen identity `without being forced 
to abandon their own identity'. 55 
In sum, Mouffe's vision of radical democratic citizenship has three problems 
for feminists in a new wave - who wish to protect the diversity of women's political 
identities. First, she still hopes, despite her emphasis on antagonism and conflict, for a 
Ibid., p. 72 
ss C. Mouffe 'Politics, Democratic Action, and Solidarity, ' op. cit., p. 106. 
183 
transformative political settlement in which all actors become radical democratic 
citizens. Secondly, a tension arises in her work. On the one hand, she continues to 
affirm a feminist politics, whereas, on the other hand, she denies the specificity of the 
feminist identity for women by merging it with the more general radical democratic 
collective. Thirdly, the radical democratic citizen identity emerges as a substantive view 
of political solidarity, as opposed to her premise that it is no more than an `articulating 
principle' to bind citizens together for political action. It ultimately sets out a definite 
political project - ending all relations of subordination and furthering democratisation 
- to which citizens must give their commitment at the expense of their other political 
concerns. These problems are not fully solved by her agonal political settlement. 
The radical democratic citizen and agonal democracy 
So far it has been suggested that Mouffe's view of radical democratic citizenship is 
not fully suitable for her view of feminist politics as plural, diverse and non- 
essentialistic. Her vision of radical democratic citizenship mirrors Young's 
assumption that diverse groups can politically come together in a transformative 
manner so that their differences cease to matter. However, Mouffe, unlike Young, 
should not be immediately charged with irrevocable political utopianism because she 
acknowledges that the radical democratic interpretation of citizenship is only one 
among many and that, `there can be as many forms of citizenship as there are 
interpretations of those [ethico-political] principles'. S6 On a sympathetic reading this 
proviso means that Mouffe must acknowledge that women can be citizens outside of 
the radical democratic hegemony and in terms of a number of different elements of 
their identity. It is the recognition of such diverse forms of citizenship and the political 
conflict they might bring that lies behind her recent move to agonal democracy. She 
argues that agonal democracy is a site not only for the propagation of radical 
citizenship, but also for recognising and acknowledging other conflicting types of 
56 C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., p. 84. 
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citizenship. This makes her model of agonal democracy extremely important and it 
must be examined separately to her view of radical democratic citizenship. " 
Mouffe's model of agonal democracy is a mixture of the communitarian and 
liberal democratic models of democracy. She believes that communitarian theories and 
the ideal of civic republicanism on which they are based are important because they 
emphasise the ethical nature of politics and the need for citizens to participate. " 
However, she criticises recent communitarians, such as Sandel, Michael Walzer and 
Alistair Maclntyre, for premising their democratic models on the idea of the citizen as 
a unitary subject. She cautions that it is not enough for communitarians to reject the 
autonomous, abstract self, favoured by many liberals, but replace it with a vision of the 
united, situated and encumbered self, because this latter view is also an overly 
simplistic account of human subjectivity. S9 For Mouffe, then, both these accounts of 
selfhood miss the extent to which the subject is decentred and multiple. Hence, 
although Mouffe, like the communitarians, also wants to go beyond the liberal 
tradition of citizenship, in which the individual is no more than a legal entity, she does 
not want to privilege the citizen identity as the good life. To privilege citizenship in this 
manner would be to determine and fix the subject in terms of only one aspect of their 
identity. Mouffe instead wants to ensure that `the identities qua individual and qua 
citizen are preserved, and none is sacrificed to the other; they coexist in a permanent 
tension... between liberty and equality, which is constitutive of modem pluralist 
democracy and whose resolution would lead to its destruction'. "' 
Mouffe's model of agonal democracy is still being developed and it not yet clear how it will be 
integrated with her earlier view of radical democratic citizenship and radical democracy. There are, of 
course, similarities between her models of radical and agonal democracy, both are concerned with the 
conflictual nature of political processes and how to include diverse and excluded political actors. 
However, what marks out the recent shift in her thought is her exploration of 'agon' in politics and 
the implications it has for political relationships and institutions. Indeed, Mouffe's shift to agonal 
democracy has also seen her address more conventional political institutions such as political parties 
and parliamentary models as opposed to the New Social Movements that marked out her earlier work 
both singularly and with Laclau. 
58 C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., pp. 61-63. 
s9 Ibid., p. 20. 
60 C. Mouffe, `Citizenship and Political Identity, ' op. cit., p. 32. 
185 
To maintain this tension, she believes that some features of the modern liberal 
democratic tradition should be preserved. For Mouffe the most important 
contributions of the liberal democratic tradition have been `the defence of pluralism, 
the idea of individual liberty, the separation of Church and State, the development of 
civil society... a distinction ... between the private and the public 
domains'. 61 Without 
these elements there is a risk, according to Mouffe, that pure civic republicanism is an 
ancient model of democracy that, privileges the common, citizen identity above the 
private, individual one. 62 Ultimately, Mouffe hopes agonal democracy will avoid both 
the liberal privileging of private, pre-political identities and the civic republican 
valorising of the citizen identity as the highest form of identification for any subject; 
the latter being an identity that triumphs over private wants and needs in favour of the 
common good. 63 
The issue of citizenship is made more difficult for Mouffe because she 
believes that `modern democracy is characterised precisely by the absence of a 
substantive common good'. "" Hence, in the agonal model the collective nature of 
citizenship has to be based on something other than this impossible ideal of the 
common good or the deliberative ideal of consensus. Here she turns to the 
Oakeshottian model of civil association to consider how common rules of citizenship 
can be formulated that do not depend on citizens sharing common interests, identities 
or even the same conception of citizenship, and that thus allow the citizen to remain 
decentred. From Oakeshott's model she appropriates the idea of "respublica". These 
are the shared rules of democratic and political action that guide civil conduct. They 
are contingent on the democratic tradition out of which they arise and amount not to a 
common good, but to a common 'public concern' that when the citizen acts in public 
they will abide with the "respublica" 6S Put simply, fellow citizens need have nothing 
in common other than that they abide by these rules in their political conduct. As 
61 C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., p. 62. 
62 C. Mouffe, 'Politics, Democratic Action, and Solidarity, ' op. cit., p. 100. 
63 Ibid., p. 100. 
64 C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., p. 64. 
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Mouffe writes, `[t]he identification with those rules of civil intercourse [respublica] 
creates a common political identity among persons otherwise engaged in many 
different enterprises'. " With these rules of conduct in place, citizens can follow many 
different interpretations of citizenship and hold many different `ethico-principles' - of 
which Mouffe favours the radical democratic view. However, not all conceptions of 
citizenship are valid according to the rules of democratic life and those that are not 
based on liberty and equality are excluded as being the antithesis of the democratic 
tradition. 
Given that no concept of citizenship can be privileged, the political sphere for 
Mouffe is constantly being contested. Hence, it needs a model of democracy and a set 
of democratic institutions that can accommodate this range of citizenship. She argues 
that the agonal model of democracy is the best model to deal with this sort of conflict 
and diversity. In the agonal model the aim of the political process is precisely to 
`transform antagonism into agonism' 67 She adds that when a previously antagonistic 
relationship between citizens becomes an agonal one, `[the] opponent... is no longer 
considered an enemy to be destroyed but somebody whose existence is legitimate and 
whose rights will not be put into question'. 68 In short, the agonal model moves a 
social relationship of outright hostility to one of legitimate political inclusion. 
Like other current theorists of agonal democracy, such as Bonnie Honnig, 69 
she also wants to encourage the `agnostic dynamic' in politics as a sign of healthy 
democratic life. 70 For Mouffe it brings conflict, passion, rhetoric and a concern for a 
common ethical life into the democratic process. ' Once these elements of politics 
have been accepted, Mouffe argues that a revitalised politics will appear in which 
' Ibid., p. 67. 
66 Ibid., p. 67, here Mouffe uses Oakeshott's concept of 'respublica' which are themselves based on 
Wittgenstein's idea of a 'shared grammar'. In both cases the rules set out the shared criteria for action 
but do not force citizens to act or prescribe the substance of these actions. 
67 C. Mouffe, 'Politics, Democratic Action, and Solidarity, ' op. cit., p. 99. 
68 Ibid., p. 107. 
B. Honnig, `Difference, Dilemmas and the Politics of Home, ' in S. Benhabib (ed. ), Democracy and 
Difference, op. cit., pp. 257-277. 
70 C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., p. 6. 
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participation and political action are widespread, and which is continually renewed by 
the emergence of new political conflicts. These new conflicts both regenerate the 
agonal model and prevent it from ever being finalised: finality being a perfect, conflict- 
free utopia. As Mouffe writes of agonal democracy, `conflict and antagonism are at 
the same time its condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of its full 
realisation'. 72 The agonal model is therefore contingent on new conflicts emerging. 
Seyla Benhabib, however, distrusts this overt privileging of conflictual and 
agonal citizenship and makes two salient objections to it. She first asks how Mouffe, 
and other agonal theorists, can ensure that the democratic tradition they contingently 
base their politics on is a just one. She asks, `how can theorists of agnostic democracy 
safeguard freedom, justice and respect for the rights of citizens as free and equal 
beings, if they are unwilling to place some constraints ... [on] the will of the sovereign 
people? '73 Mouffe however, as will be examined later, does place constraints on `the 
will of the sovereign people and does not assume that they will automatically make just 
decisions. Hence, she accepts the necessity of institutional mechanisms to order and 
protect the political process, and allow decisions to be made in the face of conflict. 
Benhabib's second objection to Mouffe (and other agonal theorists) is that she 
has no `coherent theory of rights'74 at the base of her citizenship, thus leaving it up to 
the whims of the political contest to see if the political actor will be included or not. 
Mouffe would respond, however, that her agonal model does have such a theory, but 
that these are contingent on specific modem democratic traditions of liberty and 
equality and are not necessarily universalisable. 75 Moreover, Mouffe does not shy 
away from the fact that the lack of any foundational guarantees for these rights makes 
them contestable. She makes it clear therefore that anyone who called these rights into 
" C. Mouffe, ibid., p. 65, argues that it is necessary to `re-establish the lost connections between 
ethics and politics'. 
72 Ibid., p. 8. 
" S. Benhabib, `The Democratic Moment and the Problem of Difference, ' in S. Benhabib, (ed. ), 
Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, op. cit., p. 8. 
'a Ibid., pp. 77-78. 
" C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., p. 19, explicitly states that a theory of democratic 
rights is essential in a modern pluralist democracy. 
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question would be excluded from agonal democracy, though not from promoting their 
own interpretation of the citizen identity. 
However, the agonal model is still problematic for women as feminists and 
citizens. It valorises participation and is legitimated by civic commitment rather than 
formal political procedures. Women, as it was argued in Chapter One, do not always 
have the time for extensive political participation and need other more minimal ways of 
being involved. The other problem is whether Mouffe successfully reconciles her view 
of radical, antagonistic and subversive citizenship with a clear vision of the political 
institutions that could contain and manage these conflicts. Hence, while Mouffe does 
value the place of some liberal-democratic institutions to provide political order, she 
does not theorise why feminists or other radical democratic and subversive groups 
would support such institutions and not see them as indicative of the general and 
oppressive social order. Thus, Mouffe needs to explicitly theorise the legitimacy of 
these institutions for radical groups, who historically, at least, have not supported 
liberal democratic political institutions. Without this amendment, her work risks 
glorifying contest for radical groups as the only legitimate form of political action, 
above the importance of decision-making and compromise. 
Despite these criticisms of Mouffe's work, her model of agonal democracy is 
still extremely important for new wave feminism because of its central concept of the 
`political'. For Mouffe what ultimately marks out her agonal model of democracy 
from both communitarian and liberal democratic versions is its view of the political as 
a distinct type of human action and relationship. She believes that it is necessary to re- 
introduce this concept to democratic citizenship to revitalise and make explicit the 
specificity of political life. This concept of the `political' will be extracted from her 
work and examined from its roots in Schmitt and Oakeshott's theories, through to her 
own political vision. It is then possible to set out the concept's implications for 
feminism in a new wave. 
Reintroducing the Political 
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Mouffe's concept of the political draws on the work of Carl Schmitt and Michael 
Oakeshott to introduce a distinct vision of the political and politics as an activity. It 
suggests that the political relationship occurs when the subject faces others who may 
not share their values but with whom they must co-exist with and come to a decision 
with. She summarises this concept thus, 'political life concerns collective, public 
action; it aims at the construction of a `we' in a context of diversity and conflict'. 76 
Following Mouffe's view of the political in agonal democracy, it is possible to draw 
out four characteristics of the political: the `public' nature of the political, the 
constructed nature of collective political identity, the dialectic of conflict and 
authoritative decision making in the political process, and the contingent basis of the 
political. These characteristics will be examined in turn. 
The public nature of the political 
The first characteristic of the political that Mouffe, along with Oakeshott and Schmitt, 
specifies is that it is in some sense public. It is not public in the impossible sense that 
some liberal thinkers have aimed for as a process that is entirely separate to the private. 
Rather, the political is public because it is aimed at, and in terms of, 'Others': those 
who are not familiar or similar to oneself. In other words, it is directed at strangers, 
although not always at opponents. Following Oakeshott she sums up the 
public/private divide in the political as, `the wants, choices and decisions are private 
because they are the responsibility of each individual, but the performances are public 
because they are required to subscribe to the conditions specified in respublica'" 
This political definition of the public/private divide is a better response to Mouffe's 
postmodern political strategy than her vision of radical democratic citizenship for two 
reasons. 
First, it accords with her anti-essentialist demands, enabling the individual to 
have a `plurality of allegiances'. As the quotation above indicated, the individual may 
76 Ibid., p. 69. 
" Ibid., p. 72. 
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have a number of different private wants that are not overridden by the public-political 
identity. Secondly, in contrast to the radical democratic view of citizenship, the public- 
political identity is contingent on the private and pre-existing interests of the 
individual; they are simply given a different dimension as they becomes public via the 
political process. She does not assume, as she does in her vision of radical democratic 
citizenship, that these pre-existing interests, and more generally any pre-existing 
identities, will be automatically transformed by the political relationship. In her agonal 
vision, therefore, the political relationship is more minimal. In becoming public the 
demands of the individual are not transformed. They are simply given an additional 
dimension because they must be defended in accordance with the common institutions 
and rules - the "respublica "'$ - by which citizens co-exist. Consequently, she does 
not assume a solidaristic relationship between citizens as she does with those citizens 
united by a common concern with radical democratic citizenship. Rather, the starting 
point of the political is a relation of co-existence and, at worst, hostility. The potential 
for transformation, on these terms, can only be the result of the political process. 
The political and collectivity 
The second related characteristic of the political is that it is in some sense about a 
constructed, artificial and temporary collective identity. Hence, in agonal democracy 
the political bond is never a substantive bond of solidarity based on a shared sense of 
the common good. It is, by contrast, a formal relationship constructed around the 
sharing of the contingent values of liberal democracy and the respublica that guide 
political conduct. The political relationship becomes an artificial bond constructed for 
political and public relationships and does not assume a shared social identity. 
However, the moment the democratic values of liberty and equality are 
constructed as a basis for a political collective, they become partial. Some people will 
'$ C. Mouffe, ibid., pp. 67-69, borrows the concept of 'respublica' from Oakeshott's work. It refers 
to the body of civil laws, rules, and in Mouffe's interpretation values, that govern and guide - but do 
not determine - how citizens act in the polity. She thus defines it as, `a specific language of civil 
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not agree with this interpretation of them. Mouffe therefore makes the Schmittian 
recognition that the need for a collective identity automatically introduces conflict into 
the political. In Schmitt's work whenever a political collective, a "we", is identified, 
then an enemy, a "them", emerges. 79 For Schmitt this process is the actual moment of 
the `political'. Mouffe agrees with Schmitt therefore that there can be no political 
coming together without the designation of what the political collective is not. 
The challenge for Mouffe's agonal concept of the political, and why she 
moves it on from Schmitt's more warlike definition of politics, is to provide a political 
voice for the `them' without excluding, oppressing or marginalising such dissent. " 
Her response to this is entirely sensible and she recognises the importance of political 
institutions in legitimating adversarial relations. As she puts it, it is necessary to 
undertake `the legitimation of conflict and the creation of institutions whose aim is to 
transform antagonism into agonism (Mouffe's italics)' "81 However, 
despite 
embracing the `other' as a legitimate rival through political institutions, Mouffe does 
make it clear that there is always an ultimate incommensurability. At this point the 
"them" becomes an "enemy" and rejects not only the values of the polity but also its 
institutions. 2 With this rejection the political relationship breaks down and is either 
renegotiated or transformed. Hence, for Mouffe the political process of coming 
together is always characterised by inescapable conflict, that both allows for the 
political to occur and makes it inherently vulnerable. 
Conflict, decision-making and the political 
The political collective cannot be a unified whole. It will always face dissent and 
hostility. This feature of the political is recognised by Mouffe, Oakeshott and Schmitt. 
intercourse'. It finds expression in explicit constitutions and procedures, as well as more diffuse value 
systems. 
79 Ibid., p. 111. 
80 Ibid., pp. 114-115. 
8) C. Mouffe, `Politics, Democratic Action, and Solidarity, ' op. cit., p. 108. 
BZ C. Mouffe, ibid., p. 107, states, `the category of the 'enemy' does not disappear; it now refers to 
those who do not accept the set of values constitutive of the democratic forms of life, and reject their 
basic institutions'. 
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All three thinkers, to some extent, accept that diversity produces conflict and 
antagonism. For Oakeshott, diversity means that the political cannot be defined in 
terms of one purpose or a particular conception of the common good. 83 For Mouffe, 
the antagonism produced by social diversity constantly threatens to subvert any 
political settlement and limits any hope of a utopian transparent and unified society. 84 
However, Mouffe makes it clear that conflict never completely sunders the 
political. It is not simply a moment of war or open conflict, but is actually limited by 
`decision'. According to Mouffe, political decision-making cannot be the rational 
consensus of the deliberative model because `conflict and antagonism... indicate 
precisely the limits of rational consensus, the fact that every consensus is by necessity 
based on acts of exclusion'. " What distinguishes `political' decision-making from 
consensus, is that the decision always takes place in the context of the possible 
emergence of conflict and thus it can only be tenuous and transitory. Political decision 
is as Mouffe argues the "undecidable decided". 86 In fact, it can be said that if 
decision is not made in such a context of conflict and diversity it ceases to be political. 
For if all had reached consensus on the decision, there would be no need to `weight' 
the decision, so to speak and make it authoritative by specifying a sanction for 
breaching the decision. It is only when the decision is made knowing that it could be 
contested, that it is necessary to make it authoritative, it then becomes a political 
decision. 
Contingency and the political 
It has been shown so far that the political does not refer to a solid, separate sphere of 
human relationships but to a dimension to human action. Hence, for Mouffe, the 
political is seen in very Aristotelian terms as a `dimension that is inherent to every 
83 C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., p. 67. 
as Ibid., p. 69. 
8S Ibid., p. 111. 
86 Ibid., p. 152. 
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human society and that determines our very ontological condition'. " On these terms, 
anything can be political if it is presented publicly; there is nothing that is to be seen as 
inherently a private matter for the private sphere. Thus, a concern becomes political if it 
is defended, justified or discussed with those who may not necessarily agree. 
Consequently, what emerges from Mouffe's reading of Schmitt and Oakeshott and 
her own postmodern concerns is a concept of the political as momentary, performative 
and thoroughly contingent. For Oakeshott, the political is always contingent, 
depending on action and utterance to continually `re-enact' the `language of civil 
understanding'. " When this discourse is not being enacted then there is no political. 
Similarly, for Mouffe the political is discursively constructed as the moment of 
hegemonic formation, the moment that citizens come together to act in public. In both 
cases a political regime is never a necessary occurrence, but a reaction to a contingent 
set of events that changes from one moment to the next as new social antagonisms 
emerge. Indeed, Mouffe says of democracy that it, `is something uncertain and 
improbable and must never be taken for granted'. 8' Hence, the political identity and 
the political concerns of citizens will change in this contingent process. The political 
on this reading, therefore, cannot prescribe the content of politics or the substance of 
political identities because it is a contingent dimension to human activity that emerges 
when groups or individuals face each other to make their demands in public. It does 
not specify what these demands should be or who should be participating in the 
political process, these will be decided contingently in a particular social context. 
Thus, a concept of the political is developed by and through Mouffe that is 
characterised by publicity, collectivity, conflict and decision, and contingency. These 
are all remarkably useful for feminists in a new wave and point to a form of politics 
that is more limited than the one desired by the deliberative versions of democracy 
favoured by Benhabib and Young. These amended versions of deliberative democracy 
are not amenable to the dimension of the political because they are not open to the 
$' Ibid., p. 3. 
88 M. Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 122. 
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political as a place of conflict. Benhabib and Young displace conflict, believing, 
respectively, in either ultimate consensus or an initial consensus over procedure. 
Furthermore, deliberative democracy is not open to the political in the sense of 
publicness. It is a democratic model in which the subject confronts those who are 
inherently similar to it, i. e. other rational, autonomous agents. Or, in Young's reading 
of it, the other is made familiar due to the transformative effects of the democratic 
process of confrontation. 
Hence, Mouffe's vision of the political is a better response to feminism after 
fragmentation than these models. It recognises contingency, anti-essentialism and anti- 
utopianism that mark out the current conditions of feminist theory. However, while 
Mouffe has gradually developed her model of agonal democracy and its underlying 
concept of the political, she has not, as yet, theorised feminism outside of the project of 
radical democratic citizenship. Given the problems with the radical democratic view of 
citizenship for feminists, in that it denies the specificity of their movement, it would be 
useful to go beyond Mouffe's work and delimit the implications of her concept of the 
political for feminists in a new wave. 
Feminism and the Political 
It would be fruitful to use the concept of the political found in Mouffe's work and 
expand it to restate the importance of the political for feminists in a new wave. When 
the political is reintroduced to feminism it is not a question of defining what feminism 
will speak about for it is too fragmented, too diverse, to be prescribed in this way. The 
political is restated instead as a dimension to feminist discourses that many second 
wave feminists have been blind to in their emphasis on identity politics. This 
dimension is about the public confrontation of others who are not familiar or similar to 
oneself. It expects a difficult and complex process that cannot fully satisfy quests for 
identity formation, because such quests, as it was suggested in the study of second 
wave feminism, are based on relations of sympathy, solidarity and often `sameness'. It 
89 C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., p. 6. 
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is still possible to take issues of identity into the political process, and indeed many 
feminists will continue to want this sort of politics. However, it must be accepted that it 
is utopian to expect harmonious, identitarian political relationships in which all actors 
share the same identity. Ultimately, a subject can only seek secure affirmation, 
reassurance and sympathy for her identity among those with whom she is familiar 
with or similar to, and this situation is not a characteristic of the political. It is thus 
necessary to take the four features of Mouffe's concept of the political - the idea that 
it is a `public' process, a constructed collective identity, conflict and decision-making, 
and contingency - to address their implications for feminism as a political discourse in 
a new wave. 
Feminism and the `public' nature of the political 
The public nature of the political in this regard does not refer simply to a `public' 
sphere facing a `private' sphere. Rather it designates the political as a dimension of 
human relationships that occurs when we face and make demands on others who are 
not similar to us but with whom we must coexist anyway. This 'public' relationship 
can occur in any social or even private space, what matters is the relationship of 
`otherness', the sense that political agreement cannot be assumed. As Iris Young 
states, `politics must be conceived as a relationship of strangers who do not 
understand one another in a subjective and immediate sense, relating across time and 
difference'. 9° This is the public nature of the political and it can take place in any 
sphere or institution where we make our demands to strangers. 
For feminists it is necessary to embrace the public nature of the political, to 
stop rejecting it as a space/place created by males. Unless this sense of the 
`publicness' of all political relations is accepted, utopian and separatist dreams of 
90 I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 
234. However, unlike Young, I do not believe that any political model can transcend our stranger 
status; this remains the limit to all models of democracy. 
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`women-centred' politics and knowledge will continue. 91 In these visions feminists 
have demanded political processes that are women-only, so that they do not confront 
their supposed male `enemies'. While these separatist relationships of mutual 
sympathy and support have been important in empowering women, they have not been 
strictly political. Indeed, feminists who chose separatism often withdrew from political 
confrontation altogether and saw their demands become re-marginalised. Hence, the 
public nature of the political does not prescribe the content of feminist discourse, but 
does make it clear that their demands must be made in public. It is up to individual 
feminists though to decide whether they want to subject their hopes of identity 
affirmation to the public nature of the political given that it is often a hostile and 
unsettling meeting of strangers. 
Constructing a feminist political identity 
The second feature of the concept of the political drawn from Mouffe's work is that 
the political collective and political identity is constructed as part of the political 
strategy itself. It is not just assumed on the basis of pre-existing social relationships. 
Hence, private identities and interests will be the impetus to start a political process, to 
create a political identity. However, the process in itself will strategically shape these 
identities for the public confrontation of others who may not share them. Again 
feminists moving into the new wave must be aware that they have to construct women 
as a feminist political grouping. There is no natural social group of women on which 
to base feminist political practise. In the new wave, feminists will have to, as part of 
their political strategy, establish links between women and build alliances. These 
alliances moreover will have to be painstakingly pieced together and will require more 
than the process of consciousness raising that often proved to be so homogenising 
and exclusionary in the second wave. 
91 1 am not denigrating attempts to find women-only spaces. Indeed, women-only spaces are 
important for social support and solidarity. I am merely noting that these are not properly political, 
especially if it is expected that all women in them will share the same values. 
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The process of building a feminist alliance would at least allow feminists to 
galvanise behind single-issue campaigns. Moreover, coming together with such a 
minimal sense of unity may be preferable to endless fights over the true meaning of 
feminist politics that has often further fragmented the remains of the second wave 
movement. It is possible to qualify this sense of a minimal alliance and note that it 
refers only to the political side of feminism and is necessary if we want any sort of 
unity. It does not define feminism as a social project. What is envisioned in this 
process therefore is the sort of unity, if looser, of a political party - such as the British 
Labour Party - that comes together strategically to win elections but still retains a 
number of different `wings' and traditions within the general organisation. In short, 
feminism like the British Labour Party is a broad church. 
The constructed nature of political collectivity, and the hard task of strategically 
building and defending it, also points to something beyond Mouffe's political vision. 
This is the concern that feminist politics must have a concept of representation in the 
alliance to indicate that it cannot be or speak for all women. Mouffe's dismissal of the 
specificity of the feminist project means that she never explicitly considers how 
feminists would need to build alliances among themselves, let alone as radical 
democrats. In the next chapter a more general model of representative democracy will 
be proposed as a useful democratic model for feminists in a new wave. Representative 
democracy will be seen to provide the plurality of political institutions that will be 
necessary should the tenuous feminist coalition breakdown, as well as a concept of 
representation with which to constitute a feminist alliance. 
Feminism and the recognition of conflict 
The third aspect of the political is the ever-present possibility of conflict in politics. 
This conflict extends to identities, interests and interpretations of values. The picture of 
the fragmentation of the second wave portrayed in Chapters One and Two indicates 
that feminist theories and politics are in the throes of such political conflict. Hence, 
feminists in the new wave must be concerned to `come to terms' with the conflict that 
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has arisen. They must engage with the reasons for conflict and think about the ways in 
which it can be managed, both in the internal dynamics of competing 'feminisms' and 
in terms of women and feminists finding political inclusion as citizens and as 
feminists. 
The idea of conflict also signifies the extent to which politics is inextricably 
entangled with power relations, such that value systems and interests become 
entrenched and conflictual when they are presented politically. For feminists, then, to 
recognise conflict is also to recognise that their own politics are beset by power 
relations, as Jane Flax has noted, `we [feminists] need to learn to make claims on our 
own and others' behalf... knowing that ultimately there is nothing that justifies them 
beyond each person's own desire and need and the discursive practices in which these 
are developed'. 92 As Flax's statement suggests, feminists must learn to make 
demands and state their interests without presenting them as objective, neutral 
discourses that all rational people will agree on. For Flax this also encourages 
feminists to take responsibility for the power inherent in their claims and the conflict 
they may cause. If feminists do not recognise their own power demands, they face 
potential disillusion and frustration as they politically engage with others who do not 
agree with them. 93 
Feminism, contingency and decision 
Finally, the political is also characterised by contingent decision-making, without 
which conflict is meaningless. For Mouffe there is conflict because decisions have 
been made that momentarily fix social and political relations. Once fixed, new 
antagonisms emerge to challenge them. "' However, decisions can be made in the 
face of diversity and extreme value pluralism, through a political process that ensures 
that they are also temporary and contestable. Again this idea is important in allowing 
92 J. Flax, 'The End of Innocence' in J. Butler and J. W. Scott (eds. ), Feminists Theorize the 
Political, (New York and London: Routledge, 1992), p. 460. 
93 Ibid., pp. 458-460. 
9' C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, op. cit., pp. 151-152. 
199 
feminists to shake off utopian hopes of consensus and come together as a temporary 
alliance, avoiding the debilitating practise of fracturing into smaller and smaller 
feminist groups to obtain a lasting consensus. Once more, the concepts of 
representation and representative democracy will play roles in this decision-making, 
providing the sort of institutions and mechanisms necessary for short-term and 
authoritative decisions to be made. 
Thus, the political on these terms is obviously a limit on many feminist 
discourses as they seek re-establishment in the face of fragmentation. But it could be 
the first step in re-establishing feminism as a political discourse in a new wave. The 
next step is to establish a model of democracy that will do greater justice to the 
political than Benhabib, Young or Mouffe's visions. These feminists have all faltered 
in providing a model of democracy that captures the distinctive elements of the 
political by expecting transformative political situations, denying the role of interests in 
politics and expecting extensive citizen participation. In the next chapter, a generic 
model and defence of representation and representative democracy will be developed 
that addresses the needs of feminists in a new wave, allowing for a range of political 
identities for women. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter Mouffe's ideas on radical democratic citizenship and agonal 
democracy were addressed to see if they were suitable for feminism in a new wave. It 
was shown that both these elements of her work repeated some of the problems of 
Benhabib and Young's political models, relying on the democratic confrontation to 
produce a transformation in social relations and identities. While her model of 
citizenship was problematic, Mouffe's more recent work on agonal democracy is 
underpinned by a concept of the political that is characterised by publicity, conflict, 
contingent decision-making and the construction of political identities. This view of 
the political is useful for feminists in a new wave allowing them to re-engage 
politically after the utopian and separatist dreams of the second wave. However, 
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because Mouffe has not extended this view of the political to feminism, it was 
developed and explored to see how it could meet new wave feminist concerns. It was 
thus suggested that to capture the political, feminists must be strategic, building 
temporary alliances and accepting the interest-based nature of their demands. They 
must also expect conflict in the political process and be prepared to make 
compromises in the knowledge that all decisions are provisional. Thus, it will be 
contended in the next chapter that to fully incorporate the political, feminists need to 
develop clear conceptions of representation and representative democracy. These will 
provide a background of mechanisms and institutions for feminists and women facing 
the tumultuous and conflictual nature of the political, in their own alliances and as 
citizens in wider democratic processes. 
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Chapter Six. Feminism and the Concept of Representative 
Democracy 
Introduction 
Since the fragmentation of the second wave feminist movement, many feminists have 
been re-evaluating women's political identity and collectivity. This process has been 
going on for over a decade and it is now possible to say that feminism is on the edge 
of a new wave. Postmodern discourses have played an important part in bringing 
about this new wave. As the study of Chapter Two concludes, a postmodern approach 
to feminism demands a twofold process. On the one hand feminists must come to 
terms with the fragmentation of the feminist movement and reconceptualise it as an 
alliance or coalition rather than a sisterhood. On the other hand, the postmodern 
approach calls for feminists to recognise the precarious nature of their politics. 
Consequently, if feminists understand the postmodern position, they will also be 
concerned to place feminism in a wider political framework, ensuring that women's 
citizen identity is protected as well as their feminist one. Ultimately, postmodernism is 
so important in a new wave because it finally breaks with the separatist position in 
feminism and places women in the centre of society and politics. 
For the feminists of this study, Benhabib, Young and Mouffe, postmodern 
theory provides new tools and concepts to assess feminism. Each has seen 
postmodernism as a critical strategy that allows feminists to come to terms with the 
fragmentation of the second wave and which raises new questions of democratic 
inclusion. The problem with each of their theories of democracy is that they have all 
failed to come to terms with the need for, and the nature of, the concept of 
representation in any new wave of feminism. Instead, they favour the presence and 
participation of women in transformative political models and do not fully address the 
importance of representative mechanisms. To avoid these problems, it will be 
contended that representative structures must be in place in any future feminist 
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movement and that feminists need to seek wider involvement in representative 
democracy as citizens before the presence and participation of women can be secured. 
Hence, this chapter will set out a defence and re-theorising - in terms of new 
wave feminism - of representative democracy. It will consider the history of 
representative democracy, its theoretical basis and the existing practices of 
representative democracy to delineate what is distinctive and useful about it for 
feminists in a new wave. With this defence, feminists can embrace the distinctive 
features of modem representation and representative democracy to restate a politics of 
citizenship that is responsive to their demands after fragmentation. The concept of 
representative democracy on this reading is particularly important for feminists who 
have accepted the postmodern challenge and thus want to maintain a commitment to 
anti-essentialism, contingency and anti-utopianism in their feminist politics. 
The chapter is split into two sections to explore representative democracy for 
feminism in a new wave. The first half introduces the concept of representation and the 
model of representative democracy. It looks first at the problems with other feminist 
models of democracy, briefly reiterating these to illustrate why a concept of 
representative democracy is useful. Secondly, the history of the concepts of 
representation and representative democracy is considered, from their roots in 
revolutionary practice, through Whig and Burkean visions of representative 
democracy, to the studies of Hanna Pitkin, Anthony Birch and Bernard Manin. ' 
Thirdly, the chapter details the distinctive features of representation and representative 
democracy that are useful for feminists in a new wave. These features are the 
`paradox' of representation as the simultaneous presence and non-presence of the 
represented, ' the representative democratic emphasis on elections and procedural 
equality, and the historical contingency of representative models of democracy on 
' H. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 
1967), A. Birch, Representation, (London: Pall Mall, 1971), A. Birch, The Concepts and Theories of 
Modern Democracy, (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), and B. Manin, The Principles of 
Representative Government, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
2 H. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, op. cit., see pp. 8-9, is the first to recognise and theorise 
the paradox of representation. 
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conditions of social diversity and `moral indeterminacy'. ' 
The second half of the chapter concerns the relationship between feminism and 
representative democracy. It begins with a consideration of feminist responses to 
representative democracy and suggests that in the second wave these attitudes were 
largely hostile to representation, with many second wave feminists favouring 
participatory models of democracy. However, the feminist attempt to establish party 
quotas in the 1980s and 1990s and the gradual institutionalisation of feminist groups 
suggests a more open attitude to representative democracy is developing. With this 
new attitude in mind, the implications of representative democracy for future feminist 
politics will be detailed. This involves a twofold analysis that looks at both the impact 
of representation on a future alliance based feminist movement and also at the sort of 
political strategies feminists might deploy in finding their place in representative 
models of democracy. It is clear from this distinction that feminism can be reconciled 
with issues of representation in two areas: by theorising the importance of a concept of 
representation in a feminist alliance and by examining the place of feminists in 
representative democracy. It concludes by examining how feminist theory, in all its 
historical permutations, might modify existing representative practices and provide it 
with a rich theoretical dimension. 
Why representative democracy? 
So far three models of democracy have been considered: Benhabib's model of 
deliberative democracy, Young's model of communicative democracy and Mouffe's 
model of agonal democracy. Each model was assessed in terms of it usefulness for 
democratically including women as both feminists and citizens. It was concluded that 
none of the models was fully adequate in providing these types of political inclusion. 
To start with Benhabib's model of deliberative democracy, it was seen to have a 
number of difficulties that made it problematic for feminists in a new wave. She begins 
' G. Kateb, 'The Moral Distinctiveness of Representative Democracy, ' Ethics, Vol. 91, No. 3 (April 
1981) p. 360. 
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by theorising feminists as a unified political group, whose sole political objective is to 
achieve democratic inclusion as autonomous citizens. She goes on to suggest that once 
feminists are present in a deliberative democratic structure, their aims, and those of 
women more generally, will be met in the deliberative formation of the common good. 
This transformative vision, it was argued, is both undesirable and unrealistic for 
feminists in a new wave. It continues to posit a unified feminist 'movement' as the 
only form of feminist political collectivity, missing the great diversity of feminist 
discourses after the second wave. Her political model also risks denying the political 
nature of feminist claims by requiring feminists to sacrifice the specificity of their 
demands to a democratic process committed to the common good. Moreover, she fails 
to adequately address the representative nature of her united feminist vision, and 
whether it can represent the interests of all women through its demand for autonomous 
citizenship in deliberative democracy. 
Young also works from a basic model of deliberative democracy, but she 
modifies it further than Benhabib to take more account of social diversity. Thus, 
instead of positing a unified feminist group, she initially developed the idea of an 
`affinity group'. In the `affinity group' women were allowed to come together 
politically without reference to a shared and essential 'female' identity. The group was 
meant to avoid essentialism because its structure was cognisant of the differences 
between women, fluid and dynamic. She believed that if women could be represented 
in a more inclusive democratic model in terms of such an 'affinity group', they could 
make their specific political demands heard and still remain a heterogeneous collective. 
However, it was contended that her concept of communicative democracy, which was 
based on this idea of `affinity group' representation, was only practicable once the 
`affinity group' became a permanent, rigid and institutionalised forum for women. 
These alterations to the structure of the affinity group made it less dynamic and fluid 
than she had originally intended and her political settlement began to essentialise 
women's identities, arguing that women in the affinity group could unanimously 
decide on how to use a political veto in their name. There was a further problem in 
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that while she had made moves to theorise group representative mechanisms at the 
communicative democratic level, she was less clear on how these would operate to 
make the affinity group internally representative. Ultimately, Young's communicative 
model was seen to give women a political identity as women and feminists, but to lose 
sight of how women could find democratic inclusion beyond the confines of their 
gender difference and marginality. Her recent model of serial collectivity has gone 
some way in making up for these deficiencies. In this work she suggests that any 
future feminist group will be short-term, possibly issue-based and narrowly 
representative, women will thus need other political spaces to make their voices heard. 
However, she has not as yet altered her concept of democracy to respond to these 
changes. 
Chantal Mouffe, in contrast to both Benhabib and Young, was seen to be more 
successful in understanding the difficulties in securing a fully inclusive political 
model. She also had a deeper concern that essentialism should not creep back into a 
feminist collective in the light of the fragmentation of second wave movement. Her 
response therefore was to consider how feminists could form non-essentialising 
political groups by joining with other marginalised group and positioning their 
demands as part of a wider fight against subordination and in favour of further 
democratisation. She termed this collective, `radical democratic citizenship'. She 
argued that it would be structured as an alliance, allowing the groups to come together 
for political action, while maintaining some of their political differences. It was seen 
that she has also begun to theorise a model of agonal democracy that can take account 
of the difficulties in forming political collectives in diverse societies, where citizens 
may have a number of social and political allegiances. Despite these promising moves, 
it was argued that Mouffe continues to privilege a citizen identity based on the radical 
democratic collective. She believes that membership in such a collective will radically 
transform the pre-existing identities of those in it. Consequently, she, like Benhabib, 
risks subsuming the specificity of feminist political claims to wider democratic 
demands. Moreover, this vision of radical citizenship, by assuming a set of common 
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concerns, does not marry well with her view of an agonal democratic politics governed 
by incommensurable conflict and partial decision-making. 
Therefore, three broad problems emerge in Benhabib, Young and Mouffe's 
models of democracy that suggest that the concepts of representation and 
representative democracy could be very useful. Firstly, they assume either explicitly or 
implicitly that women as feminists can be successfully unified as an active, 
participatory political collective. It is very possible, however, that feminism will not be 
able to rebuild itself as a united political collective and that the concept of 
representation will thus be necessary to avoid problems with accountability in a 
fragmented movement. Moreover, many women do not have time for the pure presence 
these models prescribe and thus, some degree of representation would be necessary to 
legitimate these democratic models. Secondly, they believe that democratic models, if 
properly inclusive of social difference, can be transformative: changing conflicts of 
opinion and value-pluralism into collective common concerns. However, by holding 
onto utopian dreams of a transformative politics, they do not seriously examine 
existing models of representative democracy that could be useful in a feminist strategy 
for democratic inclusion. Moreover, the emphasis of Young and Benhabib on 
transformative models of democracy does not take account of the distinct nature of the 
political that was examined in Chapter Five. In expecting transformation they thus 
forgo the political, believing that social relations can be harmonised and consensual 
decisions made. A generic model of representative democracy, it will be argued next, is 
more responsive to the political as a relationship of `otherness' and potential conflict 
than these discourse and deliberative models of democracy. Thirdly, Benhabib and 
Mouffe assume that women as feminists will be prepared to risk their specificity for 
inclusion in a reworked model of democracy. In other words, they assume that women 
will privilege their citizen identity over their feminist one. This assumption does not 
account for women's diversity and their plurality of political demands, allegiances and 
identities. 
The model of representative democracy, it will be argued, fits the demands of 
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feminism in a new wave, allowing women to be politically included as both feminists 
and as citizens without subsuming the one under the other. In meeting these demands, 
it draws on the postmodern critical strategy that has been crucial in realigning feminist 
theory in the new wave. Hence, it respects anti-essential identities, anti-utopianism and 
the contingency of political thought on existing political traditions and practices. 
Moreover, it meets with the concept of the political identified in Chapter Five, 
recognising the public nature of the political, the need for artificial political identities to 
be created, the presence of incommensurable conflict and the need for contingent 
decision-making. The model of representative democracy argued for here will be both 
a defence and re-theorising of existing models. Central to this project is the belief that 
feminists have much to gain by making strategic use of existing democratic practices. 
They must find women's place in democracy now and not in a utopian vision of 
consensual politics. 
A short history of representation and representative democracy 
The history of representative democracy is important because this is a defence of an 
existing political model. It is therefore necessary to understand the different 
manifestations of representative democracy as both a theoretical concept and an 
evolving practice. What the history shows is a dynamic, complex and diverse model. It 
developed from formal, and frankly absolutist origins, through the Enlightenment, into 
a model that is open to many interpretations and institutional forms. There are three 
broad areas in the study of the history of representative democracy that need to be 
examined: the concept of representation, the meeting of representation and democracy, 
and the role of the democratic representative. 
Formal representation 
The idea of political representation began to develop before the rise of mass suffrage 
and democratic citizenship. It has its roots in the medieval era. In England the person 
of the King initially became more `representative' to gain the consent of the barony 
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for his tax demands. Hence, the Magna Carta was signed to allow knights to be 
elected who could then agree on the King's tax proposals. These knights eventually 
became a parliamentary assembly whose members not only negotiated with the King, 
but also ensured their constituents' demands were heard and that their constituents in 
turn were kept informed of the King's actions. 4 When the concept of representation is 
considered in its historic isolation from democracy, its formal features become 
apparent. 
Put simply, formal political representation is the authorisation of the 
representative to act on behalf of the represented. It is fulfilled in its formal sense if the 
government or representative is responsive and accountable to those it represents. The 
representative in being responsive is consequently legitimated and thus continues to be 
authorised to act on behalf of the represented. 5 In the most formal definition of 
representation there are some variables. How the representative `acts on behalf' of the 
representative is one such variable - are they to act independently or in terms of a 
mandate - and this will be determined by the different historical and theoretical 
conditions of the concept. Another variable is how the success of the representative 
relationship should be measured. Again, different criteria emerge at different historical 
moments. 
Indeed, without a democratic basis, the concept of representation is necessarily 
minimal. As J. Roland Pennock recognises, hereditary monarchs and dictators such as 
Hitler can be considered to be formally representative. He writes of Hitler. 
Even Hitler, sought legitimacy by claiming to represent the 
people... because through him the true spirit of the German people 
found expression. He also sought to authenticate his legitimacy by 
claiming the constitutional legality of his regime and by subsequent 
reliance on plebiscites .6 
Thus, many types of political regime may wish to present themselves as 
`representative'. So while the idea of representation as a purely formal procedure can 
4 A. Birch, Representation, op. cit., pp. 26-28. 
s A. Birch in The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy, op. cit., pp. 76-78, sets out the 
functions of political representation, including authorisation, legitimation and responsiveness. 
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point to important ideas such as legitimacy, accountability and responsiveness, it is 
given extra depth when it is contingently theorised in terms of democratic equality. It 
is this ingredient that modernised the concept of representation and made it a 
substantive as well as a formal relationship. 
Representation and democracy 
Historically representation and democracy meet in the English political debates of the 
seventeenth century' and in the American and French Revolutions. 8 In the English 
debates, according to Anthony Birch, there were three conceptions of representative 
democracy: the Whig, the Tory and the radical. Whigs believed that representative 
democracy should be a process of formally authorising the representative, in this case 
a Member of Parliament (MP), to find the national interest. 9 The Whig concept of 
representative democracy thus remained a minimal one in which the representative 
seeks authorisation and not guidance from the electorate. However, the Whig position 
was opposed by the Tory belief that the representative should represent the collective 
interests of the local electorate as opposed to the national one. 1° The Whig position 
was also opposed by the radical belief that each man should be able to establish the 
representative relationship through universal suffrage. " 
The radical position was, unsurprisingly, important in the development of 
representative democracy because it believed that the represented should have the 
ultimate authority over the representatives, an idea that is crucial in any theory of 
democratic representation. Thus, radical groups such as the Levellers wanted universal 
suffrage and regular elections12 and English followers of Tom Paine suggested that 
6 J. Roland Pennock, 'Political Representation: An Overview, ' in J. Pennock and J. W. Chapman 
(eds. ), Representation: Nomos X, (New York: Atherton Press, 1968), p. 7. 
A. Birch, Representation, op. cit., p. 36, notes that these debates emerged from calls to extend the 
suffrage which then focussed on the role of the parliamentarian as a representative. 
a B. Manin, The Principles of Representative Government, op. cit., p. 1. 
9 A. Birch, Representation, op. cit., p. 37. 
'o Ibid., p. 38. 
" Ibid., pp. 52-53. 
12 Ibid., pp. 37. 
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citizens should be able to rebel against unpopular governments. 13 Yet another radical 
thinker, Jeremy Bentham, argued that Parliament should be a microcosm of society so 
that every social group and position was reflected in its constitution. 14 These radical 
positions increased accountability of the representative relationship. But in doing so, 
they made the relationship between the representative and the represented more 
separate. `S The representative could no longer assume that he naturally embodied the 
desires of the representatives, or that he would know what was best for them - the type 
of representative relationship the Whig's assumed. Rather, the radical position wanted 
the represented to guide the representative via a democratic electoral system. 
Hence, once representation is linked to democracy the representative continues 
to be responsive and to seek authorisation. But he is no longer seen as the 
unquestioned and ultimate authority, exemplified in the work of Hobbes, who, once 
given authorisation, stands in for and makes decisions as the represented. 16 
Consequently a separation occurs between the representative and the represented, with 
the latter expected to have some control over the former. In turn, modern concepts of 
representation alter the classic conception of democratic equality because of this 
distinction between the representative and the represented. What is now important in 
the representative democratic working of political equality is the equal right of all to 
elect a representative. Manin argues that this sort of equality is very different to the 
sort of political equality found in ancient democracies - such as in Athens - which 
were based on the equal right to stand for election. " Again, the emphasis is shifted 
from the representative to the represented and, as Manin notes: 
In a system based on lot... the persons that happen to be selected are 
13 Ibid., p. 53. 
'a Ibid., p. 55. 
is This idea that the relationship between the represented and the representative became more separate 
is of course quite ironic, because most radical thinkers who demanded universal suffrage would have 
wanted to bring the representative closer to the people. 
16 Although this is a widely recognised element of Hobbes's work, Hanna Pitkin gives a very 
detailed account of it in, The Concept of Representation, op. cit., pp. 14-37. 
" B. Manin, The Principles of Representative Government, op. cit., pp. 8-35, argues that it is 
precisely the desire to secure the equality of choice (of representatives), as opposed to the equality of 
standing for political office, that means representative democracy relies on the election and not the lot 
to select its representatives. 
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not put in power through the will of those over whom they will exercise 
their authority; they are not put in power by anyone. Under an elective 
system, by contrast, the consent of the people is constantly reiterated. ' $ 
The electoral process thus becomes central to establishing the representative 
relationship in representative democracy, ensuring that the people, the democratic 
public, authorise the representative. Consequently, modern representative democracy 
rests on new concepts of representation and new interpretations of democracy that 
break with the absolutist heritage of representation, and can be understood in terms of 
a separation between the represented and the representative. " The representative no 
longer is the represented as he was under an absolutist system. 
Democracy in the twentieth century: the changing role of the representative 
As representative democracy developed, important questions emerged about the nature 
of representatives and their relationship to the represented. Initially, the representative 
was seen to represent either sectional, economic interests or, in the Burkean case, the 
national interest. In these representative relationships good representation hinged on 
whether the representative properly protected the local interests they stood for - the 
idea of the representative as a constituency MP - or whether, in the case of Burke's 
concept, they acted with the independence of mind to decide on the common interests 
of all. These issues were played out in pre-twentieth century `mandate-independence' 
debates, 2° which asked if representatives were to be mandated, contractually obliged to 
represent the exact wishes of the electorate, or whether the representative should be an 
independent actor seeking out the common good or national interest 2' These same 
questions have been asked in twentieth century accounts of political representation and 
'8 Ibid., p. 85. 
"B. Manin, ibid., p. 28, again notes that the lot does not produce this type of distinction. With the 
lot, the selected person governs because they are also the governed, Thus, there is a direct relationship 
of identification between the governed and the governor, that is broken with the electoral system, 
whereby the citizens vote for someone distinguished from them. 
20 H. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, op. cit., pp. 144 -167. 
21 Both radical thinkers such as Bentham and conservative thinkers such as Burke believed that 
representatives should be free to find, respectively, the common good or the national interest without 
fear of factionalism or sectionalism. J. Lively and A. Lively (eds. ), Democracy in Britain: A Reader 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 83. 
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representative democracy, but the increasing complexity of the national interest and the 
growing diversity of local communities have seen the issues become less defined. 
Moreover, a new concern with the social identity of the representative has developed 
that to some extent eclipses the mandate/independence debate. 
The new concern with social identity changed the nature of debates on 
representation in the twentieth century. Prior debates had tended to argue that the 
representative should be someone fit for political leadership, either by birth or 
education. 22 Even John Stuart E11, who saw educative benefits in representative 
democracy, wanted the most educated members of society to be given extra votes to 
ensure that only representatives of the highest calibre were elected. 23 Beyond this 
basic social characteristic that all representative shared, there was no other debate about 
identity. Indeed, the role of the representative was to represent the interests, either local 
and economic or national, of the represented. He did not have to share their social 
position. 
It was only in the twentieth century that the need to match the social identity of 
the representative to the social identity of the represented was seen as an important 
factor in democratic representation. 24 Manin attributes this to the rise of party 
representative democracy in which socialist parties characterised the vote as `not a 
matter of choice but of social identity and destiny' Zs The emergence of the Labour 
Party, which wanted to secure better representation of the working class in Parliament, 
certainly emphasised this identification between the representative and the represented. 
As Anuerin Bevan, a Labour Party MP in the early twentieth century, stated, `a 
ZZ This was ensured and protected by a property qualification for representatives, that was in place, in 
England, until 1858, ibid., p. 82. 
Z3 J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government, (London and Toronto: J. M. 
Dent and Son Ltd, 1910), pp. 256-260, was also concerned that once the working classes were 
enfranchised, Parliament would become dominated by their representatives and highly 
unrepresentative of the middle and upper classes. 
24 As I stated earlier, this concern begins to transcend the mandate/ independence argument. While a 
representative who fully reflects the social standing of those they represent and acts accordingly is 
certainly a mandated actor, the latter argument, voiced by Bevan, assumes that even in those areas 
where the representative must act, perhaps unexpectedly, with some independence, they will 
necessarily act as their represented do, given that they share the same social identity. 
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representative person is one who will act in a given situation in much the same way as 
those he represents would act in that same situation'. He added, `in short, he must be 
of their kind'. 26 Many first wave feminists used these types of arguments to argue for 
women's enfranchisement. Milicent Fawcett, for example, argued that women 
representatives, because they were female, could bring specialist knowledge of moral 
issues to political life. These arguments continue to have force today in calls for 
Parliament to become a microcosm of society and in feminist attempts to establish 
party quotas for women MPs on the basis that only women can represent women's 
interests. In general these debates have seen the idea of representation shift from 
sectional or national interests and issues, to a personalised concern with identity. 
These new questions about the nature of the representative have been attempts 
to mitigate and close the separation between the representative and the represented. 
However, as will be examined in detail in the next section, Manin has shown that the 
actual practice of representative democracy via the electoral system makes this gap 
impossible to close. According to Manin, the election always takes place to distinguish 
the representative from the represented, thus creating a separation between the two. 
Moreover, in seeking to close the gap between the representative and the represented, 
the whole idea of representative democracy is undermined. The representative no 
longer has to be accountable because it is assumed, as the Bevan quotation showed, 
that the representative will naturally know how to act as the represented would. Indeed, 
it will be argued that if a full identification of the representative with the represented 
could possibly occur in a representative democracy, then the relationship would not be 
representative at all; it would be a relationship of `identification'. Hence, it will be 
shown in the next section that modem representative democracy has several features 
that constantly hinder the perfect identification of the represented with the 
representative. In fact, this sort of identification is not part of the distinctiveness of 
ZS B. Manin, 'The metamorphoses of representative government, ' Economy and Society, Vol. 23, 
No. 2, (May 1994), p. 151. 
26 A. Bevan, `Working Class MPs, ' in J. Lively and A. Lively (eds. ), Democracy in Britain: A 
Reader, op. cit., p. 97. 
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modem concepts of representation and representative democracy and actually risks 
returning it to its absolutist origins. 
It is clear from this short history that as representative democracy has 
developed, as both a theory and a practice, it has become increasingly complex. 
Moreover, due to its dominant role in actual, existing democracy in the West, it is 
difficult to define representative democracy in a purely theoretical way without any 
reference to empirical observation. Given these two difficulties, the recent history of 
representative democracy cannot be approached in a definitive manner. At best the 
history of representative democracy has two general branches. One is the history of 
political representation as a means to establish the responsiveness, authority and 
legitimacy of any government. Since the concept of representation arose in the 
thirteenth century, few governments would claim to be unrepresentative in this formal 
way. The second branch to the history of representative democracy concerns its role as 
a democratic concept in which the people authorise the government (the 
representatives) in a substantive manner, making demands that must be explicitly met 
by government. To fulfil this role, the government must be accountable to those it 
represents, and attuned to both the nature of the represented and the representative., To 
this general picture must be added the institutional patterns of most representative 
democracies. These encompass a number of different levels of representation, from the 
local to the national, and allow for the representation of many different 'things', from 
organised interests to individual grievances. Pennock has summarised the complexity 
of representation, stating: 
The existence of numerous and varied avenues of representation, each 
by virtue of its own peculiar nature, seeing, reflecting, attempting to 
effectuate a slightly different facet of that great conglomerate of desires 
and interests that make up the electorate, probably produces a more 
tolerable result than could be accomplished by any one of them 
alone. 27 
It would thus be neither sensible nor possible to give a rigid definition of 
representative democracy. It is not an ideal type but a dynamic practice. Consequently, 
27 J. Pennock, `Political Representation: An Overview, ' op. cit., p. 27. 
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it would be easier to draw out the distinctive features of representative democracy and 
political representation as it operates in representative democracy than it would be to 
portray such an ideal. It can then be re-theorised as a useful interpretation of 
citizenship and democratic inclusion for feminists in a new wave. 
Representative democracy and the political 
Representative democracy shares characteristics with other types of democracy and it 
may be interpreted in many ways, with many institutional practices, but it has three 
distinctive features. 28 One, its concept of representation is based on the presence and 
non-presence of the represented in the political process, two, its formal procedural 
basis is the election and third, following Kateb, it presupposes `moral indeterminacy' 
and social diversity. It will be shown how these distinctive features meet with the 
concept of the political outlined at the end of Chapter Five. This concept is based on 
the `public' nature of the political, a constructed, collective political identity, the 
presence of conflict in political decision-making, and the contingency of the political. 
By meeting this concept of the political, representative democracy is, in turn, a useful 
model for feminists in a new wave. 
The separation between the representative and the represented 
The first distinctive feature of representative democracy is its concept of political 
representation that is characterised by the separation between the represented and the 
representative. As it was shown earlier, this separation occurs as the concept of formal 
representation meets democracy and the represented, in this case the electorate, become 
more important than under absolutist regimes. Hanna Pitkin was one of the first 
thinkers to address this peculiar characteristic of representation, noting that it rested on 
a paradox: `being represented means being present in some sense, while not really 
28 These features are not the essence of representative democracy in the sense of being original and 
unchanging. They are contingent and dynamic, for example the type of election that might be held 
can be run in a number of different ways and produce a number of different types of representation. 
But without these features, a political model is not representative democracy. 
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being present literally or fully in fact'. 29 When this paradox is applied to political 
representation in representative democracy, it is clear that there is no necessary, fixed 
identification of the representative with the represented. Indeed, Manin indicates how 
the electoral system produces this separation between the representative and the 
represented, of which he writes, `an elective system does not establish an identity 
between those who govern and those who are governed'. 30 According to Manin, the 
electoral system does not produce such identity because the process of electoral choice 
means the represented choose representatives who are distinct from them in some way. 
They might hold particular political skills or a party membership that the electorate and 
other candidates do not share. 31 
The separation between the represented and the representative is seen by many 
theorists to be the central weakness of representative democracy. Thinkers from 
Rousseau32 to Carole Pateman have criticised representative mechanisms, insisting that 
they depend on the alienation of political right. In this process of alienation, the elector 
gives up her political right to a representative over whom she then finds she has no 
control. 33 It is necessary to reverse this tradition of thinking to suggest that in complex 
and diverse societies representation is not the alienation of political right, but a way of 
establishing it. 
In this regard, political representation and its separation of the representative 
and the represented facilitates the construction of an artificial, collective political 
identity, that was seen to be a central characteristic of `the political' in Chapter Five. 
29 H. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, op. cit., p. 153. 
30 B. Manin, `The metamorphoses of representative government, ' op. cit., p. 137. 
3' B. Manin, The Principles of Representative Government, op. cit., p. 140, argues that people may 
still want to elect people who are like themselves, but the situation in which they make their choice 
hinders this desire, `the situation of choice constrains voters to elect candidates possessing 
uncommon (and positively valued) characteristics, regardless of their specific preferences'. At the root 
of this argument seems to be the suggestion that if we did not elect a representative because they 
were somehow distinct from us, and only voted for those like us, then we would have to ask the 
question, 'why am I not standing for office? ' The only way to meet such a question would be to 
return to a system of lot to fill political office. The electoral system cannot answer this question 
because it produces the distinctiveness of the representatives. See B. Manin, ibid., pp. 139-144, for a 
general discussion of how election produces distinction. 
32J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, (London and Vermont: J. M. Dent and Charles. 
E. Tuttle, 1993), p. 266. 
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As Ernesto Laclau argues, in times of social diversity, when peoples' identities are 
disunited because of social complexity, the representative can actually become a 
temporary, fixed reference point that provides a focus for collective demands and 
makes democracy possible. He writes: 
In advanced industrial societies, the fragmentation of identities around 
issue politics requires forms of political aggregation whose 
constitution involves that political representatives play an active role in 
the formation of collective wills and not just be the passive mirror of 
the pre-constituted interests. 34 
In identifying this process, Laclau argues against the idea of perfect democratic 
representation in which the transparency of the representative process is achieved. For 
Laclau, therefore, social diversity emerges as a background condition to representative 
democracy and the representative emerges as a figure to find political unity in this 
diversity. There are clear roles for feminists here in temporarily aggregating women's 
political demands and in alliance building. They could become a focal point for 
finding and encouraging political collectivity. 
The idea of the representative actively constructing political collectives also 
brings to fruition Pitkin's paradox of representation - that representation is to be 
present and yet not present - with the representative becoming the `intermediary'. As 
such, he or she has a specific political role that makes them distinct from, but never 
separate to, the represented. This process allows the represented to be both present in 
the system, through their authorisation of the representative, and non-present at the 
same time. Their partial status as `non-present' political actors allows them to seek out 
other political allegiances and identities. In short, the separation between the 
representative and the represented meets with the characteristics of `the political' in 
allowing for a partial and artificial political identity to be established through the role 
of the representative. In turn this artificial identity can be conceived as non- 
essentialising because it never entirely determines the citizen identity, leaving each 
citizen free to pursue a number of political causes and allegiances without breaking the 
33 C. Pateman, The Disorder of Women, (Oxford: Policy Press, 1989), p. 103. 
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representative relationship. Consequently, the representative process allows a political 
identity to be constructed in terms of one element of the citizen's identity, which 
otherwise remains decentred and multiple. 
The role of the election and procedural formality in representative democracy 
The representative relationship is established and maintained in representative 
democracy through the election procedure. It is via the election that the represented 
select and authorise the representative to act on their behalf in political decision 
making. The primary concern of the election therefore is not what is registered in the 
election, be this a sectional interest or a common interest, but to establish the act of 
representation. As Manin argues, `election is a method for designating those who 
should rule and for legitimising power'. 3S This is very different to the role of the 
election in direct democracy, which is primarily concerned to register the views of the 
electorate. 
In authorising the representative via the election, the sense of distance between 
the representative and the represented emerges again. The electoral process 
compounds this separation because, as Manin's work shows, it produces 
representatives who are distinguished in some way from those they represent: 
`election cannot, by its very nature, result in the selection of candidates who resemble 
their constituents'. 36 He goes on to argue that election necessarily produces a 
representative who is distinct because it involves making a choice. According to this 
argument, in making a choice between candidates, the elector must choose in terms of 
a characteristic she considers one candidate to have above all the others and one that 
she considers to be a superior characteristic. This characteristic, according to Manin, 
has traditionally been wealth or social status or education, but it can be any positively 
34 E. Laclau, 'Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony', in C. Mouffe (ed. ), Deconstruction and 
Pragmatism, (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 49. 
35 B. Manin, 'The metamorphoses of representative democracy, ' op. cit., p. 136. 
36 B. Manin, The Principles of Representative Government, op. cit., p. 149. 
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judged trait. 37 
The election also produces a separation between the represented and the 
representatives because, according to George Kateb, the electorate in a representative 
democracy is aware of the artificial nature of authority that needs to be revalidated at 
every election and thus they are less respectful of it. They do not see the electoral 
process as a permanent expression of their identities or their interests. As Kateb states, 
`political authority is, at every moment, a temporary and conditional grant, regularly 
revocable'. 38 Hence, the electorate accept the temporary nature of the authority they 
have established and acknowledge that it is revisable. 
The electoral process, because it produces this minimal and formal political 
relationship, is also useful in coming to terms with the public and conflictual nature of 
the political as a relationship between others, between citizens who may not be 
sympathetic to each other's demands. By voting in elections, all citizens can participate 
in the system as citizens, even when they are in radical disagreement. This more 
minimal sense of participation can also be very protective, allowing conflicts to emerge 
and be expressed without the citizens having to subsume their whole identity in the 
political relationship. Mark Warren also recognises the value of minimal institutional 
and procedural frameworks in the face of political conflict, stating: 
They [radical democrats } should ask whether... people will jump at the 
chance to become active participants. If they don't, it may not be just 
because our culture induces apathy... but also because of the 
unattractive features of politics as such. Radical democrats must 
therefore think about how institutional designs could lessen and 
contain the risks of politics while still offering the means to articulate 
and negotiate its discomforts. 39 
Thus, the electoral system is a vital part of this institutional framework, allowing for 
minimal and widespread participation in a potentially conflictual process. 
3' B. Manin, ibid., p. 160, makes it clear that these traits are contingent and thus change from one 
context to another. Moreover, they don't actually have to be superior, they must just be perceived as 
such. 
38 G. Kateb, 'The Moral Distinctiveness of Representative Democracy, ' op. cit., p. 358. 
39 M. Warren, 'What Should We Expect From More Democracy? Radically Democratic Responses to 
Politics, ' Political Theory, Vol. 24, No. 2, (May 1996), p. 266. 
220 
Social diversity and `moral indeterminacy' in representative democracy 
The open nature of the electoral decision-making process leads into the third 
distinctive feature of representative democracy, what George Kateb refers to as its 
`moral indeterminacy'. Representative democracy encourages moral indeterminacy 
according to Kateb because of the partial nature of representative political authority, 
which means that the represented are less afraid of it. Consequently, a condition of 
moral indeterminacy emerges, entailing `the belief that within a frame of settled 
commitments, a number of contrasting and competing responses or answers to 
morally tinged questions are to be expected and welcomed'. 4° It is not relativist 
because representative democracy still allows a temporary and authorised decision to 
be made through the electoral process. This decision is temporary because the 
authority of the decision is partial and potentially open to contest. Hence, he concludes 
that representative democracy because of its partiality, `cultivates a general tolerance 
of, and even affection for diversity: diversity in itself, and diversity as the source of 
regulated contest and competition' '" 
Manin also theorises how representative democracy procedures produce 
contesting public opinions. For Manin, the representative in democracy ceases to 
embody the whole people because of the electoral separation between them and the 
representatives: `repsresentative government is a system in which the representatives 
can never say "We the people" with absolute confidence and certainty'. 42 According 
to Manin, without a substantive act of identification to ground representation, there 
remain areas of opinion outside the remit of the representative where differences can 
flourish. 43 He argues moreover that this diversity of public opinions in representative 
democracies encourages the formal accountability of the representative, such that he or 
she must think through their actions in terms of the range of possible public opinions 
if they want to be re-elected. This process leads to representatives identifying, 
' G. Kateb, 'The Moral Distinctiveness of Representative Democracy, ' op. cit., pp. 360-361. 
°' Ibid., p. 361. 
4'13. Manin, 'The metamorphoses of representative democracy, ' op. cit., p. 143. 
4° B. Manin, The Principles of Representative Government, op. cit., p. 174. 
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crystallising and reshaping political demands and preferences, adding to pre-existing 
interests and ideas through the political process. "' 
The social diversity of representative democracy, as was shown, also 
constitutes and is constituted by the partiality of representative decision-making. 
Decision-making in representative democracy is inescapably partial because of both 
the separation between the representative and the represented, and the electoral 
process. Hence, it is because the representative never fully embodies the represented 
that any decisions made at elections can only be partial and temporary. As Laclau 
writes of this process, `the particularity of the decision assumes the function of an 
imaginary closure - while not being entirely able to perform an actual and final 
closure'. " The electoral process, therefore, makes it clear to citizens that any decision 
holds until the next election, when new representatives could be elected on a different 
platform. 46 Hence, representative democracy produces social diversity because of the 
separation between the representative and the represented, but this very diversity, 
coupled with the formal procedures of the election, allows temporary, partial and 
authoritative decisions to be made. 
This idea that an authoritative decision can be made, even in the face of great 
diversity, gives representative democracy a definite advantage over the models of 
deliberative democracy examined in Chapters Three and Four. In Benhabib and 
Young's discourse models, decision-making still revolves around consensus. It was 
argued that such consensus could only be achieved in a substantive manner at the cost 
of social diversity. Indeed, it was seen that Young and Benhabib, as well as Mouffe, 
ultimately privileged transformative democratic settlements in which social differences 
were erased in the quest for political consensus. Representative democracy on the 
other hand, allows for partial, temporary and authoritative decisions to be made even 
" B. Manin, `The metamorphoses of representative democracy, ' op. cit., states that, `in politics 
demand is not exogenous; in general, preferences do not exist prior to the action of politicians, ' p. 
161. 
45 E. Laclau, 'Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony', op. cit., p. 59. 
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when there is substantial political dissent and social diversity. 
To summarise, the representative model of democracy that has been theorised 
here meets with the concept of the political outlined in Chapter Five. It is public, taking 
as its condition the diversity and lack of unity between citizens. As Fred Dallmayr has 
recognised, democracy is always about the recognition of separation and strangeness - 
that was seen to be constitutive of the political public - and its temporary overcoming 
via the process of representation. " Hence, representative democratic procedures do 
not assume a relationship between sympathetic equals and they maintain the separation 
between the representative and the represented, because the act of political 
representation is only temporary. The representative, as Laclau's work showed, thus 
assumes an important role in constructing an artificial, political collective identity and 
shaping the issues or identities that will form the basis of the election. The electoral 
process in turn allows the representative to be authorised to make temporary and 
partial decisions. These decisions can be contested and revised at the next election 
because they are partial and inherently revocable, depending as they do on electoral 
outcomes. Consequently, the election procedure sets up the relationship of conflict and 
decision that was also shown to be a feature of the political. 
Feminist responses to representative democracy 
Feminist responses to representative democracy have been mixed. Many feminists in 
the second wave objected to representative democracy and representative processes in 
liberal democracy for two reasons. Their first concern was that representative 
democratic models were inherently male oriented. Many feminists, for example Susan 
Moller Okin, argued that the exclusion of women was woven into the theoretical basis 
' It should be noted that representative democracy necessitates regular elections or else it is neither 
representative, the ruler would be a permanent and absolutist expression of the people, nor 
democratic, because without the regular election the people would have no autonomy in the process. 
" F. Dallmayr, 'Postmetaphysics and Democracy', Political Theory, Vol. 21, No. 1 (February 
1993), pp. 116-123, notes that the people are an 'absent presence' in postmetaphysical democracy. 
Following Charles Lefort, he says that they are neither a 'compact body' nor a 'nullity' - the latter 
being governed by complete hostility and the former by complete transparency and solidarity. Instead 
it is an amalgam of both that is typified by Heidegger's concept of "overcoming". 
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of these types of democracy. According to her argument, representative models 
presumed women would be in the private sphere looking after the children, while men, 
the `representatives, ' decided the political issues of the day. 48 This concern was 
compounded by the general radical view, forcefully asserted by Pateman, that political 
representation is the alienation of one's political rights and thus it can only extend and 
worsen the political exclusion of women. As Pateman writes, `citizens can only look at 
such a [representative] political sphere and not act in it'. 49 Gynocentric feminists, 
more generally, objected to the competitive, conflictual and hierarchical nature of 
representative democracy embodied in the need to win elections, all of which they felt 
was antithetical to women's natures. Such criticisms have had a powerful legacy. Ruth 
Lister, for example, concludes her recent study of feminist citizenship by remarking 
that when she began her work she was unsure whether citizenship could encompass 
women at all, believing that citizenship might be inherently `woman-unfriendly' so 
The second set of objections concerns the minimal nature of representative 
mechanisms. For many feminists in the second wave, political participation was crucial 
to get women together, to get their voices heard, and ultimately, to aid them in their 
identity formation. And, as has been well documented, most second wave feminists 
thus embraced participatory models of democracy. This type of thinking has also had 
long legacy in the feminist movement. Iris Young, for example, continues to assert the 
importance of political participation for `consciousness raising' and solidarity. s' 
Ultimately, for many second wave feminists the representative model that allowed 
participation to begin and end with the vote, if the woman so pleased, meant that 
women could remain politically isolated. On these terms women were left as no more 
than drudges to their private identities. 
`$ Susan Moller Okin's, Women in Western Political Thought, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, (1979) 1992), is the classic examination of how women were systematically excluded from 
political thought and practice. She goes on to note that until we question this inherent exclusion, 
women will never be fully included in the political dimension, p. 286. 
49 C. Pateman, The Disorder of Women, op. cit., p. 104. 
so R. Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 195. 
s' I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 
153. 
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However, while participatory political structures did mobilise women in the 
second wave, they brought their own problems. These are outlined in Chapter One and 
can be reiterated briefly. Consciousness raising was meant to bring women together 
and to find out what they had in common. In the early days of the movement this need 
to create solidarity kept some potentially divisive subjects such as lesbianism off the 
agenda. Consequently, any woman who found she was different either conformed to 
the consensus of a group or left. Some of the latter set up their own groups and others 
withdrew feeling politically disillusioned. The fact that the legitimacy of the group 
rested on the participation and commitment of its members meant that they tended to 
be very unrepresentative of women, with young, childless and educated women 
predominating, as they had the most time on their hands for the protracted political 
process. This would not have been such a problem if they had been elected the 
movement leaders and had the authority to speak for other women, but as this was 
rarely the case, there were accountability and legitimacy problems: the black feminist 
critique was one of the clearest indications that the movement was not representative. 
Moreover, without clear leaders, these groups tended to fragment and withdraw from 
politics as internal debates became unwieldy. This political withdrawal was 
compounded by the general feminist distrust of conventional and state politics that had 
inspired the participatory model in the first place. As Ursula Vogel has noted, these 
sorts of feminist conceptions of citizenship `tend to emphasise grass-roots 
participation at the expense of involvement at the institutional centre of the state'. s2 
What these problems of second wave feminism suggest is that feminists must 
look beyond participatory models of democracy and consider how representative 
mechanism and representative democracy can help re-politicise feminism after the 
fragmentation of the second wave. While feminists are right to have concerns about 
the alienating potential of representative democracy - and these concerns will be 
addressed at the end of the chapter - they must first consider the benefit of the model 
S2 U. Vogel, 'Is Citizenship Gender-Specific? ' in U. Vogel and M. Moran, (eds. ), The Frontiers of 
Citizenship, (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 82. 
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for feminists in a new wave. A new wave in which their utopian dreams of sisterhood 
and separatism, that fuelled their preferences for participation, have been replaced with 
fragmentation and diversity. Indeed, even in the second wave, the American liberal 
feminist organisation, NOW, gave some force to the importance of representative 
structures. They held regular elections to elect a leadership slate and on this basis 
maintained one of the largest feminist group memberships over a long period of time. 
While they remained too minimal and corporate for some, their longevity was an 
achievement in the context of the second wave and NOW even witnessed the election 
of a radical platform. -' 
There is also a sense in which many feminists are ready to come to terms with 
and re-theorise representative models of democracy. As Anne Phillips recognises, it 
has taken the re-emergence and maturation of the feminist concern with citizenship for 
feminists to seriously consider `macro-level' democracy, which includes liberal 
democracy and issues of representation. "' Some feminists have now begun to ask 
whether representative, liberal democracy is inherently opposed to women or whether 
their exclusion has been historically contingent and is thus revisable. " A study of 
British feminism by Vicky Randall and Joni Lovenduski has traced the increasing 
involvement of feminists and feminist issues in the political system since the late 
1980s. 36 While such institutionalisation can bring its own problems, it at least 
suggests that the representative system can begin to incorporate feminist issues. 
Moreover, the end of the separatist dream, that pervaded the second wave radical 
sector, has led to more pragmatic forms of feminism. In the 1980s, the recognition that 
the feminist movement was fragmented meant that some feminists, such as Anne 
Phillips, argued that it was now necessary to live with representative democracy and to 
s' In 1982 they had a membership of 250,000, B. Ryan, Feminism and the Women's Movement: 
Dynamics of Change in Social Movement Ideology and Activism, (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1992), p. 73. 
sa A. Phillips, Democracy and Difference, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), p. 104. 
ss See Valerie Bryson's Chapter on 'Politics and the State' in Feminist Debates: Issues of Theory and 
Political Practice, (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), pp. 90-122. 
56 J. Lovenduski and V. Randall, Contemporary Feminists Politics: Women and Power in Britain, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 135. 
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make it work for women. Hence, Phillips has looked extensively at the possibility of 
establishing party quotas for the selection of women parliamentary candidates. " This 
idea was further reflected in feminist practice with the establishment of Emily's List, an 
organisation that supports women's attempts to get into Parliament. " 
What seems to have happened is that many feminists now feel a certain degree 
of ambivalence towards questions of representation and representative democracy. The 
experiences and legacies of the second wave make them cautious and sometimes 
hostile to these concepts, yet the issues of the new wave and its concern with 
citizenship make some degree of representation necessary and inevitable. As was 
shown, Benhabib, Young and Mouffe's political models typify this ambivalence. 
Benhabib until recently failed to seriously engage with representative democracy, 
holding out for a utopian model based on presence, participation and transformation. 
Mouffe at least seems to accept the need for representation and representative models, 
but she does not submit them to an explicit examination. And, whereas Young has 
looked at representation, her position will be examined later, she continues to base it 
on the permanent representation of social groups which risks essentialising women. 
It is now necessary to push feminism closer to representative democracy and 
let feminism embrace its distinctive political elements as the basis on which a feminist 
politics might be rejuvenated. It will be seen that a model of representative democracy 
will neither erase the differences between women nor ground a sisterhood, but it could 
provide a framework in which the differences become manageable. A greater concern 
with representative democracy, moreover, would enable feminists to politically re- 
engage, allowing women to participate in politics as both political feminists and as 
citizens. It is clear then that feminism engages with the concepts of representation and 
representative democracy in two ways: the concept of representation must operate in a 
feminist movement as a coalition and conversely, feminists must operate in existing 
s' Anne Phillips has written frequently on the subject of quotas, but Engendering Democracy 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), pp. 60-91, deals in most detail with the specific question of quotas 
for women and their place in issues of representation. 
"Emily's List is an organisation formed to support and advise prospective female MPs. 
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models of representative democracy. Each of these areas will be considered separately 
to outline the different issues and questions they entail for feminists in a new wave. 
Once the framework of representative democracy is accepted, it might be easier to 
address its problems of apathy and minimalism, and to supplement it with other 
democratic measures drawn from deliberative and agonal models. 
The concept of representation in the feminist alliance 
During the second wave, two connected factors emerged that served to make the 
feminist movement appear `unrepresentative': ideological factors and formal, 
organisational factors. In the first instance, the emergence of the black women's 
critique exposed how unrepresentative the ideology of sisterhood was. Until this point, 
the logic of sisterhood operated on an extreme and essentialising metaphysic of 
presence. In this logic to be a member of the sisterhood was to be all women, 
experiencing the same, universal patriarchal oppression. In this process, representation 
is replaced with the equal, personal identification of all members of the group with 
each other. 
Most feminist groups therefore did not have leaders or formal voting 
procedures. They eschewed formal voting in favour of consensus decision-making to 
further reflect the ideal of sisterhood: namely, that each woman spoke for all women 
and all women could be any woman. The problems of sisterhood and the organisation 
of the second wave are now widely discussed, but there is still a lack of concrete 
thinking on how to make a future feminist movement, both ideologically and 
organisationally, more representative. It is also apparent that making the movement 
more representative by structuring it as an alliance is not the best way to achieve 
substantial, widespread representative procedures, because an alliance structure may be 
too loose and diffuse to enshrine these procedures. Consequently, it is necessary to 
separately address both the ideological and structural factors of representation. In the 
course of this analysis there will be some speculation about the course of feminist 
politics in a new wave, in accordance with the arguments of Chapter Two, which 
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suggested that it will be alliance-based, non-essentialising, non-utopian and concerned 
with women as both citizens and feminists. 
The ideological basis of representation in a new wave of feminism 
Few feminists today foresee a return to sisterhood and many feminists now advocate 
an alliance or coalition structure for the movement. 59 While most of these feminists 
advocate an alliance structure to avoid essentialising women, it is also an important 
strategy to bring the idea of representation into feminist political practice and thinking. 
Conceiving of the movement as an alliance acknowledges that the movement is not 
representative of all women. It is only representative of those women involved and 
even then it must continually negotiate its claims to representation ensuring that it is 
not ignoring groups of women, or so that it can justify any kind of exclusion bo 
Hence, the representative relationship now seems necessary and realistic for 
feminists both at movement level and citizenship level. Women do not have anything 
naturally or essentially in common and hence any common political relationship 
between them will be a constructed one. As such, it will be open to contest and dissent. 
In these conditions, it is imperative that feminists accept that they are representatives 
for interested women and that they do not take their own experiences and opinions to 
stand for the experiences and opinions of all women. Feminists can thus recognise the 
diversity of women's experiences but seek to represent a feminist political viewpoint, 
which reflects but does not encapsulate a set of women-specific political issues. The 
formal election of representative leadership and policy is, as Laclau's work made clear, 
one way to temporarily aggregate feminist views into a political position when no 
natural consensus can be reached. What is more, this is an imperfect but stark choice 
for feminists. Either feminists accept unity around representation - knowing that this 
process of representation can never be complete or perfect - or they will find 
themselves in a position where there is no way of speaking, as feminists, for women at 
59 Cf. Chapter Two, p. 83-84. 
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all 
The organisational basis of representation in a new wave of feminism 
The problem with structuring the feminist movement as an alliance is that it makes 
organisational and procedural representation very difficult to implement. An alliance is 
a diffuse and loose network of groups and in changing political circumstances it will 
have varying degrees of unity and solidity. It is possible, therefore, that at times the 
alliance will face internal conflict between groups which have remained distinctive 
elements within its structure. 61 Given its precariousness, alliance-wide, formal 
procedures for representation such as the election of a leadership platform may be 
impracticable. Iris Young's idea of women's affinity group representation exemplifies 
the problems in trying to tie the bonds of alliance too tightly for the purpose of 
political representation. In her work on communicative democracy, women are seen as 
a specific affinity group to be represented in all government decisions, in some cases 
they will even have the final authority over government policy. If her example is 
fleshed out in terms of procedural representation, it is clear that there would need to be 
some form of electoral and voting mechanisms within the affinity group of women. A 
vote would need to be taken among all women to decide their political position and to 
elect a leadership that, on Young's reckoning, would have to have separate sections to 
reflect different sub-groups of women. 2 With these procedures in place, it is 
conceivable that the leadership could make representative decisions and, at least, hold 
referenda on areas such as reproductive policy where women will have the power of 
veto. However, the sheer scale of this exercise makes it difficult to imagine. Moreover, 
for it to be workable, it still presumes that women hold a common position so that they 
could come to some unanimous agreement to use a veto. 
60 Here I am thinking of women who are members of explicitly anti-feminist groups. A feminist 
alliance would have to make it explicit that they were to be excluded in terms of representation. 
'"' If there was a relatively stable feminist alliance, then it might be possible to think about 
permanent and formal procedures of representation. 
62 I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, op. cit., p. 162, notes how it is necessary to 
ensure the movement has forums for any group of women who feel they are distinctive. 
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A more likely scenario for the representation of women, than a permanent 
rainbow coalition with a separate section for women, is that local and national 
governments decide on an ad hoc basis to consult feminists. This consultation will 
occur either because the tiers of government want to create `women-friendly' policy or 
because feminists have brought an issue to government attention by protest and 
pressure. Thus, it is possible to envision two different workings of procedural 
representation in the feminist alliance to meet this scenario, and these are dependent on 
the varying political circumstances the alliance might find itself in. The first is a set of 
ad hoc procedures of representation for the alliance to get together for a period of 
consultation with either local or national governments and the second is a more 
permanent, alliance-wide drive for representation, starting with the representativeness 
of each feminist group. 
Ad hoc procedures are useful if a feminist alliance wants to establish its 
representativeness ready for a local or national government consultation process. For 
this type of consultation to be substantial, the consulted group should aim to be 
formally representative. An instructive example of how to establish representation 
quickly took place in the Greater London Council (GLC) in the early 1980s. Randall 
and Lovenduski document how the GLC Women's Committee (composed of cross- 
party councillors) prepared for consultation with council leaders by holding a number 
of public meetings for interested women and then electing some of the attendees on to 
the Committee with the councillors. 63 The process was obviously voluntarist and it did 
not, according to the authors, resolve questions about the authenticity of the 
representatives. 64 But it does show that representation can be formally established 
among feminists and women for consultation purposes. 
The second political circumstances in which the need for organisational 
representation arises is in the self-organisation of the feminist alliance, especially 
63 J. Lovenduski and V. Randall, Contemporary Feminist Politics, op. cit., pp. 194. 
64 J. Lovenduski and V. Randall, ibid., p. 195, note how questions were raised as to whether the 
elected women were too competitive and thus unrepresentative, and if all groups of women were 
included. 
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where there is no external impetus for representation to be established as there was in 
the case of the GLC consultation. Here the very diffusion that is the hallmark of the 
alliance precludes long-term uniform procedures for representation. While sometimes 
the alliance - as a whole - will have to formalise quickly for consultation, at other times 
it might be that only one group within the alliance is being consulted. To cover these 
eventualities, there needs to be a general diffusion of the principle of representation 
among feminist organisations. Each group in the alliance will need to get its own 
house in order, so to speak, vis-ä-vis representation. It can do this by electing a 
leadership, however rudimentary, that is revocable and accountable. This leadership 
could in turn liaise with the whole alliance should this be necessary. 
In holding a leadership election, the group also establishes a distance between 
the representative and the represented. The relationship between the two becomes an 
impersonal and formal one as opposed to a personalised one. In the second wave 
movement, many feminists deliberately came together in small groups without formal 
structures and in which their political relationships were personal and consensual. At 
times of disagreement, women in these groups were forced to either conform to 
maintain the consensus or dissent and literally risk personal exclusion. By contrast, it 
is far easier to disestablish an impersonal representative relationship, and the 
consequences are less harsh, than it is to break free of such a personalised one. In the 
representative relationship, the formal bond can at least be re-negotiated if the terms 
are right, or it can be revoked at the next election. 
It is not being pretended for one moment that establishing representation in an 
alliance will be an easy task or that all the problems associated with representation will 
magically drop away. This reading of representation expects conflict and contest to 
take place because it presupposes, as a condition of representation, that there can be no 
perfect identification between the representative and the represented. It is likely that 
contests will arise over the nature of what is being represented by the representative: be 
it political issues, the political skill to make decisions and draw up strategy or the 
social identity of the represented. It is thus difficult to prescribe what should be 
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represented in the feminist alliance. What we might fall back on as a guide is Bernard 
Manin's idea that an electoral selection of representatives automatically produces 
representatives who are distinctive from those they represent. For Manin this 
distinction arises because a choice must be made to vote for one candidate over 
another. He argues that this choice will be based on the social superiority of the 
candidate, but it is possible to theorise the distinction in terms of superior political 
skills or the saliency of particular issues. 
Hence in a feminist pressure group such as Women Against Rape, the 
representatives would hardly need to be elected in terms of the issues they represented, 
as these have already been agreed as the reason for the group's existence. What might 
make a candidate distinctive are the different political skills she holds to define and 
convey the issues of the group in the wider political process. Many feminists may feel 
uneasy about electing representatives in terms of their skills, believing that women's 
different socialisation means that these skills are not distributed evenly, with many 
women yet to fulfil their potential. Valerie Bryson has argued however that to 
disregard skills entirely is also problematic, wasting time and productivity in the 
group. 6S Good support structures and the temporary nature of the election, moreover, 
should allow women to learn political skills and have a chance to use them. This skill- 
learning process was often ignored in the less formal arrangements of the second 
wave, whereby leaders `emerged', imposed their views and were unaccountable. 
In identity based feminist groups, say for example, black feminist groups who 
are concerned with crossover issues of gender and race, the election process might 
distinguish between candidates in terms of issues rather than political skills. In such 
groups we would expect a number of conflicting issues to emerge and the group could 
then make temporary decisions on which issues to prioritise politically, without 
needing to split into factions. Finally and because - as will be examined later - 
representation has a symbolic dimension, a feminist group which is predominantly of 
65 V. Bryson, Feminist Debates: Issues of Theory and Political Practice, (London: Macmillan Press, 
1999), p. 102. 
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one ethnic group or religion, but claims to represent a wider cross-section of women, 
might choose as part of its electoral process to distinguish some candidates on the 
basis of their minority status vis-ä-vis the group as a whole. In other words, they 
would be making a distinction in terms of social identity. It would be a symbolic step, 
but it would help the group maintain its legitimacy. 
Hence, the call for feminists to take representation seriously is asking for three 
things. One, the acknowledgement that in times of diversity and fragmentation 
representation is the only way to establish a partial and temporary unity at any level of 
the alliance. Two, that formal representative mechanisms could be useful to organise a 
feminist alliance in varying political circumstances. And three, that the general idea of 
representation is important as a symbolic response to the homogenising effect of the 
ideal of sisterhood. To secure this symbolic aspect, it might be enough for feminists to 
state, `we represent those women who... ' when they voice political claims. 
Women and feminists in representative democracy 
Many of the representative measures discussed in relation to a feminist alliance are 
dedicated to maintaining and establishing a separate movement from mainstream state- 
politics. It follows therefore that when the Chapter refers to feminists in representative 
democracy, it is not envisioning a permanent and institutionalised (re)presence of 
feminists. Rather, for both theoretical and pragmatic reasons, it is characterising a 
more piecemeal involvement in existing institutions of representative democracy. In 
keeping with this flexible approach, feminists must find their place in representative 
democracy on a number of different levels and in a number of different ways. 
Feminists should thus seek inclusion in representative democracy both as women with 
wider citizen concerns and as feminists. 
Feminists in representative democracy 
The role of postmodernism in shifting feminism into a new wave indicates that 
feminists must come to terms with the political and its contingent reflection in existing 
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political practices. If feminists are to re-engage with politics then they must not chase 
another utopia. As Jean Bethke Elshtain has asserted, they must begin, 
grappling with those powerful forms of discourse that necessarily 
define politics in the West. .. far better, it seems to me, to theorise 
practices and to engage in theoretical practices. This helps to keep our 
feet on the ground and to avoid the systematizing delusions that have 
plagued Western philosophy. 66 
Feminists must thus look at the present model of democracy in the West and ask how 
can they engage with it? What strategies are necessary to be heard in this model? And, 
how can it be improved? It is also worth noting that our experiences and expectations 
of democracy are partly constituted by being citizens in a representative model. It is 
these experiences of democracy that might resonate with women who feel distanced 
from second wave feminism. 
What is particularly important about representative democracy for feminists is 
that it is amenable to the political, allowing for public engagement, conflict, decision- 
making and the construction of collective identities for temporary political action. 
Feminists, in engaging with representative democracy, engage with the distinctive 
features of the political and shatter the separatist dream. They learn to make their 
claims in public to those who may disagree with them. Representative democracy 
provides this sort of public confrontation through its parliamentary institutions and its 
electoral system. They must also bring feminist issues into political spaces beset by 
conflict and decision-making. In representative democracy, the need to make 
temporary decisions in the face of conflict is a crucial feature of the electoral process, 
which is further opened up by the fact that all decisions are reversible at a later date. 
Finally, feminists in times of diversity can stand as the partial unifying, representative 
figure for women who can no longer be constructed as an homogeneous social group 
with a common set of objectives. 
Indeed, there has been an increasing emphasis among feminists, as the new 
wave takes force, that existing models of representative democracy have encompassed 
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and have been penetrated by feminist groups and ideas in a number of different 
political spaces. As Lovenduski and Randall summarise, `feminists have gained 
important positions in state institutions and in participatory structures, widespread 
campaigns have mobilized new groups and generations of activists, and feminist ideas 
have found a place on policy agendas. '67 Further, they have charted feminist 
involvement at all levels from local councils, through state negotiations over policy, to 
trade unions and political parties. A picture thus develops of feminists operating in 
representative democracy to introduce feminist issues and to find political 
representation for women, getting women involved and heard as democratic citizens. 
When feminists do stand in this manner, as the artificial political collective for other 
women and feminists in the wider political process, it is important to ensure that there 
are representative structures at the lower level of the alliance so that their 
representativeness is accounted for. 
Women citizens in representative democracy: the end of identity politics? 
Representative democracy is also a useful for model of democracy for including 
women as citizens as well as feminists. A generic form of representative democracy 
therefore seems to have two features that make it suitable for the inclusion of women 
as citizens, aside from their possible identity as feminists. One, it is anti-essentialist in 
terms of identity, being based as Anne Phillips says on `ideas' over 'presence"' and 
thus, two it is not legitimated by participation, but by the representative democracy. 
Representative politics can be conceptualised in an anti-essentialist manner 
because it is not entirely dependent on the citizen's personal identity, but her beliefs 
and interests. As Manin argues, our current practices of representative democracy 
retain the vestiges of the party system in which social identity was important and also 
" J. Bethke Elshtain, `The Power and Powerlessness of Women, ' in G. Bock and S. James (eds. ), 
Beyond Equality and Difference: Citizenship, Feminist Politics and Female Subjectivity, (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 124. 
67 J. Lovenduski and V. Randall, Contemporary Feminist Politics, op. cit., p. 135. 
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encompass more diffuse political practices in which the flux of public opinion bring 
issues to the fore again. As issues come to the fore again, Manin notes that, `this 
resulting division [of public opinion] does not necessarily reproduce or coincide with 
electoral cleavages: the public may be divided along some lines in elections and along 
others on particular issues'. 69 Consequently in the representative process, the citizen 
can hold a number of different interests in a number of political spaces, some of which 
may clash. While the political beliefs and interest of a citizen may very well be derived 
from her sense of identity, she does not need to be present in the political process on 
the basis of personal identity to make these heard. The intermediary figure of the 
representative fulfils this presence. By way of contrast, in Young's communicative 
model, which privileges representation in terms of identity groups and not interest, 
women are determined as political actors by their gender identity that risks suggesting 
all women hold the same values and have the same political needs. In a representative 
model a woman can have feminist interests, religious interests, party interests etc. 
without undermining any of these. But for those who chose, it is possible to politically 
define oneself in accordance with one identity and to seek representation on this basis. 
Representative democracy is also useful to feminism in a new wave because it 
is legitimated by the electoral process and not by participation. This has two 
consequences for women. Firstly, it allows for different levels of participation at 
different times so that women who do not have time for politics can chose a more 
minimal form of participation such as voting and still be represented. Anne Phillips 
concurs that, although we must not glorify the vote, it is important for setting a low 
threshold of participation in the system. 7° Secondly, existing representative democracy 
stands as an immutable institutional presence for those instances when the feminist 
alliance has broken down. In other words, it provides other political spaces for women 
as a kind of insurance policy when the movement is dormant or in disarray. It will be 
" A. Phillips, The Politics of Presence, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 1-26, charts the 
progress of ideas over presence in representative democracy, believing that presence is now beginning 
to come back into the concept. 
I B. Manin, `The metamorphoses of representative democracy, ' op. cit., p. 164. 
237 
remembered here that abortion, equal rights and sex discrimination legislation were all 
passed in Britain during the 1960s, when the feminist movement was relatively 
inactive. 
Getting women into representative democracy 
Hence, representation allows women to find democratic inclusion in a wide range of 
political spaces and as citizens who might have a wide range of political identities, 
some of which may conflict. However, to ensure that women's inclusion in 
representative democracy is substantive, it is necessary to look at how women can 
actively seek inclusion in the model. It is important that women are seen as important 
political actors in representative democracy. While one way of asserting the 
importance of women is through feminist representatives - who have a crucial function 
in getting women heard politically - it is also necessary to look at the nut and bolts, so 
to speak, of women's representation as citizens in a representative democracy. It is 
particularly important that any measures to get women included do not re-essentialise 
them. 
To this end, four factors to encourage women's inclusion in representative 
democracy will be examined: the symbolic nature of women's representation, women 
in political parties, women as voters and women's inclusion beyond identity. It is 
presupposed in this analysis that women also have the option of finding inclusion 
through feminist groups and that such groups are in themselves specific political 
identities for women. Hence, feminists groups should become part of the general 
picture of women's political representation. Moreover, this is not a set of prescriptions 
to get women included as women, because this would be to suggest that women have a 
set of common interests. It must be accepted that getting women included in 
representative democracy is a feminist project that involves getting them included in 
diverse political spaces and in terms of diverse interests and political concerns. 
70 A. Phillips, Democracy and Difference, op. cit., p. 112. 
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Symbolic representation 
While the fragmentation of the second wave feminist movement exposed the problems 
of identity politics, this is not to suggest that the discourse of identity politics has been 
eradicated. Indeed, the feminist concern with identity reflected a wider twentieth 
century attack on the neutrality of the state and its institutions. As it was argued earlier 
in the chapter, feminists and socialists believed that political representation should 
ensure that the social identity of the representative matched that of the represented. 
This idea is still powerful, despite the fact that social identities have become more 
complex. Hence, it has become standard procedure to question the representativeness 
of an institution in terms of whether it adequately reflects the social make-up of 
society. In this sense representation relies on a `symbolic' aspect and the presence of 
women representatives has a symbolic function in legitimising representative 
institutions and signifying their inclusiveness. 
However, Judith Squires warns, following Pitkin, that symbolic representation 
is hard to constitutionally guarantee and is often based on `highly subjective' 
assessments of what counts as good representation. " It could also be added that 
securing women's symbolic representation in legislatures - making sure that the 
number of female MPs is proportionate to women's numerical social presence - does 
not guarantee that a `women's position' will emerge or that there will be huge shifts in 
political culture in response to their presence. It is not possible to guarantee this 
cohesive position because, if the anti-essentialist critique is accepted, women do not 
necessarily share a common political stance. In light of these fears it is necessary to 
make sure that symbolic representation is seen as one part of a broader conception of 
democratic representation. It is important for the legitimacy of our representative 
institutions, but it remains, as Hanna Pitkin noted, a rather imprecise and loose idea. 
As she writes, '[w]e are emphasising the symbol's power to evoke feelings or 
attitudes. And we are calling attention to a vagueness, looseness, and partial quality of 
" J. Squires, 'Liberal Constitutionalism, Identity and Difference, ' Political Studies, Vol. XLIV, 
(1996), p. 633. 
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the reference'. 72 
Hence, it is necessary to supplement the desire for symbolic representation 
with more concrete attempts to include women in representative democracy that also 
take account of the distinctive nature of democratic representation. It is for these 
reasons that feminists must present their discourse and ideas as a specific political 
identity for women. This identity does not reflect shared social status, but shared 
concerns and political interests. Women's only necessary relationship to each other is, 
as Young has theorised, one of seriality. It is not substantive and merely refers to the 
fact that they share the same material body. Anything other than this limited 
commonality, is produced by a political process of construction, alliance building and 
debate. Hence, it is crucial that feminists, beyond this symbolic aspect of 
representation, push for consultation with feminists at all levels of representative 
democracy. The experiences of women's representation in the GLC might indicate 
how this process could begin. Moreover, if these feminists groups are themselves 
representative, then this is one way to involve women in the system without 
essentialising them. Ultimately, simply increasing women's numbers in representative 
democracy, may mean very little is if is not. supplemented with contingent and political 
processes of identity formation that takes account of women's political identities as 
feminists, business women, party members - that is to say, all the things that make up 
their citizenship. 
Women as political party members 
The second step is to continue to push for the better representation of women 
in political parties and trade unions. Again, this is important for symbolic reasons and 
because of the new wave feminist concern to respect and promote women's decentred 
identities. To this end, it is necessary to ensure that women are included in many 
political spaces, in terms of the many interests and concerns that make up their citizen 
identity. The demand for guaranteed quota systems in political parties and trade 
72 H. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, op. cit., p. 96. 
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unions becomes one more element in the drive to get women included in all political 
spaces and in terms of a range of their contingent identities; as is opposed to simply 
pushing for women's inclusion as women. 
However, Phillips, who has devoted much work to the use of quotas, makes 
several warnings about how this will pan out. First, she warns there is no guarantee 
that stabilising quotas for women in political parties will lead to a `women's position' 
emerging in Parliament. Party divides remain very strong and eat into this 
commonality. " Second, Phillips holds out on whether a threshold of representation of 
women will change the style of politics. She suspects it will bring some changes, but 
writing these in stone in advance of greater inclusion is impossible and risks 
essentialism. 74 As she writes: 
Changing the gender composition [of elected assemblies] cannot 
guarantee that women's needs or interests will then be addressed. The 
only secure guarantees would be those grounded in an essential 
identity of women, or those arrived at through mechanisms of 
accountability to women organized as a separate group. 75 
Phillips argument ultimately is that quotas can get women in, but do not guarantee 
anything. In light of these concerns, it is necessary to balance up the arguments for 
quota systems76 against more structural measures to support women who are 
interested in politics. These structural measures might include financial support for 
interested women and a substantial review of parliamentary hours and childcare 
provision. 
Women as voters 
The third way to get women into existing representative democracy is through the 
election process itself. Valerie Bryson opens up election as a feminist issue citing 
73 A. Phillips, The Politics of Presence, op. cit., p. 76, cites the Norwegian example as evidence of 
this phenomenon. 
74 Ibid., p. 71. 
"s Ibid., p. 82. 
76 By far the strongest argument for quota systems is that they ensure substantive numbers of women 
enter politics in the shortest possible time. Unfortunately, in Britain, at least, the use of quotas is 
somewhat tarnished by the political controversy over the Labour Party's limited use of them prior to 
the 1997 election. 
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recent electoral information showing that women in Britain are more likely to be 
floating voters then men and are thus additionally influential in deciding elections. She 
states that this has led to `an increased sense that the vote is not an empty formality, 
but something which feminists can use as part of an overall strategy for real 
change'. " By encouraging women to use their vote, they can become important actors 
in the system without being institutionalised or essentialised. 
Rethinking identity 
However, the fourth way to get women into representative democracy without 
essentialising them is for feminists to recognise the limits of identity politics and think 
in terms of issues and interests rather than identification. If feminists produce 
discussion on issues, these are more likely to find their way on to policy agendas and 
into policy networks. These are far more established methods of policy-making than 
those found in identity politics, which often relied on consciousness-raising to raise 
issues. Moreover, single issues are often the easiest way to mobilise large numbers of 
women to take part in feminist and other politics. Young's recent work on serial 
collectivity suggests how issues can be separated off from identity, allowing women to 
come together but in more short-term ways. 78 
Hence representative democracy opens up a number of levels for women to be 
involved as citizens and as feminists. While it would seem unwise to push for a 
women's party or some other such organised bloc of women, women can still be 
included in their specificity as women and as feminists without the risk of 
essentialising them. It is necessary to avoid the dilemma found in Mouffe's work, that 
rejecting women as an essential group precludes speaking of women's specificity in 
any way, so that feminism becomes lost in a wider democratic project. Lovenduski and 
Randall make the point, if it needs to be made again, that `accepting that difference and 
" V. Bryson, Feminist Debates: Issues of Theory and Political Practice, op. cit., p. 109. 
7$ See I. Young, `Gender as Seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social Collective, ' in L. 
Nicholson and S. Seidman (eds. ), Social Postmodernism: Beyond Identity Politics, (Cambridge: 
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competing identities are endemic does not mean that politics cannot happen. If this 
were the case, we would have to deny that politics ever took place'. " Feminists in a 
new wave, who have paid attention to the question of representation, can be central in 
pushing for changes in women's representation in non-essentialising ways. The 
crucial factor here is that feminists will have a large role to play in constructing a 
temporary political identity for interested women. 
Feminist transformations of representative democracy 
So far the argument has been very cautious in suggesting what will be distinctive in 
increasing the representation of women. There is still a fear of essentialising women 
and there is the solid humanist feminist standby that until women are in the democratic 
process, in sufficiently equal numbers, we will have no idea of the potential changes 
they could deliver. What we might say, with less controversy, is that those women who 
have come through the feminist legacy of the second wave, as a student of feminist 
ideas, a member of a feminist group, or a participant in the second wave movement, 
have enough of a history and a sufficiently established discursive tradition, to want the 
modification of existing representative political practices in several ways. 
Most feminists in a new wave are clearer, even clearer than those in the second 
wave, that the silence of some women should not be taken as a tacit acceptance that 
feminists can speak in their name. The response of this thesis has been to reassess 
feminism's structures of representation and accountability so that it explicitly 
acknowledges those women who it speaks for. Other responses have been 
forthcoming, Iris Young, for example, has suggested a range of practical measures to 
ensure that there is access to funding for groups who do not speak, who are not heard. 
The political climate of the second wave also indicates the need for the marginalised to 
learn political skills. To generalise then, feminists are more attuned to the perspectives 
of the marginalised and forgotten. On this basis we might say that getting more 
Cambridge University Press, 1995). Here, she gives some examples of women organising around 
issues and not simply in terms of their gender identity, pp. 208-209. 
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feminists in to representative democracy, if not more women, will emphasise wider 
issues of inclusion and political equality in times of diversity. Susan Mendus also 
recognises this trend, arguing, `feminism searches for an understanding of democracy 
as something to be aimed at through difference, not something to be attained via the 
removal of difference (Mendus's italics)'. 80 
These issues of the unheard also encompass those questions of deliberation 
and the need to allow difference into political arguments that have been so important to 
Benhabib and Young. It is clear that representative democracy is institutionalised 
through deliberative assemblies that allow for the public confrontation of political 
actors and help to legitimise it as a political system. Hence, the arguments of feminist 
deliberative theorists are important for two reasons. One, to assess whether women, 
and other marginalised people, are really heard in these arenas. Two, to emphasise that 
simply increasing the number of women in deliberative situations does not mean that 
they will automatically be admitted to debate on the same terms given to more 
established political actors. While these concerns are to be treated sympathetically, 
they are still best achieved in existing representative institutions as opposed to, as yet 
unpractised, transformative deliberative political models. The advantage of 
representative deliberative institutions is that they are rooted in, as Mark Warren puts 
it, `standard adversarial procedures'. These include secret ballots and voting and are 
important for Warren `where an irreducible pluralism of interests (or time constraints) 
limits the capacities of deliberation to produce decisions'. " 
Part of the response to ensure women are really heard is the feminist new wave 
concern that politics should be flexible and dynamic. We take the radical spirit of 
protest from the second wave and marry it with the anti-essentialist critique to see 
politics operating on a number of different levels, in different spheres and at different 
times of life. This dynamism reflects the embedded and embodied nature of the self, 
79 J. Lovenduski and V. Randall, Contemporary Feminist Politics, op. cit., p. 91. 
80 S Mendus, 'Losing the Faith: Feminism and Democracy, ' in J. Dunn (ed. ), Democracy the 
Unfinished Journey: 508 BC to AD 1993, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 218. 
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which Benhabib and other feminists want to involve in politics, and its constant 
changes. Thus, feminists are more likely to emphasise how the institutions of 
representative democracy might reflect multiplicity and embeddedness with better 
working hours and the provision of creches: no representative is simply a politician. 
None of these add up to a promise of a new politics, a homogeneous feminist 
or women's viewpoint, but they are vistas on a life in which politics is important and 
accepted but is no longer crushing and defeatist. It is the start and not the end of the 
political story which in the 1980s threatened to re-marginalise women. Representative 
democracy then is not to be seen as a panacea for all of feminism's ills. It is rather a 
framework in which they can start to address these problems and possibly rebuild a 
feminist alliance and re-engage women with citizenship. In this process, feminist 
issues will always be contested and a vibrant feminist movement as an alliance should 
be protected where possible. But its very precariousness means we must get women 
into representative democracies and at all levels. This is important for both political 
equality and in terms of symbolism. 
81 M. Warren, 'What Should We Expect From More Democracy? Radically Democratic Responses to 
Politics, ' op. cit., p. 266. 
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Conclusion 
It was suggested in the Chapter One that feminism is on the edge of a new wave, in 
which the politics of citizenship will be central. Most feminists have left behind the 
separatist dreams of the second wave movement and have looked to more inclusive, 
and dare it be said, conventional political models. The aim of this thesis has been to 
show that these changes are desirable, rejuvenating feminist politics and political 
theory. To this end Chapter Two discussed the role postmodern theories have played 
in shifting feminism into this new wave: emphasising the anti-essential nature of the 
feminist political subject, the difficulties in formulating universal, non-contingent 
feminist theories of oppression and the problems of second wave utopian political 
thinking and its denial of difference. However, it was concluded that feminist analysis 
has not become determined by postmodern thought and has developed its own 
concerns and strategies. 
New wave feminists, then, have two political concerns. They want to rebuild 
and nourish a feminist movement of some sort and ensure that women are included in 
democratic models of citizenship as feminists, as well as other types of political actors. 
In terms of rebuilding the feminist movement, it seems likely that any future movement 
will be united as a loose alliance or coalition to take account of the differences between 
women and the varying interpretations of feminist politics that exist. Indeed, it is 
possible that in the diffuse social conditions of Western life, there will never again be a 
structured, widespread feminist movement as there was in the first and second waves. 
In this situation, feminists need to consider other political strategies that will 
incorporate conventional institutions, pressure groups and single-issue politics. These 
allow for a plurality of political spaces for feminists and women after fragmentation, 
reflecting the diversity of their concerns. 
Whatever the future structure of feminism as a political movement, its politics 
will be dynamic, precarious and contingent. Indeed, the history of feminist politics is 
infused with these very features, and they bring to feminist political battles both the 
benefits of flexibility and the disadvantages of fragmentation. However, these features 
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of feminist politics also make it imperative that feminists understand and theorise clear 
institutions and procedures for women's inclusion. Such institutions and procedures 
can stand as other political spaces for women to find a political voice in the absence of 
a feminist movement or even when they feel that a feminist alliance does not represent 
them. For these reasons, feminists in the new wave want to conceive of inclusive 
democratic models of citizenship, where well defined procedures and mechanisms 
ensure that women and marginalised groups have access to decision-making 
procedures. 
Feminists are currently theorising numerous models of democratic citizenship. 
Three of the most important and influential have been considered in Chapters Three, 
Four and Five: Seyla Benhabib's model of deliberative democracy, Iris Young's 
model of communicative democracy and Chantal Mouffe's model of agonal 
democracy. Each of these models has contributed to the concerns of new wave 
feminism, looking at the future of feminist movement politics and theorising how to 
get women included and heard in democratic politics as feminists and as citizens. It 
was argued that Mouffe's model of agonal democracy is particularly important 
because it pays detailed attention to the distinctive nature of the political. She notes 
how political relationships are messy, conflict-ridden and often exclusionary, and 
argues that political institutions need to reflect these features. However, the thesis 
concluded that all three thinkers ultimately desired a transformative kind of democratic 
politics, in which feminist concerns are transformed by the civil process of creating a 
common interest. 
It is not desirable or practicable to expect transformative political relationships. 
Not only does it appear inherently utopian, but it also strips feminist claims of their 
basis in power and positions them as neat additions to the collective, civic good. As it 
was argued in Chapter Five, feminists need to recognise the power and interest claims 
of their political demands, to be aware when they might cause dissent and conflict. 
This type of awareness is important if feminists are to re-engage with politics. In short, 
feminists need democratic models of citizenship that respond to the political as a 
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conflictual, contingent and public process. In this process feminists will confront 
others who will not be sympathetic to their demands and thus it cannot be assumed 
that a transformative political relationship will occur in which conflicts of interest 
disappear. What is more important is that the political relationship is procedurally 
legitimate, that authoritative decisions can be made in the face of conflict and 
compromises reached. Consequently, existing models of representative democracy 
were considered to look at how they met women's concerns as both citizens and as 
feminists with specific political demands. 
There is no disputing the fact that the representative model of democratic 
citizenship is contentious for many feminists. These feminists have tended since the 
second wave to view it as inherently exclusionary, and have instead favoured 
participatory models; working on the assumption that the bodily presence and 
commitment of women is the best way to change attitudes and get women's voices 
heard. Chapter Six therefore trod a somewhat cautious path to defend and open up 
representative democracy to feminism. It explored how representative democracy has 
historically developed into a diverse, dynamic and contingent set of institutional 
practices and theoretical visions. With this type of history, it is able to accommodate a 
range of political actors, with a range of political interests and different levels of 
political commitment. 
It was then possible to show that representative democracy had several features 
that made it distinctive and useful for feminists in the new wave who want to get 
women into democratic politics as plural political actors, as feminists and as citizens. 
At root, the representative model, through the separation between the representative and 
the represented and the use of regular democratic elections, establishes a formal and 
authoritative political relationship. Consequently, women can create this political 
relationship without having to share a common essential identity with other political 
actors in the process. It is also possible to establish the representative relationship in 
relation to a number of different political commodities. Thus, it can stand for the 
representation of numerous private interests, a single national interest or a set of 
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pressure group interests. It is also possible that a social identity can be represented, as 
long as it is recognised that the representative will never be the pure embodiment of it. 
The representative democratic relationship therefore is open to plurality and 
flexibility and is well suited for feminism in a new wave in which women may want 
political inclusion as feminists and as citizens. They can seek representation in terms 
of a number of different elements of their identity and at a number of different levels - 
political party, trade union, feminist alliance etc. - without determining themselves 
permanently in terms of one political identity. Moreover, representative mechanisms at 
the movement level make it accountable; it only speaks for those women who 
participate in its representative procedures. 
This thesis is only the start of defining feminism in a new wave. It has drawn 
together the elements of the past twenty years of feminism and has sought to 
understand them and to speculate about the future of feminist political theory. Most 
importantly, it has suggested that the contingent political conditions of the West may 
not be the worst place for a rejuvenated feminism and that they could actually be 
useful in making feminism more attractive to those women who felt alienated by the 
second wave and its legacy. 
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